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The introduction deals with theoretical approaches to insanity and problems 
regarding the definition of madness in the Middle Ages, especially the difficulties 
in separating the concepts of madness and folly. It is argued that the widespread 
interpretation of madness as a spiritual metaphor has only a limited application to 
late-medieval literature and that there is a need to consider the secular as well as 
the religious import of madness. 
After a brief examination of attitudes towards madness in a variety of 
discourses, the meaning of madness in the medieval romances is considered. It is 
argued that despite the theological significance of madness as a metaphor for 
sinfulness, insanity here may be seen as a sort of social alienation, or even as a 
rejection of civilized values. It is suggested that this revaluation of madness is 
related to the increasingly positive perceptions of the Wild Man, whose 
characteristics the mad heroes of romance share. 
Chapter Three discusses the dream vision of Book I of the Vox Clamantis; 
it shows how Gower repeats the commonplaces of medieval didactic writers, 
regarding the peasant insurrection of 1381 as an outbreak of demonic 
derangement. It is seen that Gower makes use of the 'organic analogy' of society 
to show this madness as an infection of the entire social body. The sufferings of 
the nobility at the hands of the rioting mobs are described sympathetically in terms 
of 'grief-madness'. Thus Gower presents two very different, class-based, attitudes 
towards insanity. The discussion of Chaucer's Miller's and Summoner's tales in 
the following chapter continues the investigation of the link between madness and 
social class. Here it is seen how Chaucer undermines the traditional theological 
interpretation of madness as a punishment for sin by encouraging comparison and 
contrast of the many allegations of insanity in the texts. 
i _... . 
A rather different approach is taken in Chapter Five, which examines the 
major works of the civil servant Thomas Hoccleve. Far from regarding madness as 
essentially spectacular, the apparently insane narrator of Hoccleve's major poems 
stresses that insanity is a hidden and undetectable affliction. This conclusion, it is 
argued, contradicts the standard view of psychiatric history regarding madness in 
the Middle Ages. The relationship between madness, expressions of interiority and 
medieval autobiography is considered. 
The final chapter explores the association of madness, female unruliness 
and mystical rapture in The Book of Margery Kempe. It argues that the Book 
displays two contradictory attitudes towards madness. Kempe is eager to present 
madness as a moral abomination and she frequently invokes ecclesiastical authority 
to do so. Nevertheless, she herself is held mad by many of her contemporaries on 
account of her controversial devotional behaviour; this explains why madness is 
presented positively elsewhere in the Book, as a blessed condition of increased 
spiritual insight. In this sense the Book contains a craftily double-edged attempt by 
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Preface 
Thanks largely to the popularity of books such as Michel Foucault's Madness and 
Civilisation, the topic of madness has in recent years become fashionable in 
philosophical, critical and historical scholarship. As the Introduction to this 
dissertation makes clear, representations of madness in-medieval literature have 
already received attention from several quarters. The present work is a further 
contribution towards an understanding of the meanings -of madness 'in some 
selected works of late-medieval English literature. 
The extraordinary popularity of madness as a theme in late medieval 
literature'is not easily explained, although some excellent attempts have been made 
to do so. Penelope Doob, for example, has argued that the subject of madness 
appealed to a didactic age which found in insanity an ideal metaphor for 
sinfulness. Despite its applicability to numerous works of medieval literature, this 
theory runs the risk of subordinating all medieval representations of madness to a 
single schema. Few attempts have been made to examine madness in the light of 
political ideologies and events or to show how individuals made use of the theme 
of madness in their works. This dissertation proposes that madness in the English 
literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is a manifestation of individual 
and sometimes collective opposition to the increasingly beleaguered social, 
economic and political systems and institutions of the time. This, it is argued, can 
only be shown by looking at literary representations of madness in relation to 
considerations of subjectivity, social class and gender. 
Given the rapid growth of secondary literature about madness in the Middle 
Ages, it is now impossible to write about this subject without reference to recent 
critical ideas about the history of madness. This is the concern of the Introduction. 
As well as discussing various theoretical approaches to the study of madness, this 
chapter also outlines some of the difficulties critics have encountered in defining 
madness. 
The literary works discussed later in this work exhibit a variety of 
conventional ideas about madness. Interpretations of these ideas are often difficult 
or contentious, and not all of them can be adequately dealt with as they arise. 
Chapter 1 therefore aims to give an overview of some of the most common causes, 
symptoms and treatments of madness in the medical, theological and legal texts of 
the late Middle Ages and to discuss their origins and interpretations. - 
The remaining chapters focus mainly on literary texts written in England in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These texts are all concerned with madness, 
either in its physical or its metaphorical sense. The selection of poetic and prose 
works is intended to illustrate the diversity of viewpoints about madness in the 
Middle Ages. In the interests of, concision, however, I have excluded from 
consideration those texts which merely touch on the theme of madness or which 
illustrate points made better elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this 
dissertation casts some light on the significance of the language of madness in 
works not discussed here, such as Pearl or the mystery plays. 
Given the significant generic and stylistic differences between the texts 
discussed here, it has seemed sensible to devote each chapter to a separate author. 
The exception is Chapter 2, which examines the convention of the mad hero in its 
native genre, medieval romance. The romances demonstrate the structural function 
and moral significance of madness in the Middle Ages. Here madness, as in many 
other works of late-medieval English literature, is presented as the product of 
tensions between the individual and society. As such madness is sometimes 
condemned, but at other times sanctioned by the writers of romance, depending on 
their social positions and individual perspectives. 
The following two chapters are concerned with the relationship between 
madness and social class in the works of two contemporary authors. Chapter 3 
shows how the language of insanity is used in Gower's Vox Clamantis to describe 
the rebels who stormed London in 1381. This use of the terminology of madness, 
which is common in clerical rhetoric, eventually gives way to a vision of a whole 
society plunged into melancholic chaos. Chapter 4 focuses on Chaucer's Miller's 
and Summoner's tales, which contain sophisticated satires of the kind of official 
rhetoric found in Gower. 
Chapters 5 and 6, on Thomas Hoccleve and Margery Kempe respectively, 
examine texts in which madness is seen mainly from an individual perspective. As 
well as enduring frequent allegations of insanity, both Hoccleve and Kempe appear 
to have been afflicted with madness. While both authors are aware and make use 
of the orthodox connection between madness - and sin, the very different 
circumstances of their lives, in particular, the difference in their gender, cause 
them to use the theme of madness in unique ways. These chapters emphasise the 
importance of attending to individual experiences, as well as official 
interpretations of madness. I 
1 
Introduction 
Modern Perspectives on Madness in the Late Middle Ages 
Despite the paucity of historical evidence regarding medieval concepts of insanity, 
there is now a formidable number of books and articles on the subject. These 
studies, professional and amateur, span a dizzying range of academic disciplines 
including the history of psychiatry, literary criticism and philosophy. 1 This makes 
the history of madness one of the least clearly defined yet most vibrant areas of 
academic research. We shall begin with a brief overview of previous work in this 
field. 
- This Introduction is not a comprehensive review of scholarship: for reasons 
of space alone, a complete survey of all works touching on madness in the Middle 
Ages would not be feasible here. This discussion is therefore restricted to a small 
number of texts which seem most relevant to the present dissertation. Its aim is to 
outline what certain influential critics and historians have said about madness in 
medieval society and literature and to assess the validity of the various critical 
approaches they have employed. The chapter will also identify and attempt to 
address a number of difficulties faced by criticism in defining madness. 
Twentieth-century discussions of. madness in the Middle Ages have tended 
either to follow or to react against a one-sided Victorian version of psychiatric 
history. Nineteenth-century assessments of medieval attitudes towards madness 
were often disapproving or patronising. The medieval period, when it'was not 
glorified as a vanished age of social harmony, was regarded as a benighted era of 
barbarism and superstition. 2 The psychiatric reformers of the eighteenth-century 
were therefore seen to have rescued the insane from medical neglect. In 1887 
Tony Robert Fleury painted his famous 'Pinel Freeing the Insane', which 
admiringly depicts the occasion in 1793 when the French alienist oversaw the 
unchaining of the mad inmates of the Bicetre hospital. For the Victorian 
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progressivists, as Michel Foucault sardonically notes, the image of Pinel's 
'philanthropic liberation' of the insane symbolizes the beginning of 'that happy age 
when madness was finally recognized and treated according to a truth to which we 
had too long remained blind'. 3 Pinel's English contemporary, the Quaker William 
Tuke, shared in this triumphant - spirit of reform, opening a 'humane' lunatic 
asylum at York in 1796. 
The aims and ideals of these early psychiatric reformers are encapsulated in 
Chapters in the History of the Insane in the British Isles (1882), written by Tuke's 
grandson Daniel Hack Tuke. The book is of great importance for the early history 
of madness. Tuke gathers information about popular medieval cures and remedies 
for insanity and discusses the establishment and early development in England of 
hospitals for the insane. He has often been criticized, however, for his liberal or 
progressive view of the superstitious attitudes of the Middle Ages; although, as 
Micale and Porter justly point out, Tuke's historical account is less progressivistic 
than many critics have wanted it to be, his meliorist assumptions were taken up by 
later historians. 4 
Indeed, the disdainful attitude of liberal psychiatry towards medieval 
explanations and treatments of madness reaches its pinnacle only in the twentieth 
century. 1941 saw the publication of A History of Medical Psychology by Gregory 
Zilboorg, a man 'deeply rooted in nineteenth-century culture' and steeped in the 
major psychiatric writings of that time. 5 Predictably, Zilboorg's extraodinarily 
influential work shares some of the ideological assumptions of ° the 
nineteenth-century tradition of psychiatric history begun in England by Tuke and 
his contemporaries. 6 
It has been pointed out that Zilboorg chose the term 'medical psychology' 
rather than the more common 'psychiatry' because he bel 
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Middle Ages. The titles of these chapters -- 'The Great Decline' and 'The Restless 
Surrender to Demonology' -- amply indicate the strength of their author's 
meliorist assumptions and have helped turn Zilboorg into the Aunt Sally of 
revisionist psychiatric history. 
Zilboorg sees the Middle Ages as an unenlightened era in which the insane 
were treated cruelly and the rational study of psychology was all but eclipsed by 
supernatural explanations of abnormal mental- phenomena. 'Demonology', he 
complains, 'was to rule medical psychology for sixteen hundred years', so that 
'the human side of psychology was overlooked'. 8 It will be seen that Zilboorg's 
bleak account of post-Galenic attitudes towards insanity and his contention that 
demonology governed medical psychology throughout the Middle Ages do not 
stand up to scrutiny. 9 Nevertheless, these perspectives provide a useful context for 
Zilboorg's major project. Having described the plight of the medieval madman in 
the darkest possible terms, Zilboorg charts the triumphant advance` of medical 
science towards a more complete and enlightened understanding of mental illness. 
This is the classic statement of, what is now known as Whig history, the essence of 
which has been crisply summarized by Peter Sedgwick. 'The basic perspective of 
this variety of psychiatric history', writes Sedgwick, 'is, roughly speaking, liberal, 
evolutionist and sympathetic to modern diagnostic categories as the criterion of 
reality against which earlier -discoveries are to be tested and found wanting'. 10 
Other twentieth-century commentators on medieval attitudes towards 
madness have challenged the liberal narrative on empirical grounds. In a chapter 
on the 'Medieval Care of the Insane' (1920), J. J. Walsh warns, presumably with 
Tuke and his followers in mind, that 'only a careful study of the details of actual 
historical references to the medieval care of the insane will serve to contradict 
unfortunate traditions which have gathered around the subject entirely without 
justification in real history'. 11 Walsh argues that the treatment, of insanity in the 
Middle Ages was sympathetic and often effective. He also emphasizes the rational, 
rather than the supernatural, character of these treatments. 12 Walsh concedes that 
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religious or superstitious attitudes were brought to bear on the insane; unlike 
Zilboorg, however, he interprets their influence as essentially benign. 13 
Unfortunately, the evidence from medieval literature often contradicts Walsh's 
optimism. Nevertheless, his account is a useful corrective to the one-sided 
psychiatric history promoted by Zilboorg and his followers. 
Walsh's call for the careful study of historical references to madness has 
been heeded by a number of more recent historians. George Rosen's chapter on 
the late Middle Ages in his Madness in Society (1968) counterbalances the 
excesses of Zilboorg's book by considering various discourses about madness. 
Although a professional physician, Rosen looks at the popular and religious, as 
well as the medical discourse on madness in the Middle Ages. 
Rosen's work helped to shape twentieth-century ideas about madness in the 
Middle Ages and lent methodological muscle to the fledgling discipline of 
psychiatric history. By far the most influential work of the 1960s, however, is 
Michel Foucault's Histoire de la Folie ä läge classique, known to English readers 
as Madness and Civilisation. Acclaimed by Roy Porter as 'the most penetrating 
work ever written on the history of madness', this book diverges more radically 
than any other work from the liberal account of psychiatric history offered by 
Zilboorg. 14 Foucault's central project is to recover what he calls the 'experience' 
of insanity during the Enlightenment. Indeed, it has recently been argued that the 
medieval concept of madness is not Foucault's main concern and that the medieval 
material merely constitutes 'intriguing marginalia'. 15 But the structural importance 
of Foucault's discussion of madness in the Middle Ages should not be 
underestimated. Like Zilboorg's appreciation of medieval 'psychiatry', Foucault's 
medieval chapter serves as a springboard for his discussion of madness in the 
Early Modern period. Also like Zilboorg, Foucault gives the impression'that the 
attitude towards madness in successive epochs was stable, the product of each 
period's monolithic 'world view' or Geistesgeschichte. 16 Despite these structural 
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and methodological similarities between the works of Zilboorg and Foucault, 
Foucault's history of madness turns the liberal or Whig narrative on its head. 
Foucault's ideas about medieval madness are by no means entirely 
original. 17, Nevertheless, they remain so compelling and influential, especially 
among radical critics and philosophers, that they must be briefly rehearsed here. 
While it must be remembered that Foucault is primarily concerned with madness 
in the European and particularly the French Middle Ages, his discussion may not 
unreasonably be taken as a starting point for a consideration of the English 
situation. 
ý- Foucault argues that in the Middle Ages and Renaissance madness and 
reason were in 'free trade'- As he puts it in his earlier work, Mental Illness and 
Psychology, 'madness was allowed free reign; it circulated throughout society, it 
formed part of the background and language of everyday life'. 18 In practical 
terms, this means that lunatics were at liberty to share the streets with the sane and 
to interact with them. As Richard Howard's breezy English translation has it, 
medieval madmen led an 'easy 'wandering existence'. 19 It was only-during the 
Age of Reason, says Foucault, that the insane were deprived of their carefree life 
and began to be confined in institutions extensively and systematically. For 
Foucault, the founding of the H6pital General in Paris in 1656 marks the 
beginning of the 'Great Confinement', a period of some one hundred and fifty 
years during which- the mad -- along with other scandalous embodiments of 
'unreason' such as criminals and the poor -- were incarcerated on- an 
unprecedented scale. 20 
Foucault's powerful, and simple argument has provoked endless defences 
and often bitter attacks, particularly from empiricist historians. A number of 
critics have noted that Madness and Civilisation is ' sometimes factually 
inaccurate. 21 If the book were a strategy or a 'fiction', as Foucault latterly 
referred to many of his texts, this apparent carelessness would not matter. But if, 
as seems likely, the book is the work by Foucault which 'stands closest to a 
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genuine historical endeavour', then Foucault can be accused of negligence. 
22 A 
frequent criticism of Madness and Civilisation is that it is under-documented. 
Some of the treatments for insanity that Foucault sees as particular to the Age of 
Reason, such as the washing of the shaven head in vinegar, are in fact medieval 
commonplaces; it may therefore be suspected that medieval attitudes towards 
madness had more in -common with those during the Early Modern age than 
Foucault leads us to believe. 23 
Moreover, at least one of the practices that Foucault ascribes - to the late 
Middle Ages is plainly fictitious, namely that of exiling the insane on the drifting 
Narrenschiffe. These 'ships of fools', claims Foucault, really, existed outside the 
artistic convention made famous by Sebastian Brant and his contemporaries. As 
many exasperated commentators have pointed out, however, 'there is no evidence 
that any actual ships of fools put to sea with groups of, the mentally ill in their 
indefinite custody'. 24 The critics may have missed the point of Foucault's claim, 
which is so flagrantly false -- and his assertion of it so unusually confident . -- that 
it is presumably meant either as a joke or as an indication that the author is not in 
the business of writing an empirical history. 25 Perhaps, as Allan Megill suggests, 
Foucault should be read 'not literally, but ironically'. 26 , 
However that may be, Foucault's picture of madness and madmen in the 
Middle Ages may not unfairly be seen as a 'romantic chronicling-of decline from 
some previous age of greatness'. 27 In his later work, Foucault implicitly rejects 
his early suspicion that scientific positivism has lead to the alienation of madness 
and his belief that the madman was once privy to truths now denied to him. 28 
Nevertheless, these ideas have been taken very seriously and have been adapted 
and developed by scholars working in many areas. The medieval madman, they 
argue, was considered sacred and enjoyed a freedom which he lost only in the 
Great Confinement. Thus Yannick Ripa, shifting Foucault's schema forward by 
nearly two centuries, asserts that the confinement of women in the nineteenth 
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century signalled 'the end of the image passed down from antiquity of the madman 
as bearer of truths' . 
29 
Other critics have taken up Foucault's early claim that during the Great 
Confinement 'madness forged a relationship with moral and social guilt' . 
30 
Shoshana Felman, for example, writes that 'the medieval conception of madness as 
something cosmic, dramatic and tragic loses, in the Classical age, its 
quasi-religious mystery; madness is now desacralised, and through its exclusion 
takes on a political, social and ethical status'. 
31 This implies, as John Saward 
says, that 'the fool's place in medieval society was, natural and normal; he was 
neither an outcast nor a monster'. 
32 After the Middle Ages, however, fools 
'would not be treated so kindly. No longer would the fool be the guardian of truth; 
foolishness is now a disease or a crime'. 
33 No doubt there is some truth in each of 
these remarks; but a number of. qualifications and objections must be made to 
them. 
First, the permissive and reverential attitude towards madness described 
above is not, in fact, typical of the Middle Ages; it is popular, if at all, only at the 
very end of the medieval period. It was not until the time of Brant and Erasmus 
that there occurred a shift or break in the experience -of madness, after which 
insanity started to be seen as universal and dramatic or satirical. Foucault himself 
makes this quite plain. 'Up to the second half of the fifteenth century', he writes, 
'or even a little beyond, the theme of death rules alone. [... J Then in the last years 
of the century this enormous uneasiness turns on itself; the mockery of madness 
replaces death and its solemnity'. 34 Foucault's followers, however, have either 
conflated or confused the medieval and Renaissance eras: what they call the 
'medieval conception of madness' belongs in fact to a later period. 35 , 
This chronological blurring may be attributed not to a lack of historical 
awareness, but to the difference between the English and French definitions of 
madness. Indeed, folly cannot simply be equated with madness or insanity. In the 
Middle Ages, as today, European languages differed in the extent to which they 
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differentiated madness and folly. In Middle English, the terms 'woodness' and the 
less common 'madness' were generally reserved for the medical conditions of 
mania or melancholia. 'Folly', while it could overlap in meaning with these terms, 
more often denoted any manifestation of irrational or sinful behaviour or the sort 
of satirical folly that became fashionable in the Renaissance. The French term folie 
encompassed all of these senses. 36 
This historical difference between English and French definitions of 
madness is evident in twentieth-century critical works. In English, madness and 
folly are not synonymous. In the French language, however, they are 
indistinguishable; both fall under the umbrella concept of folie. A quotation from 
Jean-Marie Fritz's French-language book on the medieval discourse about madness 
neatly illustrates this point. For Fritz, the heroes of early romances such as 
Chretien de Troye's Yvain and the buffoons of the sixteenth-century satirical plays 
known as the sorties are all fools (fous). 37 In English, however, a distinction 
between these two sets of figures can be made on medical grounds. The deranged 
heroes of the twelfth-century romances are clearly madmen, insofar as they suffer 
from mania or melancholia. The jesters and clowns of Renaissance drama, on the 
other hand, present no such medical symptoms; - in English, such figures are fools, 
not madmen. 
The distinction between the positivist or medical concept of madness and 
the more general notion of folly is common in European languages other than 
French. As David Cooper writes: 
in some languages a distinction is made between madness seen in a 
medical perspective (pazzia in Italian) and a more general sense of 
madness (follia) that is , often, seen as something creative, 
inspirational and often satirical (as in the plays of Pirandello) or the ° 
other madness of the repressive, social system, every form of 
bureaucracy, etc., for which I prefer the English word "craziness". 
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As the German verrückt is opposed to the true delusion of 
wahnsinn. Or like the Latin delusion (de-ludere is to play, or mock 
at fully, differing from delirium -- wandering off the beaten track of 
the plough). In French there is only delire for the two very different 
senses. 38 
Since they do not distinguish between madness in its medical and satirical aspects, 
the French are more inclined than the English to stress the positive associations of 
madness in the Middle Ages. Indeed, the difference in meaning between English 
madness and French folie constitutes more than an interesting semantic distinction: 
it has been largely responsible for the seemingly endless critical controversy about 
how madness was regarded in the Middle Ages. 
In distinguishing between madness or insanity and folly it should not be 
implied that madness in its medical and positivist aspect was always incompatible 
with 'witty' folly. On the contrary, some fictional characters combine the 
deranged behaviour of the madman with the satirical function of the fool. Such a 
figure is the madman or derve in Adam de la Halle's thirteenth-century play Le 
Jeu de la Feuillde. 39 One of the dervd's functions is to provide comic relief, 
humorously wrenching words from their intended meanings in the manner of a 
Shakespearian fool. But the derve also suffers from delusions, believing first that 
he is a king, then that he is a toad, and finally that he is married to his father. As 
Edelgard DuBrock points out, this 'fou is both a real madman and a fool who is 
supposed to amuse. In this latter function he is akin to the court jester as well as to 
the sots in carnival plays and the later sotties'. 40 It is the double nature of the 
derve^s behaviour that leads Michel Foucault to talk of the singularity or coherence 
of the medieval madman -- what Foucault calls his 'densite personelle'. 41 
Nevertheless, DuBrock's comment shows that in the English language at least, it is 
possible and perhaps necessary to distinguish between madness understood in a 
medical context and foolish buffoonery. 
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There are further historical grounds for making a distinction between the 
madman and the fool. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance the fool, unlike the 
madman, was often a professional. The Senchus Mor, a fourteenth-century book of 
Irish customary law, distinguishes between folly, a professional affectation, and 
madness, which is understood as authentic mental disorder. 'A fool', says the 
book, 'is one who earns wages; a madman is one on whom the magic wisp has 
been thrown'. 42 The reference to the 'magic wisp' is obscure; nevertheless, 
'artificial' or affected folly is clearly distinguished from insanity here. In English 
law, too, 'natural', as well as artificial folly was held to be distinct from madness. 
Among literary critics the failure to distinguish between madness and folly 
is particularly noticeable. In a recent essay on Beys's seventeenth-century play The 
Illustrious Madmen, Dominique Froidefond appeals to Foucault to substantiate her 
remarks about the history of madness. Although the ideas she discusses are 
discernible in Foucault's work, they are overstated by her. 'Until the seventeenth 
century', writes Froidefond of the madman, 'he alone had the freedom to do and 
say anything with impunity because he was under the special protection of God'. 
By the time of Foucault's Great Confinement, however, 'he has lost his former 
power and prestige'. 
43, From now on 'the insane are not considered innocent since 
they are responsible for and guilty of their madness. It is the indelible stain of 
their fault'. 44 This view of medieval attitudes towards madness is quite mistaken. 
In general, the medieval madman was not a powerful or prestigious figure and was 
rarely seen as 'innocent'. In fact, one could argue with Penelope Doob that unlike 
the satirical fool, he was held to be 'responsible for and guilty of' his madness at 
least as much as his Early Modern counterpart, although, no doubt for different 
reasons. 45 
The assertion that madness was considered sacred in the Middle Ages, 
then, is somewhat misleading; and it seems to spring from a confusion of genuine 
madness and holy folly. Furthermore, Shoshana Felman's assertion that madness 
had no 'political, social and ethical status' before its supposed exclusion in the 
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Classical age appears to be unhistorical in the light of the literary and social 
evidence. 
Foucault's disciples in the anti-psychiatric movement have also made much 
of the supposed freedoms of the medieval madman. The most prominent of these, 
David Cooper, succinctly summarizes Foucault's history of madness as follows: 
In the Middle Ages in Europe madness was respected as a different 
way of being and knowing, perhaps a privileged -way with a more 
direct access to heaven. It was only after the so-called European 
renaissance, with the flourishing of mercantilism and the earliest 
beginnings of capitalism, that, in the -seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the process of exclusion of the mad began. 46 
It is easy to see the appeal of Foucault's argument for radical historians and 
critics. For Cooper and many others, the advent of capitalism marked the 
beginning of the banishment of the insane. This view, is consistent with the 
widespread romantic tendency to regard the modern madman as a misunderstood 
social marginal or even a dissenter. 47 But Cooper's bold claims have not gone 
unchallenged. The historian Roy Porter has shown that in England nothing like 
Foucault's 'Great Confinement' occurred until the early nineteenth century, and 
that when it did, the nature of confinement -- and the reasons for it -- were quite 
different from those described by Foucault. 48 Moreover, the insane were 
sometimes incarcerated in the later medieval period. As Sedgwick puts it, 'the 
beginnings of the new ban on insanity occur before the Age of Reason itself. We 
see it in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance'. 49 It is for this reason that 
medieval texts such as The Book of Margery Kempe can present the radical or 
critical aspects of insanity. 
So much, then, for the simplistic view of the medieval period as a 'Golden 
Age of permissiveness towards insanity'. 50 This romantic picture of the Middle 
12 
Ages cannot be accepted any more than the dystopic vision of Zilboorg. One 
important way of discovering medieval attitudes towards madness, it is suggested 
here, is to examine the literary evidence; indeed, much of the most valuable 
research into the subject of madness in the Middle Ages has been done by literary 
scholars. Neither Zilboorg nor Foucault examines medieval literature in much 
detail for evidence of attitudes towards insanity. Had they done so, they might 
both have arrived at rather different accounts of the medieval relation to madness. 
In the last thirty years there has appeared a number of works dealing 
specifically with madness in medieval literature, such as Judith Neaman's doctoral 
dissertation, The Distracted Knight (1968). Neaman follows her discussion of 
theological, legal and particularly medical perspectives on madness with an 
examination of literary texts -- all, as her title suggests, medieval European 
romances. With admirable efficiency, she sets out the various medical categories 
of madness, demonstrating, in the words of her later work, that 'medieval men 
knew what insanity was'. 51 By emphasising the rigour of medieval medical 
categories of madness, Neaman takes a quite ' different line from-Foucault, who 
regards the positivist accumulation of knowledge about madness as a post-medieval 
development. Neaman also argues, contra many of Foucault's followers, that 'in 
Christian medicine, as in Christian theology, true madness was never divine'. 52 
This is a provocative statement, whose implications are examined in Chapter 6; 
but it is closer to the truth than the more widespread view that, madness was 
respected in the Middle Ages. 
Along with recent, thorough studies of madness and folly by Jean-Marie 
Fritz and Muriel Laharie in France, Neaman'slater book, Suggestion of the Devil 
(1975), is one of the most important contributions to the understanding of 
medieval concepts of madness. The book covers the historical genesis of madness 
in medical, legal and social discourse. Neaman takes pains to emphasize the 
similarities between ancient and modern attitudes to madness. Such a long 
perspective is a welcome corrective to the unconvincing view, encouraged by the 
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followers of Foucault, that the medieval and the modern experiences of madness 
are essentially different, separated by an absolute 'epistemological break'. 
Nevertheless, Neaman remains sensitive to the differences, as well as the 
similarities, between medieval and modern attitudes. 53 
Neaman's taxonomical rigour is typical of Anglo-American studies of 
madness in the Middle Ages. The best known and respected of these is Penelope 
Doob's scrupulous study Nebuchadnezzar's Children: The Conventions of Madness 
in Middle English Literature, a scaled-down version of Doob's doctoral 
dissertation. 54 Both Doob's approach and her conclusions differ radically, 
however, from Neaman's. Although she mentions clinical and religious forms of 
insanity, Doob focuses on the grave moral implications of madness which, she 
argues, was almost always seen as a consequence of spiritual' turpitude. 'It is 
always the madness of sin that is most important', she writes, 'giving power and 
meaning to all cases of madness'. 55 
Like Neaman's The Distracted Knight, Doob's book is concerned primarily 
with the theme of madness in literature. After a discussion' of the causes, 
symptoms and cures for madness in the Middle Ages she applies her findings to 
the romance Sir Orfeo, Hoccleve's poems and the figure of Herod in the drama. 
Clearly; the present dissertation overlaps with Doob's in several ways; Doob's 
methods and conclusions, however, differ from mine. 
Doob's central thesis -- ý that madness in medieval literature has almost 
always a negative moral significance -- is convincing to an extent. It is doubtful, 
however, that this is the only meaning madness had in the Middle Ages. Doob's 
sources, as she says in'her doctoral dissertation, are various, including 'the Bible, 
and Apocrypha, commentaries, saints' lives, penitential manuals, sermons, 
exemplum books, romances, physiological and theological treatises'. 56 Her 
emphasis, however, is primarily on religious rather than secular attitudes towards 
madness. For Doob, the Church's view of madness as a divine punishment for sin 
is the way madness 'was seen' in the Middle Ages. This assumption, however, 
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allows the moral interpretation of madness too much purchase. Doob claims, for 
example, that even medical discussions of madness were subordinated to moral 
exegesis. It is true that Bartholomeus Anglicus -- Doob's chief medical authority -- 
begins his section on frenzy with a quotation from Deuteronomy. 57 Nevertheless, 
this quotation, however prominent, can hardly be said to govern Bartholomeus's 
thinking about madness. Indeed, Bartholomeus's biblical quotations are few and of 
no substantial importance; he is clearly not attempting to subordinate medical 
knowledge to a theological framework. Richard Neugebauer is closer to truth 
when he writes that Bartholomeus 'espoused a naturalistic theory about the origins 
of madness'. 58 Like most major medieval medical works, Bartholomeus's book is 
primarily rational and descriptive rather ý than moral and didactic; even the 
arch-progressivist Gregory Zilboorg concedes that Bartholomeus's ideas are 
'classical, reasonable, and extremely advanced for his age'. 59 
The practice of applying the theological conventions of madness to all 
medieval literature works both to homogenize texts and to oversimplify the picture 
of madness in the Middle Ages. In short, text and context are intelligible only in 
terms of one another. The danger of 'such an approach is that it draws the critic 
into a hermeneutical circle, so that flexible interpretation and the recognition of 
textual difference become impossible. 60 Unfortunately, it cannot be assumed that 
interpretations or uses of madness in medieval texts will always conform neatly to 
the writings of the Church Fathers. To make this assumption is to expose oneself 
to the criticisms which have often been levelled against so-called 'exegetical' 
critics in recent years. 61 Although, as Albert Friedman points out, Doob 
'explicitly forswears Robertsonianism', she nevertheless makes the fundamental 
exegetical assumption that medieval authors were so informed by the Christian 
essentialism of their age that their texts can carry only Christian meanings. 62 
Important as such meanings are, other aspects of madness must be 
examined if we are to construct accurate and meaningful interpretations of literary 
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texts. Recent criticism has all but destroyed the once entrenched myth of the 
Middle Ages as a period of Christian essentialism. As Derek Pearsall warns, 
not many things in medieval scholarship are easier than, to multiply 
annotations from the Patrologia Latina, and the sanctification 
offered to every literary interpretation derived therefrom does away 
with the need, and then the desire, for flexibility and sophistication 
in a specifically literary response. 63 
While acknowledging the views of the Church Fathers about madness, critics 
should not allow patristic writings to foreclose their interpretations of madness in 
works written a thousand years after Augustine. This ' is not so much a spurious 
justification for interpretative anachronism as a recognition of the diversity of 
meanings in medieval texts. Chaucer, to take one example, is concerned in the 
Miller's and Summoner's tales not only with the traditional didactic value of 
madness, but also with the particular relation between insanity and social class 
around the time of the Peasants' Revolt. 
Similarly, in the works of Thomas Hoccleve and Margery Kempe, specific 
medical, social and economic explanations of madness co-exist, and often overlap 
with conventional moral understandings of madness. Both writers may be 
Nebuchadnezzar's children, but they are also children of their age. It-is difficult to 
understand the function of madness in the works of either without considering the 
social conditions which led them to write about madness. For these reasons, this 
dissertation is concerned not only with the moral significance of madness in 
medieval texts, but also with the relationship between madness and matters of 
gender, social class and subjectivity. Such concerns are not simply marginal issues 
or historical footnotes; they are the very stuff of history. An approach which takes 
account of them must be sensitive to the particularity of texts and be 
methodologically adaptable. Some chapters of this dissertation spend considerable 
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time discussing the formal features of texts; in others it has seemed necessary to 
concentrate more on the exploration of a text's historical, milieu. As Sheila Delany 
says, 'culture is not monolithic: why should our methods be? ', 64 
In one of her more theoretical reflections, Doob hints at a central problem 
of the interpretation of madness. 'The simple fact of madness', she says, 'is like 
the fact of a biblical narrative: it is nothing until it is fleshed out with 
interpretation'. 65 The simile ' here may encourage the charge of Christian 
essentialism, for it suggests that madness, like a biblical narrative, could be 
properly interpreted in the Middle Ages only in Christian terms. Doob's comment 
also poses an interpretative paradox: how can the 'fact' of madness be 'nothing'? 
On the one hand, the word 'fact' suggests a positivist methodology, according to 
which madness is objectively and transparently 'there', an undifferentiated 
phenomenon that precedes subjective interpretation; on the other hand, Doob's 
major point seems to be that madness must be constructed. 
The ambiguity of Doob's formulation encourages consideration of the 
ontological status of madness, an issue that has bitterly divided psychiatric 
historians in the twentieth century. Michael MacDonald points out that until fairly 
recently most historians of psychiatry V 
have been philosophical realists: they generally believe that mental 
illnesses are actual diseases that can be identified in historical 
sources. They may grant that names of mental maladies changed 
over time, and so did the interpretations that succeeding eras placed 
on them, but they regard madness itself as a timeless and universal 
phenomenon. 66 
But mental illnesses, as the radical psychiatric 'revisionists' tend to argue, may 
alternatively be seen as historically contingent 'labels that authorities and laymen 
use to stigmatize certain kinds of unacceptable behaviour'. 67 Since neither of these 
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ways of looking at madness is invalid, what is needed is some sort of 
rapprochement between the two opposed schools of thought. 
Universalist and positivist approaches to the history of madness are 
common. In her ambitiously wide-ranging book Madness and Literature, for 
example, Lillian Feder treats irrationality not so much as a social construction, but 
-- as she writes in a passage on Thomas Hoccleve -- as an ahistorical or 'perennial 
determinant of human nature'. 68 For Feder, whose chief theoretical debt is to the 
ahistorical psychoanalytical ideas of Freud and Jung, madness has essentially the 
same form and function in the poems of Allen Ginsberg as it does in ancient Greek 
drama. But while there may be many similarities among the representations of 
madness of very different cultures, the specific historical and social factors that 
shape concepts and experiences of madness in any particular context must not be 
ignored. 
The tendency to globalize the concept of madness has affinities with the 
desocialising methods of positivist psychiatric history. Basil Clarke discusses the 
history of madness from a medical perspective, apparently confident that this can 
be easily kept apart from history. 'The socio-cultural context and the evaluations 
which decide the form of the conscious historical record'; writes Clarke, 'are an 
archaeological stratum overlying the biological'. 69 Elsewhere he writes that 
the separateness of the rationalistic, (including the medical) and 
spiritist approach [... ] can facilitate getting beyond the many 
accounts of church miracles or apparent medical crudities, for 
example, which tend to prevent enlightenment about what had really 
happened. 70 
Clarke is right about one thing here: in the Middle Ages supernatural and rational 
explanations of madness were separable. Nevertheless, there is a certain naivety in 
his confidence that the historian of psychiatry can arrive at 'enlightenment about 
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what had really happened' simply by weeding out cultural specificities from the 
historical record. In fact, such an approach would leave nothing to examine; the 
historian of madness must acknowledge that his subject exists ý at the crossover 
between biology and culture. 7' 
Retrospective clinical diagnosis in historical cases is sometimes , possible 
and even unavoidable. Indeed, although our cultural formations have transformed 
at a far greater rate than our biology, a thoroughgoing relativism with regard to 
the human mind is as worthless as any universalist psychiatry. As Nancy Partner 
says, 
the objection that we are making an unwarranted assumption in 
thinking that the - human , mind was essentially the same over 
centuries of changing culture is a counsel of utter despair., If the 
deep structure of human experience could change so rapidly and 
profoundly, altered by the comings and goings of institutions and 
beliefs, then there could be no discipline of history at all, and our 
endowment of memory [... ] would-be a cruel deception. As it is, 
every historian brings some notion of psychology to the 
understanding of persons encountered through evidence. 72 
This means assuming the existence over time of at least some psychological and 
physiological constants. It is quite reasonable, therefore, to diagnose Margery 
Kempe as suffering from a severe postpartum psychosis. Moreover, as is argued 
later, Kempe's experience of madness interestingly parallels that of many women 
in later times. 
Present-day diagnoses are of limited value, however, to the interpreter of 
six hundred year-old texts. The categories and terminology of modern psychology 
cannot explain medieval madness better than those of the Middle Ages; there is no 
substitute for close attention to the historical milieu of madness. A glance at the 
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sterile attempts of psychiatrist-critics to 'diagnose' illnesses in literary figures 
according to modern psychological categories reveals the dangers of 
anachronism. 73 'Scientific finality in the description of mental illness', says 
Duncan Salkeld, 'is not a goal worth striving for and a pragmatic approach in such 
matters would seem more viable'. 74 This means recognising the limited purchase 
of twentieth-century concepts such as 'schizophrenia', 'personality disorder' or 
even 'mental illness' in the historical study of madness. 
The majority of historians of psychiatry would now doubtless agree with 
Michael MacDonald that 
retrospective diagnosis, while` not necessarily invalid, yields 
disappointing results. A more fruitful approach to the history of 
insanity is to try to account for the shifting stereotypes of mental 
disorder by placing them in their historical and cultural context 
rather than trying to "read through" them, as it were. 75 
After all, as MacDonald points out, historians do not study insanity itself 
(whatever that may be), but other people's observations of the insane. The 
rejection of a thorough-going psychiatric positivism does not imply that mental 
illnesses do not really exist. It is simply that we must be more flexible in our 
thinking about insanity. Historians should think of madness 'like heart-failure or 
buboes, as a physical fact; but interpret it, like witchcraft. or possession, 
principally as a socially-constructed fact'. 76 Margery Kempe's psychosis is 
presented as a 'physical fact'; but it is also an equally real social construction. 
This emphasis on the constructedness of madness, of course, does not 
imply that madness is not real to its sufferer, or that first-person experiences of 
madness are irrecoverable. Yannick Ripa writes that 
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We should always remember that there are two ways of looking at 
madness: it can be observed from the outside or experienced from 
the inside. The difference between experience and observation is 
always passed over in silence and the hidden story of madness is 
never told. 77 
Ripa's distinction between first and third person observations of madness, however 
schematic, is legitimate. The validity of first person accounts of madness in the 
Middle Ages, however, has been undermined in recent years for two not. unrelated 
reasons. First is the prejudice that madness cannot be perceived by its sufferer; 
second is the antihumanist premise that medieval people had no concept of 
subjectivity or interiority. Both of these assumptions, it will be seen, are 
untenable. In fact, it will be argued that madness in the late Middle Ages was 
often experienced and articulated as a problem of the subject in relation to his or 
her community. This study of madness will examine not only how the mad were 
seen, but also, insofar as it is possible and relevant, how they saw themselves and 
their sickness. 
The preceding discussion has, it is hoped, indicated some of the major 
problems raised by the most important secondary texts on madness in. medieval 
literature. Chief among these, perhaps, is the lack of critical consensus about the 
definition of madness. This might be overcome if commentators agreed to 
distinguish, albeit weakly, the concepts of madness and folly. To fail to do so is 
simply to ignore an important medical, legal and literary distinction of the Middle 
Ages. The focus of this dissertation is madness -- acquired melancholia or mania -- 
rather than folly or idiocy. 
Another general problem is that assumptions about what madness is, how it 
was interpreted in the Middle Ages, and how best to discover its meaning have too 
often been governed by reductive or totalizing theories. Madness was not regarded 
with unmitigated horror, as liberal historians have tended to insist; nor was it 
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generally seen as a mark of innocence and sanctity, as the disciples of Foucault 
have implied. In fact, the texts considered in this dissertation display a range of 
often contradictory attitudes towards madness. 
As far as method is concerned, criticism often fails to appreciate the 
specificity of literary texts. The full significance of madness in literature cannot be 
elicited simply by applying the pronouncements of the Church Fathers to a variety 
of texts. Certainly, in order to understand the various meanings of madness in 
medieval texts it is necessary to take into account both theological and medical 
ideas about madness, ideas which remained remarkably stable throughout the 
Middle Ages and achieved the status of conventions. But the specific material 
conditions that could lead to madness and the various social, psychological and 
political motivations underlying allegations of insanity must also be considered. 
While this dissertation does not espouse any particular theoretical approach, its 
recognition of authorial intention as well as its insistence on the necessity of 
historical awareness in the interpretation of texts aligns it with so-called New 
Historical principles and methods. 
It has also been argued here that while we should not reject the idea of 
'universal' diseases, we can only properly understand madness by examining it in 
its historical context. Finally, we must allow that we can find out things about 
madness through first person, as well as third person observations: no-one has a 
monopoly on knowledge about madness. It will be seen that many medieval 
representations of insanity are concerned with the tension between public 
perception and private experience. 
This Introduction has argued for an opening out of the discussion of 
madness in the Middle Ages and for a flexible and historically aware consideration 
of literature which resists any kind of reduction. This is not to say, of course, that 
medieval texts shared no common ways of understanding insanity. Since it is 
impossible to decide what differentiates texts without first considering what unites 
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them, we shall begin our study of literary texts with an examination of some 
conventional ideas about madness in a variety of discourses. 
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Chapter 1 
Madness in the Late Middle Ages: 
Conventions, Practices and Attitudes 
It is neither possible nor necessary here to provide a detailed analysis of medical, 
theological or legal ideas about madness in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, a brief 
description of the conventions of madness in all areas of medieval culture will 
enable us more easily to identify representations of madness in the following 
chapters and to place them in a broader historical context. Naturally there are 
pitfalls in constructing such a 'backgrounds' chapter. Criticizing certain scholarly 
works about madness in Renaissance literature, Carol Neely has warned that 
medical theory, for example, is too often conceived of 'as a unified, ` unchanging 
body of material that literature reflects or draws on'. 
I Neely's comment is perhaps 
less relevant to the medievalist than' to the Renaissance scholar: the comparative 
stability of medieval medical -- and, for that matter, theological -- ideas about 
madness partly legitimizes a 'blanket' approach. Moreover, the proposition that 
literature 'reflects' medical ideas is not untenable. Neely is correct, however, to 
imply that medical theory is not necessarily homogenous. A reflection on the 
significance of the conventions of madness will support the argument that there 
was a diversity of attitudes towards madness during the late medieval period, all of 
which might be manipulated by literary authors. 
From the beginning of the Middle Ages, ' didactic writers regarded all 
disease as a divine punishment for sin. lElfric tells how a man who joked that he 
was St Swithun was struck lifeless and recovered only when he confessed his sin at 
the saint's shrine. 2 Abbot Leofstan of Bury Saint Edmunds, meanwhile, was 
afflicted with various illnesses, including madness, as a punishment for an act of 
impiety. 3 Madness was a punishment for sin in literature as in life. The 
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graphically described physical and mental sufferings of Herod described in 
numerous medieval works are always seen as the consequences of spiritual 
turpitude. Bede, meanwhile, relates how the seventh-century king Eadbald was 
punished for incestuously marrying his father's second 'wife. 'His immorality', 
writes Bede, 
was an incentive to those who had [: `.. ] submitted to the discipline 
of faith and chastity, to revert to their former uncleanness. 
However, this apostate king did not escape the scourge of God's 
punishment; for he was ' subject to frequent fits of insanity and 
possessed by an evil spirit. 
4 
Here, again insanity is presented not only as the punishment of an individual 
sinner, but also as a dire warning to others to avoid the temptations of sin. 
Such cautionary tales are equally widespread in the late Middle Ages., A 
grim cautionary story from John Mirk's Festial must suffice to convey the 
powerful medieval association between madness and sin. 
Ther was a man, a curset lyuer, pat was an officer to a lord. And as 
he rode to a maner of De lordes, he fell wod, and so vnbrydylt his 
hors pat bare hym into a maner of De lordes. But when he come yn, 
anon De bayly sagh what De man ayled, and made anon his hynes 
bynd hym to a post in De berne. Then when De bayly had ysoupyd, 
he bade on of his hynes go loke how pys man dyd. And when he 
come to De berne, he segh pre grete doggus as blacke as a cole on 
yche a side plucke away hys flesche. [... ] Thus who so lyueth a 
fowle lyfe, he may be sure of a foule ende. 5 
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As so often in medieval literature, madness here is only one element of a divine 
punishment that ends in grisly death. Although madness could be seen as a test for 
improving the just, it was more commonly seen in didactic literature as a token of 
moral taint. 'To the mediaeval mind', summarize Claridge, Pryor and Watkins, 
'madness was a direct result of, and punishment for, unacknowledged or 
unrepented sin'. 6 
The connection between sin and madness is made clear in the Old 
Testament. Zechariah prophesizes that those who attack Jerusalem will be 
punished with insanity: 'On that day, says the Lord, I will strike every horse with 
panic and its rider with madness' (Zechariah 12: 4). In Deuteronomy, which rests 
on ancient tradition, Moses warns his people that if they 'will not obey the voice 
of the Lord your God or be careful to do all his commandments and his statutes 
[ ... ] the Lord will smite you with madness and 
blindness and confusion of mind' 
(Deuteronomy 28: 15,28). The latter passage is used by the thirteenth-century 
writer - Bartholomeus Anglicus in his preface to his discussion of madness, 
suggesting the influence of biblical tradition on medieval concepts of madness.? 
Original Sin, it was thought, disposed all men to madness. Indeed, 
medieval theologians and didactic writers often attributed all disease to the Fall, 
even if they also discussed madness in terms of its immediate physical causes such 
as a psychological disturbance or an imbalance of the humours. Humoral theory 
stated that all illness is caused by a disequilibrium in the balance of the four 
humours: blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile, the melancholy humour. 
Before the Fall, men's bodies combined these humours in ideal proportion and 
were therefore free from infirmities. According to the twelfth-century theologian 
Hildegard of Bingen, the Fall led to a surplus of the melancholy humour in 
Adam's body. This imbalance disposed him to illness and melancholy madness. 8 
The Fall also caused mental derangement by altering man's psychology. In 
the Galenic 'three-ventricle' psychological theory, the brain was divided into three 
areas. The rear ventricle was memoria. The middle ventricle, known as cogitativa 
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or imaginativa, contained the faculty of reason or estimation; disorders of this 
faculty caused melancholia. The front or anterior ventricle housed the faculty 
called imaginatio or phantasia, disorders of which resulted in mania. 9 This model 
is widespread in the literature of the late Middle Ages. The author of the 
fourteenth-century mystical treatise The Cloud of Unknowing attributes mental 
disorder to the Fall. The prelapsarian imaginatio, he explains, was 'obedyent vnto 
Pe reson' such that no 'vnordeynde ymage' was possible. 'Bot now!, he laments, 
'it is not so'. Man's first sin has irrevocably altered his physiology so that, unless 
carefully governed by -reason, his imagination leads him into the error of 
madness. 10 
Original Sin, then, is important in -the sense that it -'created that 
physiological degeneration which would incline man to, sin and serve as a 
mechanism through which additional sins might bring about earthly punishment 
[... ] without - God's direct intervention'. 
I I Dishearteningly, this physical 
imperfection could only become more acute as history unfolded: the myth of the 
postlapsarian world's gradual decline implied a corresponding degeneration of 
man's mental and physical condition. 12 
For medieval theologians and didactic writers, then, all disease results from 
sinfulness, whatever its instrumental causes; in this sense, all men are born with a 
predisposition towards madness. Nevertheless, insanity, unlike idiocy, was thought 
to be acquired rather than congenital. In the seventh century, Isidore of Seville 
distinguished insania; an acquired mental disease, from amentia, a congenital 
intellectual deficiency. 13 Although these categories soon fell out of official use, by 
the thirteenth century madness and idiocy were widely distinguished along the 
same lines: idiocy or 'natural folly' was considered to be an insuperable condition 
of intellectual subnormality; madness, on the other hand, was acquired postnatally 
and was seen as essentially temporary. This distinction was particularly important 
in legal contexts, since the property of idiots, but not that of madmen, was 
alienated to the crown for their lifetimes. 14 English law was therefore mainly 
36 
concerned with establishing idiocy; medical and literary authors, meanwhile, 
displayed far more interest in madness. 
If theology tended to reduce the explanation of madness to the presence of 
sin, medical and literary texts emphasized the diversity of the instrumental causes 
of madness. Perhaps the best guide to medieval medical ideas about madness is 
provided by the friar known as Bartholomeus Angliciis in his De Proprietatibus 
Rerum, a popular thirteenth-century encyclopaedia translated' into English by John 
Trevisa at the end of the following century. Bartholomeus was perhaps the most 
widely read authority on madness in the late Middle Ages and his ideas about 
madness, -which -are ý mostly derived, from classical medical authorities, may 
therefore be taken as typical of his time. 15 There are, explains Bartholomeus, two 
main sorts of 'madness, 'madnes bat hatte mania and madnes bat hatte 
malencolia'. 16 These two distinct forms of madness, we have, already noted, 
affected different areas of the brain: mania was a disorder of the' imagination, 
melancholia of the reason. This basic division of madness into mania and 
melancholia, and the psychological model which underpins it, is central in most 
writings about, madness in the Middle Ages. Although the three-ventricle 
psychological schema did not persist in Western thought as long as humoral 
theories, it was more widely understood in the Middle Ages and is particularly 
prominent in medieval literature. 17 
Bartholomew lists a number of the instrumental causes of both mania and 
melancholia. 'Pese passiouns', he says, 
comep somtyme of malencoly metis; and somtyme of dringke of 
stronge wyn that brennep be humours and turnep hem into askes; 
somtyme of passiouns of be soule, as of besynes, and grete pou3tes 
of sorwe, and of to greet studie, and of drede; somtyme of be 
bitinge of a wode' hound obir of some obir venemous best; 
sometyme of corrupte and pestilente aier pat is infect; somtyme of 
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malis of corrupt humour pat hap ke maystrie in pe body of man to 
brede siche a sikenes. 18 
The causes of madness, then, were remarkably various: thus Jean-Marie Fritz has 
dubbed the medical discourse on madness 'le discours infini'. 19 Many of these 
causes imply moral fault on the part of the madman. Penelope Doob. even argues 
that madness was always considered as'a sign of spiritual turpitude, regardless of 
its precise instrumental cause. 20 Certainly, as Claridge, Pryor and Watkins state, 
'medical literature, though bound to note and discuss the physiological causes, in 
no way contradicted the strong belief promoted by all other literature of the time, 
that madness was punishment for sin'. 21 
Moral interpretations of madness did not always, however, take priority 
over rational ones. Man existed at the nexus of the natural and supernatural 
worlds. Thus medieval people, like the ancient Greeks from whom they inherited 
many of their medical ideas, could consider the causes of madness in purely 
physiological or purely theological terms or, as is often the case, both. 22 As 
Michael MacDonald explains: 
The traditional medieval and Renaissance model of the universe 
postulated the existence of both natural and supernatural forces at 
work in a hierarchical order of powers and beings. Man existed at 
the point of convergence between the natural and supernatural 
orders, and he was subject to both kinds of powers. This model 
permitted contemporaries to explain mental disorder as the 
consequence of events that occurred on any of the several planes of 
existence, acting singly or in concert. 23 
Man's ability to keep separate the natural and supernatural realms increased with 
the rediscovery of Aristotle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Aquinas played 
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a particularly important role in stipulating what Walter Ullman calls a 'double 
ordering of things', according to which 'full value could now be ascribed to the 
natural and the supranatural'. 24 From this point on the natural world could be an 
object of study in its own right and rational and supernatural explanations of 
madness co-existed in both imaginative and medical works. 
From a modern standpoint, at least, the - most irrational medieval 
explanation of madness is that of demonic possession. According to many 
twentieth-century psychiatric historians, the theory of possession entirely displaced 
rational thinking about madness and became the only available explanation of 
insanity. As suggested in the previous chapter, the prevalence of such one-sided 
views may be attributed to the influential medical history of Gregory Zilboorg; but 
the many historians who have accepted his account without question are equally to 
blame. Despite adducing some contrary evidence, Thomas B. Graham falls back 
on Zilboorg's work to support his contention that in the Middle Ages 'demonology 
[... ] became an unshakable basis for the medieval treatment of mental 
disorders'. 25 For other commentators, the mad were regarded as witches. Another 
disciple of Zilboorg, Derek Coon, asserts that 'abnormal behaviour was attributed 
to supernatural forces such as possession by a devil or the curses of witches and 
wizards'. 26 Similarly, Erwin Ackerknecht complains that 'for over a thousand 
years the mentally ill were [... ] regarded as possessed by the devil and by evil 
spirits, or were considered to be witches or sorcerers who could produce the 
illness in others'. 27 
Each of these statements is in some way misleading. First, the popular 
misconception that madness was associated with witchcraft in the Middle Ages 
may be dismissed as an anachronism. Certainly, allegations of witchcraft were 
made against heretical sects in the late Middle Ages in Europe, and witchcraft 
trials became increasingly common during the period. 28 But witchcraft, it appears, 
was only rarely associated with insanity: very few of the medical, theological, 
legal and literary texts dealing with madness link insanity with sorcery. It was 
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certainly not until the end of the fifteenth century that sorcery became a 
widespread concern. In 1484 Innocent VIII declared war on witches in his bull 
'Summis desiderantes'. Five years later Kramer and Sprenger produced their 
Malleus Maleficarum (Hammer of the Witches), which maintained that disbelief in 
witchcraft was heresy. 29 Moreover, trials for witchcraft peaked not in the Middle 
Ages but in the seventeenth century. In asserting that witchcraft was a, major 
feature of the Middle Ages, then, Ackerknecht and Coon have 'moved history 
backwards, describing the events of the 16th and 17th centuries as if they occurred 
during the ninth through 12th centuries'. 30 Coon and Ackerknecht attribute to 
medieval people the much later concern with witchcraft, rather as other historians 
confuse the satirical Renaissance concept of folly and the medieval concept of 
madness. In both cases, attempts to understand medieval attitudes towards insanity 
have been bedevilled by the inaccurate chronologies of historians of psychiatry. 
Unlike witchcraft, demonic possession did indeed have a relation to 
madness in the Middle Ages and must therefore be explored more fully. Strictly 
speaking, it is misleading to talk of possession as an explanation or even as a form 
of madness: madness and possession were not identical and the causal connection 
between them was reversible. 31 Michel Foucault cautions that many mistaken 
views about madness have been founded on errors and prejudices arising from the 
confusion of madness and demonic possession and reminds us that 'the complex 
problem of possession does not belong directly to the history of madness, but to 
the history of religious ideas'. 32 Nevertheless, the concepts of madness and 
possession are inextricably linked in the Middle Ages. 
The Anglo-Saxons believed in possession by elves: Old English ifig means 
'mad' or 'frantic'. 33 Even after the advent of Christianity, 'diseases attributed to 
"devils" by the Church were still attributed to elves' by the common folk'. 34 
Elf-lore seems to have survived into the later medieval period, but was by that 
time apparently regarded with sophisticated disdain: in Chaucer's Miller's Tale, 
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for instance, John the carpenter is ridiculed for his superstitious belief that 
Nicholas's apparent madness is caused by the operations of 'elves' and 'wightes'. 
More widespread in the late Middle Ages was the entirely orthodox belief 
in possession by demons. In the classical world, of course, possession was not 
necessarily negative: benevolent daemons could inspire artistic creation or 
prophecy, as Plato notes in the Phaedrus. 35 Christianity, however, denied this 
possibility. As Michael Screech puts it, 
the one fundamental change which Christians"were obliged to make - 
to these, Platonic teachings, -- apart from replacing classical 
polytheism with trinitarian monotheism -- was to rule out the 
'possession' of a mortal by those good spirits, those good daemons, 
whom Christians' termed 'angels' ('messengers'). Only evil 
daemons ('devils') can 'possess' a human being. In this way the 
often good classical daemons become the evil demons --of 
Christianity. 36 
For the medieval Church, therefore, demonic possession was intimately connected 
with evil. Accordingly, religious manuals severely rebuke the possessed, although 
the seventh-century Penitential of Theodore, reluctantly concedes that 'if a man, is 
vexed by the devil and can do nothing but run about everywhere, and [if he] slays 
himself there may be some reason to pray for him if he was formerly religious'. 37 
The best-known biblical possession cases were perhaps- those of Saul (I 
Kings 16: 14-23) and the man in the parable of the miracle of the Gadarene swine 
(Mark 5: 1-15; Luke 8: 27-35). Both of these men, of course, richly deserve their 
punishments. Simon Kemp is right to stress that 'demonic possession was not 
thought to involve a witch or other human agent. The devil or devils was assumed 
to act on his or their own initiative'. 38 Nevertheless, possession'could not occur 
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without God's ordination. 39 The good man could therefore be possessed by devils 
only as a test of faith. 
Attitudes towards demonic possession, particularly insofar as it was seen as 
a cause of madness, appear to have varied among different social groups. Traugott 
Oesterreich concludes his survey of medieval cases of possession with the remark 
that they 'are completely similar from whatever century they may come' and 'bear 
the impress of the stability which characterized that period' "40 This-should not 
imply, however, that attitudes towards possession were the same among all 
sections of medieval society. As scholars in many fields are increasingly coming to 
realize, the Middle Ages only appears a 'stable' period when - its contents are 
viewed from a single perspective. All of Oesterreich's examples are drawn from 
Church accounts - of exorcisms; but a brief examination of other sources reveals 
that not everyone in the Middle Ages credited the theory of demonic possession. 
- Demons became increasingly numerous and ingenious in the late Middle 
Ages. 41 They could now enter a person's body and take up residence in, it. In 
most cases, possession was sanctioned morally, as in Caesarius of Heisterbach's 
story about a five-year-old girl who was possessed by a demon. As she was 
drinking milk her father said to her: 'I wish you might eat the devil in your 
greediness! '. Immediately she 'felt his presence and was harrassed by him for 
many years'. 42 Another popular story about possession is found in Gregory the 
Great's Dialogues. A nun wanted to eat a lettuce so eagerly that she neglected first 
to make the sign of the cross over it. She was immediately possessed by a demon 
and suffered convulsions. The abbot was summoned and he prayed for her 
healing, whereupon the terrified devil asked what he had done wrong. 'I was 
sitting on a leaf of lettuce', complained the demon, 'and she came and ate me'. 43 
Such stories combine humour with a deep superstition. Nevertheless, 
another amusing German anecdote from the fifteenth century shows that among the 
educated, at least, demonic possession was not believed in lightly as a cause of 
madness. In his Liber de Reformatione Monasteriorum Johann Busch relates an 
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anecdote about his 'cure' of a possessed woman. An agitated ploughman came 
running from the fields to seek Busch's assistance in curing his wife, whom he 
thought to be possessed by a demon. Examining the woman, Busch concluded that 
the woman's 'possession' was no more than one of the 'many fantasies' which 
tormented her. In order to 'get a whole brain again', Busch advised that the 
woman should keep to a sensible regimen of food and drink, including a quart of 
hot ale taken with butter. 44 The story indicates that belief in possession was more 
common among the uneducated than the learned. 
Examining representations of madness in Shakespeare's plays, Duncan 
Salkeld notes a number of cases of what he calls 'spurious' possession. In such 
cases 'the spiritual potency of - the terms has been "emptied out", to use 
Greenblatt's phrase; not only into the fiction of a play but into the fiction of 
characters - who - either feign - possession, or are= falsely accused of it'. 45 
Representations of possession in medieval literature are generally less playful. The 
ranting of Herod or the fractiousness of Noah's wife in medieval mystery plays, 
for instance, may be attributed to their possession by the Devil. Such outrageous 
behaviour doubtless constituted a moral lesson as well! as a comic spectacle. 
Nevertheless, both Chaucer's Miller's Tale and his Summoner's Tale contain 
examples of 'spurious' possession. By the end of the Middle Ages, moreover, the 
terms used to refer to possession had become detached from their original 
meanings. '"Lunacy" and "demonic possession"', writes Luke Demaitre, 'referred 
more consistently to the intermittent occurrence of the attacks than to their 
respective causation by the moon or the devil'. 46 
Medical writers certainly gave little credence to the theory of possession. 
Popular manuals sometimes discuss the phenomenon, but usually without any hint 
of moral censure. According, to the fifteenth-century Book of Quinte Essence the 
possessed are 
43 
born vndir Pe constillacioun of saturne, Pe wickide planete. Forsope 
to siche men deuelis wole gladly appere, and minister to hem her 
priuy temptaciouns wikinne the cours of her bou3tis, and these men 
pus tormentid wip be passiouns of malencoly comounly speke wik 
hem, stryue and dispute wip hem silf whanne Pei be a-Toone, pat 
ofte tymes obere folk may heere it. 47 
Such men, says the book, are 'turmentid' with 'noyous. ymagynaciouns'; but they 
are not blamed for their conditions. Moreover, the suggested cure for possession 
here is medical, not superstitious. The focus is therefore on the instrumental, 
rather than the original supernatural causes of madness. 48 
The major medical texts of the Middle Ages have practically nothing to say 
about -demonic possession. None of the eminent and' widely-read authorities on 
madness, including Bartholomeus Anglicus, considers demonic forces to play any 
part in the onset of madness. Jerome Kroll, goes so far as to state that 'no major 
medical work taught at the universities prior to the fourteenth century pays 
attention to demonology'. 49 There is, to be sure, a glancing reference to demonic 
possession in the thirteenth-century Compendium Medicine of Gilbertus Anglicus. 
But even for Gilbertus, 'possession was never a central hypothesis'. 50 Basil 
Clarke reminds us that the idea of demonic possession was confined mainly to 
popular tradition and that in the received medical texts explanations of mental 
disorder were 'kept within the framework of a rational pathology. This means 
excluding demonic explanations, and they do not feature in the ' main textbooks, 
though they may be mentioned as believed in by other people'. 51 
Clearly, belief in demonology was confined mainly to popular tradition. 
Abelard's rejection of 'the idea that the devil caused insanity', for example, 
certainly shows his own scepticism about demonic possession; but the fact that 
such denials were felt to be necessary also indicates that such superstitious beliefs 
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were commonly held. 52 We can say, however, that demonic possession, which 
usually implied moral taint, was a far from universally credited cause of madness. 
Attitudes towards madness caused by planetary movements were also 
diverse. Augustine had objected to astrology, of course, because it restricted free 
will. In the thirteenth century, however, Aquinas stressed that a person has 
responsibility even for astrological madness. A person's passions may be affected 
by the movements of the heavenly bodies, but he or she still has the responsibility 
for opposing those passions. In doing so, Aquinas implies, he opposes also his 
will, which is free and 'in no way subject to the movement of the heavens'. 53 The 
wise man, according to the theologians at least, is able to avoid illness. 
The medical use of astrology as a predictional aid to anticipate or pre-empt 
the threat of madness was hampered by the church's suspicion of astrology, which 
was proscribed by canon law. Both Isidore and Bede, -however; acknowledged the 
role of the heavenly bodies in influencing human health. Aquinas even notes that 
doctors now use astrology as a predictional aid; but he also reflects official 
suspicions about the art, warning, 'I do not want you to become the companions of 
devils'. 54 
'Astrological speculation was widely regarded as a token of overreaching 
and deranged imagination. According to Archigenes, for example, madness can 
lead the educated to launch 'into fantastic astronomical or philosophical 
theories'. 55 Christian thinkers regarded such speculation as sinful. For Richard 
Rolle, the practice of astrology violates the first commandment. 'Alswa in is 
commandemente', says Rolle, 'es forbodyn to gyffe trouthe till socerye or tyll 
dyuynynge3 by sternys, or by dremys, or by any swylke thynges'. 56 As the author 
of Dives and Pauper explains, those who 'welyn been of Godys preuy counseyl' 
want to 
puttyn God out of his maieste, out of his kyngdom and his 
lordshepe and out of his fredam and makyn hym more bonde to Pe 
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sterrys an euere was ony kyng or ony lord or ony man vpon erthe. 
They welyn been of Godys preuy counseyl, wyl God nyl God, and 
rewlyn hese domys. 57 
It is presumably for this reason that the fourteenth-century Canons of Astesanus 
condemns 'the use of the astrolabe for purposes of prognostication' and a later 
penitential requires two years of atonement for 'one who beholds things to come in 
an astolabe'. 58 
Astrological studies could merit the punishment, of madness. Over-curious 
philosophers and astrologers who persisted in their folly risked divine retribution, 
often in the form of insanity. In the eleventh century John of Salisbury wrote 
ominously that he had 'attended the lectures of a very large number of astrologers, 
and known quite a few personally; yet I recall none who persisted long in this 
error, but that in. [sic] the Lord's - hand brought some condign punishment on 
him'. 59 Fra Giordano of Pisa, meanwhile, chastised those who 'want to 
understand by reason what they should hold by faith, and attain to things not 
granted to them'. Such people, he warns, 'break their necks, and go blind and 
mad'. 60 Such is the fate of Nicholas in Chaucer's Miller's Tale. 
Of all the heavenly bodies, the moon in particular was often credited with 
causing madness. -The close connection between madness and the lunar cycle is 
suggested by the Old English adjective monaß-seoc which Toller translates as 
'lunatic, epileptic'. 61 Bartholomeus Anglicus writes that the moon has properties 
that 'ben nou3t ful goode'. Drawing on Ptolemy, he says that the moon causes 
men to become 'vnstable and changeable, and renninge about fro place to place'. 
The moon also has the power to bring about defects of the eye, discomfort, sorrow 
and also epilepsy, the 'fallinge euel'. 62 Indeed, the epileptics of Trevisa's 
translation are Bartholomeus's lunaticis et caducis. 63 
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Like Bartholomeus, William Langland draws attention to the physical 
instability of lunatics and their socially outcast state. But his famous description of 
the 'lunatyk lollares' is admiring rather than condemnatory: 
Ac hem wanteth wyt, men and women bothe, 
The whiche aren lunatyk lollares and lepares aboute, 
And madden as be mone sit, more other lasse. y' 
Careth they for no colde ne counteth of non hete 
And aren meuynge aftur be mone; moneyeles pey walke, 
With a good will, witteles, mony wyde contreyes, 
Riht as Peter dede and Poul. 64 
Langland feels that these harmless madmen have a special dispensation from God 
for, their sins, `For vnder godes - secret seat, here synnes ben keuered'. 65 He 
therefore advises that 'We sholde haue them to house and helpe hem when they 
come'. ' Langland's attitude lends some support to the romantic view of the 
medieval madman as a blessed wanderer. But such views of madness are 
uncommon in the late Middle Ages. Moreover, we should be aware that 'the 
necessity to catechize the common people on charity to the insane suggests that 
such charity was not the rule'. 66 
Explanations of lunacy were complex. In the third century Origen analysed 
the case of a biblical lunatic who was possessed by a demon (Matthew 17: 14-18), 
explaining that the devil makes use of the phases of the moon in order to possess 
individuals. 67 But in the twelfth century Giraldus of Wales, in Daniel Tuke's 
words, 
combats the interpretation of' an expositor of Saint Matthew- 
[Origen], who said that the insane are spoken of by him as lunatics, 
not because their madness comes by the moon, but because the 
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devil, who causes insanity, avails himself of the phases of the moon 
(lunara tempora). Giraldus, on the contrary, observes [... ] that the 
malady was in consequence of the humours being enormously 
increased in some persons when the moon is full. 68 
To be sure, physiological explanations of lunar madness are not the rule: the 
eminent thirteenth-century physician Gilbertus Anglicus, in his Compendium 
Medicine, refers to lunatics as 'possessed'. 
69 Nevertheless, Giraldus's argument 
typifies the late-medieval tendency to keep separate the natural and supernatural 
worlds. 
As well as being influenced by the moon and the stars, the incidence of 
insanity was thought- to vary according to the seasons. Each season disposed 
human beings to a certain type of madness. 70 But all types of madness were 
generally considered more likely to strike in the summer months. In 1270 Norwich 
jail refused to release a homicidal madman named Richard of Cheddestan. 'The 
same Richard is well enough', says an advisory letter from the prison to the court, 
'but it cannot be said that he is so restored to soundness of mind that there would 
not be danger in setting him free, especially when the heat of summer is 
increasing, lest worse befall'. 71 The frenzy of Charles VI of France always 
returned in hot weather. In Capgrave's words, 'as long as be wedir was hote, his 
sekenes cesed neuyr'. 72 Hoccleve's, Complaint also contains the ' idea that the 
summer heat induces insanity. 
Both Hoccleve and Margery Kempe make extensive use of the analogy 
between madness and drunkenness. The association between drunkenness and 
madness, first made in Aristotle's Problems, became remarkably common inýthe 
Middle Ages: William of Conches, for example, compared the frenzied man to the 
drunkard, for whom everything is shifting and unstable. 73 Chaucer's Friar John 
remarks that 'Wyn maketh man to lesen wrecchedly / His mynde and eek his 
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lymes everichon', 74 and the Pardoner quotes Seneca to the effect that there is no 
difference 
Betwix a man that is out of his mynde 
And a man which that is dronkelewe, 
Save that woodnesse, yfallen in a shrewe, 
Persevereth lenger than doth dronkenesse. 75 
Drunkenness was the perfect analogy for madness, since both were manifested by 
essentially temporary bouts of riotous behaviour. 
Drunkenness and madness were also connected causally. The tenth-century 
Persian physician Haly Abbas notes that 'ebriety, if frequent, brings many evils to 
the body, among them the destruction of the ruling power' and 'weakening of the 
mind'. 76 Later in the Middle Ages, Bartholomeus Anglicus describes how one of 
the types of madness he classifies -- stupor -- can result from excessive drinking, 
which quenches the body's natural heat. 77 Such humoral arguments are also used 
by Bartholomeus to explain madness induced by excessive eating. 'If mete and 
drink passeth mesure', he warns, 
moisture waxip to swithe and kynde hete feblip [... ] pat malicious 
smoke [... ] disturbip Pe substaunce and Pe vse of resoun, and ryuep 
and apeirep Pe tongue pat tellith what resoun menep, and makep Pe 
tonge stamere and faille, as it is iseye in dronken men. 78 
From a purely practical viewpoint, alcohol unfitted a man for his public 
duties. In his The Office and Dewtie of Kingis, William Lauder advises that those 
responsible for the selection of priests 'sulde nocht chuse vnto that cure / Ane 
Vinolent nor wod Pasture'. 79 In religious contexts drunkenness is considered a 
moral atrocity. It is in itself the specific sin of gluttony, as well as a cause of 
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further sins. Bartholomeus, for example, warns of the deleterious effects of 
drinking wine: 'wyn makep hem pat drinkep perof wood and out of here witte and 
rese woodliche in obere men'. 80 Drunkenness was also a voluntary rejection of 
God-given reason, rendering it all the more heinous. As Chaucer's Parson baldly 
declares, 'whan a man is dronken, he hath lost his resoun; and this is deedly 
synne'. 81 Thus the drunken man is often likened to a beast. Indeed, the stages of 
drunkenness were sometimes classified according to different animals, a 
convention to which Chaucer's Manciple refers when he chastises the Cook with 
the obscure words, 'I trowe that ye dronken han wyn ape'. 82 As H. W. Janson 
notes, 'being a synonym for "fool", the ape was particularly well qualified to 
suggest the irrational antics of topers'. 83 But since, in philosophical contexts; apes 
were compared to men in all but the faculty of reason, 'the word ape became 
widely used to signify a man who lacks the power of reason'. 84 
Excessive study was considered a common cause of madness in the Middle 
Ages. Unlike the eighteenth century, the Middle Ages regarded the over-use of 
human reason not as the antithesis of madness, but its apotheosis. Michel 
Foucault's comment on the connection between learning and madness in the 
Renaissance -- although suggestive of the satirical spirit of that era -- also holds 
good for the Middle Ages: 
madness is the punishment of a disorderly and useless science. If 
madness is the truth of knowledge, it is because knowledge is 
absurd, and instead of addressing itself to the great book of 
experience, loses its way in the dust of books and in idle debate; 
learning becomes madness through the very excess of false 
learning. 85 
This idea, of course, is a longstanding one. 'He that increaseth knowledge', 
according to Ecclesiastes, 'increaseth sorrow' (Ecclesiastes 1: 18). In Acts, Paul's 
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account of his career before Agrippa attracts the censure from Festus: 'Paul, thou 
art beside thyself; much learning doth make thee mad' (Acts 26: 24). 
The late-medieval emphasis on the virtues of a weak intellect combined 
with a distrust of the learning of scholars to fortify the connection between study 
and madness. Many medieval illustrations picture the fool in a long white gown 
'that has associations both with madmen and with scholars'. 86 Study is posited as 
a cause of madness in many of the literary texts examined here, and is a cause of 
madness in medical textbooks. Study-induced madness could be seen as a 
punishment for the presumption of over-curiousity, although ý medieval physicians 
generally note study as a cause of madness with no tinge of moral censure. 87 
In certain contexts, anger is regarded as a cause, and sometimes a form of 
insanity; according to Doob, ' habitual anger is madness; it is not simply . like 
madness'. 88 Religious writers eagerly made the connection, between ira -and 
madness. According to Dan Michel, ire makes a man 'al oute of wytte'. 89 John 
Mirk, meanwhile, asks the reader of his Instructions for Parish Priests: 'Hast pow 
any tyme be wroth so / pat jay wyv hath be a-go? '. 90 The major medical texts 
seldom mention anger as a cause or a form of madness. In romances, however, the 
common adage ira est furor brevis is often exemplified by the knights who fight, 
in Malory's words, 'woodly' or 'as men outraged of resoun'. The courtly fondness 
for anger madness is also reflected in' Chaucer's Knight's Tale; here the, Temple of 
Mars is inhabited by the disturbing personification of 'Woodnesse, laughynge in 
his rage' (2011). 
Anger could overlap with other passions to produce madness. According to 
Lydgate's account of Herod's life in the Fall of Princes, Herod enters a jealous 
fury following his slaughter of his allegedly adulterous wife: 
Reste hadde he non novther day nor niht, 
Troublid with furye that he wex frentik, 
With dremys vexid & many an vnkouth siht; 
51 
Of cheer nor clour to no man he was lik, 
And eueri moneth onys lunatik. 91 
Herod's subsequent acts of random violence, embellished by Lydgate from the 
historical accounts, ensure that his raging madness quickly becomes a grotesque 
spectacle, like that of the choleric friar in Chaucer's Summoner's Tale. 
Grief, sorrow and fear constitute a further category of causes of insanity. 
In medieval literature; these are most common in the romances, which place 
particular emphasis upon the emotions of their protagonists. Bartholomeus 
Anglicus reminds us that melancolia 'comep of drede and sorwe'. 92 But grief 
could also induce manic behaviour. Thus Jacob, believing his son to be dead, 'rent 
his cloths, and put sackcloth upon his loins, and mourned for his son many days' 
(Genesis 38: 34). -Similarly, Chaucer's Melibee, on hearing of the injury done to 
his wife and daughter, 'lyk a mad man, rentynge his clothes, gan to wepe and 
crye'. 93 
Medieval attitudes towards grief depended largely upon the extent and 
duration of mourning. In the appropriate circumstances, a certain amount of 
grieving indicates a noble sensitivity. As Gottfried von Strassburg notes in his 
Tristan, 'when a man grieves for his friend and acts loyally towards him when he 
has died, this ranks above all reward, this is the very crown of loyalty'. 94 Thus 
Chaucer's grieving Man in Black solicits more sympathy than condemnation, and 
the same is arguably true of Melibee. But although 'clamorous mourning' can be 
seen 'as an edifying thing' in the late Middle Ages, prolonged grief is treated with 
suspicion, especially in the romances. 95 In Chretien de Troyes' Cliges, 
Soredamors' grief at the death of Alexander is so great that she dies of a broken 
heart. Alis and Cliges, on the other hand, are praised for ceasing their grief in due 
course: 'Alisand Cliges both mourned him becomingly, but finally ceased their 
grief, for sorrow, like everything else, must be outlived. To continue in sorrow is 
wrong, for no good can come of it'. 96 
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Medieval theologians stressed the immorality, as well as the mentally 
deleterious effects of excessive mourning. The ninth-century Penitential of Saint 
Hubert, for example, proscribes the outward display of grief: 'If anyone lacerates 
himself over his dead with a sword or his nails, or pulls his hair, or rends his 
garments, he shall do penance for forty days'. 97 When Malory's Lancelot faints 
for grief at Guinevere's funeral, a hermit upbraids him: 'Ye be to blame, for ye 
dysplese God with suche maner of sorow-makyng'. 98 As Doob comments, 
'although literary judgments are seldom so harsh, we must still be aware of the 
possibility of moral fault in characters temporarily mad through grief such as 
Heurodis in Sir Orfeo, the Dreamer in Pearl, or Melibee'. 99 
JA rarer but nevertheless significant cause of madness in the Middle Ages is 
fear, particularly in the context of battle. The convention has a long history. , As 
H. M. Chadwick notes, 'the incident of a warrior going mad in the course of battle 
is of not infrequent occurrence in the Irish stories relating to seventh and following 
centuries'. 100 In the Irish poem Buile Suibhne (The Frenzy of Suibhne), 
battle-madness is an instrumental cause of the hero's madness, which is a 
punishment for an earlier impiety: 
Now, when Suibhne heard these great cries together with their 
sounds and reverberations in the clouds of heaven and in the vault 
of the firmament, he looked up, whereupon turbulence, and 
darkness, -and fury, and giddiness, and frenzy, and flight, 
unsteadiness, restlessness, and unquiet filled him, likewise disgust 
with every place in which he used to be and desire for every place 
which he had not reached. His hands'were palsied, his heartbeat 
quick, his senses were overcome, his sight was distorted, his 
weapons fell naked from his hands, so that through Ronan's curse 
he went, like any bird of the air, in madness'and imbecility. '101 
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Likewise, in Geoffrey of Monmouth's Vita Merlini, Merlin becomes mad after a 
battle. These two poems are the earliest in which the theme of madness is central. 
Although neither Suibhne nor Merlin is entirely blameless for his madness, both 
are portrayed sympathetically. As J. S. P. Tatlock puts it, 'it is highly probable that 
Geoffrey's extremely original and striking poem [... ] started the vogue of the hero 
as madman sympathetically regarded'. 102 - 
Finally, there is 'love madness' or erotomania, which is widely considered 
a form of madness in medieval literature. This belief has been challenged from a 
number of perspectives. Michel Foucault suggests a philosophical reason why love 
was not a prominent cause of madness in the Middle Ages: 'As long as there was 
an object', he writes, 'mad love was more love than madness' " 
103 Nevertheless, 
the insanity of earthly love is emphasized by the churchmen. 'Moral Gower' holds 
that 
Dum carnalis amor animum tenet illaqueatum, 
Sensati racio fit racionis egens: 
Dum iubar humani sensus fascatur in umbra 
Carnis, et in carnem mens racionis abit, 
Stans hominis racio calcata per omnia carni 
Seruit, et ancille vix tenet ipsa locum. 
[When carnal love holds the mind ensnared, an intelligent man's 
reason becomes irrational. When the brightness of human 
intelligence is clouded over by the shadow of the flesh, and the 
spirit of reason withdraws into the flesh, man's reason stands utterly 
scorned. It is a slave to the flesh, and scarcely retains the post of 
handmaiden]. 104 
Insanity caused directly by love, however, rarely features, in medieval literature. 
Chaucer's Palamon may be described by Arcite as 'sik and wood for love' (1600); 
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but in the romances, as Judith Neaman points out, 'love madness [erotomania] 
does not exist'. 105 The heroes of romance become mad not for love, but for the 
loss of love, that is, through the instrumental causes of grief, fear, anger or some 
combination of these passions. 
This brief survey of the causes of madness illustrates the difficulty in 
generalizing about madness in the Middle Ages; nevertheless, it also provides a 
definite conclusion. Although madness was associated with sinfulness in religious 
writing, medical works -- especially the major textbooks of the late Middle Ages -- 
did not usually include moral explanations. Physiological causes of madness were 
not always seen as the mere instruments of higher forces and it is hasty to assume 
that they presuppose wickedness as the root cause of madness. I 
This point is clearly illustrated by the accounts of two famous late-medieval 
cases of madness. Froissart's Chronicles relate that Charles VI of France was 
suddenly struck with delusions and frenzy when on a campaign against the Duke 
of Brittany in August 1392. As Doob writes, 
Charles's case is highly representative of medieval attitudes toward 
madness. Almost every conceivable cause is considered except for 
possession. [... ] More important, the story illustrates the tendency 
of every man to interpret the disease as he wishes: to Guillaume [a 
physician] it is physiological only; to the popes it is moral; to the 
king's brothers it suggests no weakness on the king's part, coming 
instead from poison or from spells cast by political enemies. 106 
Another theory was that Charles's madness was due to his extreme anger at the 
Duke of Brittany, which overheated his black bile. 107 
Attitudes towards the madness of the Flemish painter Hugo van der Goes 
were similarly diverse. Fortunately for the fact-starved student of the history of 
madness, we have an unusually full account of the circumstances surrounding 
55 
Hugo's madness. The onset of Hugo's first psychotic attack recalls that of Charles 
VI's breakdown. While on a journey in about 1480 the painter 'was struck by a 
strange disorder of the imagination. He cried out incessantly that he was doomed 
and condemned to eternal damnation. He would even have injured himself had he 
not been forcibly prevented by his companions'. 108 We might conjecture that the 
painter's madness was in some way related to his 'artistic temperament'. In the 
post-medieval, as in the ancient world, an artist's divine inspiration has often been 
regarded as a form of insanity: Tasso himself associated his poetic gifts with the 
violent psychosis for which he was institutionalized; later, the romantics made a 
sentimental connection between poetry and madness, ' epitomized by the sorry 
example of Hölderlin. But such ideas were not current in Northern Europe in 
Hugo's time. 
After Hugo's death, Gaspar Ofhuys -- Hugo's biographer, and infirmarius 
of his monastery after 1482 -- summarized contemporary opinion about the 
painter's affliction. Despite his feeling that 'only God can tell' what ailed Hugo, 
Ofhuys suggests some possibilities. 'We may thus have two diverse opinions on 
the disease of our brother', writes Ofhuys; 
on the one hand we might say that his was a case of a natural 
disease. [... ] There are of course, several types of the disease 
depending on its original cause: sometimes the cause is melancholic 
food; at other times it is the consumption of. strong wines which 
heat the body juices and burn them to ashes. Furthermore, frenzies 
may occur because of certain sufferings of the soul like restlessness, 
sadness, excessive study and anxiety. Finally, frenzy may be caused 
by the virulence of noxious juices, if such abound in the body of a 
man who inclines to that malady. 109 
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Ofhuys's list of the causes of madness recalls that of Bartholomeus Anglicus; 
indeed, it is by no means unlikely that Ofhuys had encountered the latter's popular 
encyclopaedia through his medical training. The significant point here, however, is 
that all of these suggested causes are rational. 
Othuys was writing, however, as a chronicler as well as a physician. 
Unlike Bartholomew, he records contemporary speculation about the possible 
moral causes of madness. Some of Hugo's acquaintances believed that it was 
God's all-loving providence which had ordained this malady. This 
brother had been flattered enough in our Order because of his great 
art -- in fact, his name became more famous this way than if he had 
remained in the world. But since he was, after all, just as human as 
the rest of us, he had developed a rather high opinion of himself 
due to the many honours, visits and compliments which were paid 
to him. But God, `not wanting his ruin, in his great mercy sent him 
this chastening affliction which, indeed, humbled him mightily. For 
brother Hugo repented and, as soon as he had recovered he 
exercised the greatest humility. 110 
The disagreement about the explanation of Hugo's illness- suggests that by the 
fifteenth century a scepticism about supernatural causes of insanity existed 
alongside less rational beliefs. With the increase in the circulation of medical texts 
in the fifteenth century it is likely that this scepticism filtered downwards to a 
wider section of, society. At all events, the works of writers who lived in quite 
different circumstances, such as Thomas Hoccleve -and Margery Kempe, contain 
similarly diverse explanations of madness. 
In theory, at least, the identification of madness was rather easier than its 
explanation. As Judith Neaman points out, -mental disorders in the Middle Ages 
were 'diagnosed largely by behavioural symptoms which are conceived of as clear 
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and easily recognisable'. 
III Sometimes, however, an individual's speech was 
made the basis of diagnosis. This was certainly the case with idiocy. In 1383 
Emma de Beston of Bishop's Lynn was questioned by a panel in order to 
determine whether she was an idiot. The importance of the panel's decision has 
already been outlined: the property of idiots or 'natural fools' was alienated to the 
Crown. Emma's interrogation, held at St Benedict's church in Lincoln, proceeded 
as follows: 
Being asked in what town she was, she said that she was at Ely. 
Being asked what day that Friday was, she said she did not know. 
Being asked how many days there were in the week, she said seven, 
but could not name them. 
Although she had been married three times, Emma could recall the name of only 
one of her husbands. Her responses to questions about the relative values of 
various coins -were equally unsatisfactory. The interrogating panel found that 
Emma 'was not of sound mind, having neither sense nor memory nor sufficient 
intelligence to manage herself, her lands or her goods'. The record only adds as an 
afterthought the comment that, 'as appeared by inspection, she had the face and 
countenance of an idiot'. 
112 Clearly, Emma's mental condition was ascertained 
principally by an analysis of her thought-processes rather than her appearance or 
behaviour. 
Insanity, however, usually gave itself away. For Bartholomeus Anglicus 
the 'tokenes and signes' of madness 'is diuers, for som criep, and lepip, and hurtik 
and woundil hemself and opir men, and lotiep and hidip hemsilf in pri[uley place 
and hidelis'. 113 These symptoms, most of which are associated with mania, are 
equally commonplace in literature. In Piers Plowman, Langland's 'lunatik lollares' 
leap about the countryside aimlessly. The manias of Margery Kempe and Heurodis 
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in the fourteenth-century romance Sir Orfeo are manifested by self-mutilation and 
screaming. 114 
Indeed, mania was characterized by violent gestures of excess. 
Melancholia, by contrast, entailed the absence of interest and energy, macabre 
thoughts and a tendency to solitary grieving. The madman's desire for solitude 
often causes him to flee civilization and become wild or bestial. The biblical 
prototype for this behaviour is of course Nebuchadnezzar, whose pride is punished 
by madness: 
The same hour was the thing fulfilled upon Nebuchadnezzar: and he 
was driven from men, and did eat grass as oxen, and his body was 
wet with the dew of heaven, till his hairs were grown like eagles' 
feathers, and his nails like bird's claws. (Daniel 4: 33) 
In his Anatomy of Melancholy, the Renaissance physician Robert Burton records a 
number of cases of melancholy madmen who believed themselves to be, and in 
some cases were seen to be, bears or cattle. "Another form of insanity, remarks 
Burton, is lyncanthropy or 'Wolfe madnesse, when men runne howling about 
graves and fields in the night, and will not be perswaded but that they are Wolves 
or some such beasts'. 115 Bartholomeus Anglicus notes that some men in the 
throes of what he calls passio melancolya 'if they here the kockes crowe they 
rereth vp here armes and crowith, and trowith that hemsilf be kockes'. Such 
fantasies, he continues, are based ultimately on biblical tradition, as in the case of 
a nobleman pat fel into suche a madnes of melancolye pat he in alle 
wise trowed pat he himself was a catte, - and kerfore he wolde 
nowher reste but vndir beddes Pere cattis waitid aftir myse. And in 
cas in wreche of his synnes Nabugodonosor was ipunyshid wip 
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suche a peyne, for it is iwriten in stories pat seuen 3ere hym semed 
at he was a best purou3 diuers schappis: Iyoun, egle, and ox. 
116 
Even English legal discourse reflects this association between madness and 
animality. The thirteenth-century legal theorist Bracton saw the civil status of 
individuals as dependent on their possession or lack of reason and he compared 
not-responsible individuals to animals. 
117 This extremely loose criterion attests to 
the medieval West's increasing preoccupation with distinctions between 
civilization and animality. 
Literary madmen such as Chretien de Troyes' Yvain, Merlin and the 
Middle English Orfeo take on the appearance of wild men and wander alone in the 
forests. Particularly moving is the plight of the Middle Irish Suibhne, the 
battle-maddened hero who wanders emaciated and naked through desolate 
countryside in appalling weather conditions, all the time described as a bird. Like 
the beasts, ý madmen lost the power of speech. 'And so if men askep of suche what 
pey drede and wherefore Pei bep sory', says Bartholomeus, 'pey hauep none 
answere'. 118 Thus Malory's Dynadan finds the deranged Lamerok in the forest, 
where 'he lay lyke a fole grennynge and wolde nat speke'. 
119 The muteness of the 
madman indicates both his total separation from social conventions and his 
physical and moral degradation to the condition of a beast. Indeed, the behaviour 
of the medieval madman always betokens a radical loss of identity. The tearing of 
garments, a symptom of grief-madness in many medieval texts including Sir Orfeo 
and Chaucer's Tale of Melibee, is more than a random act of destruction; in an age 
in which clothes supposedly indicated social station, it also signifies an abdication 
of rank. 
Real lunatics behaved like literary madmen. As Jean-Marie Fritz points 
out, the forest is the traditional haunt of madmen in reality as well as in the 
romances: like any romance hero, Charles VI was struck with madness in the 
forests of Northern France. 120 It is therefore extremely difficult to separate 
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conventional and actual expressions of insanity in the Middle Ages. In real life and 
in works of medicine, literature and even law, the symptoms of madness are 
described in remarkably similar ways. All medieval writers were deeply influenced 
by biblical accounts of madness. The behaviour of the possessed man in the 
miracle of the Gadarene swine, for example, resembles both Bartholomeus 
Anglicus's description of mad behaviour and the conduct of the insane knights of 
medieval romance: 'Always, day and night', says St Mark, 'he was in the 
mountains, and in the tombs, - crying, and cutting himself with stones' (Mark 5: 5). 
Such precedents do not account, however, for the ways in which the mad 
were cared for in the Middle Ages. We have already noted that the medieval 
madman did not lead an entirely 'easy wandering existence'. While it may be true 
that, 'in contrast to diehard nineteenth-century interpretations, the treatment of the 
insane in the Middle Ages was characterised by tolerance', the insane were often 
confined or restrained. 121 
Madmen in the Middle Ages were treated well under the law. Measures 
were taken to ensure that the madman's property was not misappropriated or 
misused. In fourteenth-century Bristol it was the custom that 
the mayor must see that his goods and chattels are taken and given' 
to his nearest friends to look after until he recovers his sound mind. 
And his friends must place a sufficient guard on the persons of such 
madmen as will ensure that they come, to no harm or loss and that 
they do not harm to others. 
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This treatment is certainly favorable compared with that of natural idiots, whose 
goods were alienated to the crown. 
If the preservation of the madman's property was a public matter, the care 
of his person was often left to individuals. In the Anglo-Saxon period, at least, 
there is no evidence of a 'regular custom of confining even violent mental patients 
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in churches and prisons'. 123 In fact, throughout the Middle Ages madmen were 
usually looked after at home by relatives or were simply allowed to wander freely, 
especially if they posed no threat to public order. The madman's life was often 
peripatetic: madmen held in town jails were often expelled to other cities at public 
expense, while certain almshouses turned away insane or quarrelsome 
vagrants. 124 Arrangements were flexible and ad hoc. In fifteenth-century Scotland 
a deranged or idiot girl -was sent by her parents to 
be looked after by a gentleman 
on the remote Monarch Isles off North Uist 'lest she should be seen of 
strangers'. 125 This expulsion indicates that the insane were popularly thought to 
constitute an embarrassing spectacle. 
In the late Middle Ages there is evidence that European public authorities 
assumed limited responsibility for the control of the insane. Between 1377 and 
1397, for example, the city of Nürnberg had 37 insane people in its charge. The 
municipal accounts of Hildesheim, meanwhile, show expenditures for 82 lunatics 
between the years 1384 and 1480. Often these madmen were confined: throughout 
Germany in the fourteenth century, madhouses or mad cells were built for this 
purpose. 126 There is also evidence of institutional confinement in medieval 
France. In Caen and St-Omer at least, madmen were confined in towers, as 
Michel Fosseyeux puts' it, 'comme des prisonniers'. 127 The insane were also sent 
for detention at Chätelet of Melun, south of Paris. 128 
In cases of violent frenzy, confinement was combined with physical 
restraint. Here again, imaginative , works reflect the social reality. In the 
fourteenth-century poem Sir Orfeo the madmen lying in the Fairy King's castle are 
casually described as 'ybounde'. 129 Indeed, in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries Bartholomeus Anglicus's injunction that madmen 'be ibounde, pat pey 
hurte not hemsilf and opir men' was put into practice across Europe. 130 When 
asked if he would join the Cistercian order, Walter Map wryly instructed his 
attendants: 'should it ever so happen that I resolutely insist on becoming a monk 
then bind me with chains and fetters as a lunatic who has lost his wits, and keep 
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me in close custody until I repent and recover my senses'. 131 In Mallorca in 
1360, the guardian of a certain 'den Cassellas' was given the following instruction 
by the governor of the island: 'to avoid any danger, we give you permission [... ] 
that the said Casellas be locked up at home or manacled, or whatever you think 
best, and do it in such a way that no harm can be done to anyone by that 
person'. 132 In the Hotel-Dieu in Paris, some of the mad were placed in enclosed 
beds with two observation windows; those in ordinary beds were tied to them with 
strong bonds. 133 Clearly, violent madmen, at least, were distinguished from other 
ill people in late-medieval hospitals. 
Indeed, the hospitalisation of the mad begins not in the Age of Reason, but 
in the late Middle Ages. In 1409 Juan Gilabert Joffre established the West's first 
hospital for the insane. at, Valencia; after being moved at the sight of a group of 
boys stoning and insulting a madman. This famous story, as H. C. Erik Midelfort 
points out, is significant for two reasons: 
first, because it is evidence that not all elements of medieval society 
accepted madness as part of life, and second, because it 
demonstrates that the founding of mental hospitals did not wait for 
the "absolutist" or "bourgeois" repression of the seventeenth 
century. 134 
J. H. Baas long ago showed that special houses for the insane were established in 
various Spanish towns throughout the fifteenth century. 135 
At the end of the Middle Ages the insane in England were occasionally 
confined and restrained in hospitals or prisons: As early as 1216 there was a 
hospital at Chester for 'poor-silly people', a phrase which suggests that the insane 
and the poor were not then clearly distinguished and that wealthier lunatics were 
cared for at home by relatives. 136 But it is only in the later part of the fourteenth 
century that the hospitalization of the insane becomes a major concern. In 1369 a 
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chaplain, Robert Denton, obtained a licence to found a hospital at All Hallows, 
Barking, for 'priests and others, men and women who suddenly fell in a frenzy 
and lost their memories until such time as they recover'. 
137 Salisbury's Holy 
Trinity hospital was also admitting insane patients in the fourteenth century. 
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Bethlem hospital in 1403 contained six men described as menti capti. The 
hospital inventory records 'six chains of iron, with six locks; four pairs of 
manacles of iron, and two pairs of stocks'. 
139 The Historical Collections of the 
mayor of London indicate that by the middle of the fifteenth century Bethlem was 
already receiving significant numbers of insane patients, some on a short-term 
basis, others pending the operation of divine grace: 
And yn that place ben founde many men that ben fallyn owte of hyr 
wytte. And fulle honestly they ben kepte in that place; and sum ben 
restoryd unto hyr witte and helthe a-gayne. And sum ben, a-bydyng 
there yn for evyr, for they ben falle soo mucke owte of hem seife 
that hyt ys uncurerabylle unto man. 
Hospital records note donations for the insane throughout the fifteenth century. 140 
A lazar house -in Holloway, Bath, was 'appropriated to the use of lunatics' 
sometime during the fifteenth century. 
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Baas attributes the belated flourishing of lunatic asylums to ecclesiastical 
prejudice against the insane. This accords only too well with the dubious liberal 
assumption that madhouses were essentially benevolent institutions and that 
sympathy for the insane was impossible until the dawn of the Age of Reason. In 
any case, we have already seen that the medieval insane were not always, as Baas 
claims, 'regarded as persons "possessed" by the devil and his male and female 
assistants'. 142 ` The only clear fact that emerges from a discussion of 
hospitalization is that madmen were not ° always allowed to wander ' freely, 
especially towards the end of the Middle Ages. 
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The mad were not held responsible for any crimes they committed while 
insane, and were simply imprisoned in the interests of public safety until they 
recovered from what was often regarded as a temporary condition. The best 
example is that of the homicidal maniac Richard of Cheddestan, a Norfolk man 
who in 1270 murdered his wife and two children before attempting suicide. He 
was confined in prison indefinitely. Some time later, a letter from Norwich jail to 
local justices reported that 'the same Richard is well enough; but it cannot be said 
that he is so restored to soundness of mind that there would not be danger in 
setting him free'. 
143 The prison in this case seemed to serve as a sort of early 
mental hospital. There is, at all events, no suggestion that Richard's prolonged 
detention had a punitive aspect: if madmen were regarded by moralists as 
responsible for their sufferings, they seem nevertheless to have enjoyed sanctuary 
under the law. 
Confinement and restraint were useful in cases of short-term insanity, 
especially in violent cases; but they were not considered to be cures for madness. 
Yet throughout the Middle Ages physicians battled against madness and argued 
about the best remedies for it. Like the causes of madness, the treatments 
advocated for insanity were sometimes religious or superstitious, sometimes 
rational in character. Moreover, although remedies for madness focussed primarily 
on the body, there is also evidence that what are now termed 'psychotherapeutic' 
practices were applied to the insane in the Middle Ages. As Basil Clarke writes, 
'One conclusion which is certain is that at no point in the Middle Ages will one 
generalisation serve to describe all the formulations and treament of mental illness 
which were being employed'. 
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The only specifically religious remedy for insanity was exorcism. It is still 
unclear how commonly exorcisms were performed and it would be easy to 
overestimate their importance. The Church itself seems to have been unsure of the 
usefulness of exorcism: a decretal of the synod of Reims, for example, warns that 
lunatics are more in need of medical aid than exorcism. 145 At all events, 'insanity 
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was thought to be curable through physical and mental methods without recourse 
to demonology, especially in psychoses which had been caused through emotional 
upset'. 146 Exorcisms are certainly not represented in medieval English literature. 
Throughout the medieval period, and well beyond, popular cures for 
insanity included the use. of herbs, incantantions or holy relics and the visting of 
holy shrines and wells. 147 Such remedies did not, of course, constitute a coherent 
system of treatment and tended to combine rational and superstitious elements. 
The madman in the thirteenth-century French play Le Jeu de la Feuillee is advised 
to go home and take rest after a cure by holy relics proves ineffective. Popular 
remedies often involved physical cruelty: a thirteenth-century window at 
Canterbury depicts a maniac being dragged by his friends to the shrine of St 
Thomas, tied with ropes and thrashed with birch-rods. 148 Many such treatments 
for insanity continued to be used until the nineteenth and even the twentieth 
century. 
In the late Middle Ages, rational treatments for insanity also become 
important. For Michel Foucault, the medieval madman had not yet become the 
subject of positivist medicine. It is certainly true that the ideas of the medical 
schools did not immediately or entirely displace popular religious beliefs and 
practices. Nevertheless, as Brian Stock writes, 'in contradistinction to what Weber 
proposed, the historical evidence suggests that the Middle Ages were the period in 
which rationality began to play a significant role in Western society and 
culture'. 149 From the twelfth century onwards, methods of dealing with insanity 
were transformed as the increasingly important medical schools of Salerno, 
Montpellier and Paris trained physicians in the treatment of madness. 150 By the 
end of the Middle Ages-the growing medical scepticism about supernatural cures 
of madness is reflected in Guy de Chauliac's contemptuous dismissal of the 
'wommen and [... ] many ydeotis or foles, the whiche remitten seke men for all 
manere of sekenesse onliche to seyntes', 151 
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Some of the remedies for insanity in the textworks are bizarre to the 
modern reader. Bartholomeus Anglicus, for example, suggests that in cases of 
frenzy the patient ought not to be shown images, his head should be shaved and 
washed in vinegar and his forehead smeared with the juice of lettuce or poppy. 152 
Nevertheless, it seems that many peculiar and even apparently cruel physical 
remedies for madness were motivated by compassion rather than cruelty and were 
often based on rational principles. 
One such treatment is flogging. Although this practice is not mentioned in 
late-medieval medical texts, it was employed in the Middle Ages, especially in the 
early period. A tenth-century leech book recommends: 'in case a man be lunatic, 
take the skin of a mere-swine, work it into a whip. Swinge the man therewith, 
soon he will be well. Amen'. 153 Basil Clarke asserts, inexplicably, that this 
practice implies a 'simple belief in demonism'. 154 But this is not the only possible 
explanation of flogging. In fact, whipping may have been employed only to 
diminish the madman's capacity for violence in accordance with Bartholomeus 
Anglicus's observation that 'harsh treatment of the body removes pain from the 
head and soothes frenzy'. 155 This rationale presumably underlies Bartholomeus's 
suggestion that the man suffering from stupor should 'be drawe and ihalid 
strongliche be pe here of his berd and of his hed, and pat his face be often 
iwassche with coolde watir and his feet ifrotid often vndir Pe soles'. 156 The 
physician Bernard de Gordon advocates a very similar treatment for lethargy: 
And if they are in a profound torpor, as I have seen many, their 
hair on the head, beard and chest should be pulled; they should be 
seized by the nose, their finger squeezed and their lower members 
tightly tied. 
But Bernard is aware of the thin line between harsh but necessary treatment and 
abuse, claiming that 'many die because the medical attendants think that this 
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treatment is cruel'. 157 Indeed, medieval medicine took what might be called an 
humane approach to the treatment of madness. Even haphazard and dangerous 
surgical operations, normally only undertaken as a last resort in cases of stubborn 
insanity, were well-intentioned. 158 
Psychiatric historians have concerned themselves mainly with the physical 
cures for insanity in the Middle Ages. Nevertheless, madness, although regarded 
principally as a somatic affliction, was often treated by methods which worked on 
the mind rather than the body. An asylum founded by King Alonzo at Zaragoza in 
1425 became famous for giving good 'moral treatment' for madness-159 Usually 
such treatment consisted of down-to-earth advice. In his Castel of helth (1539) 
Thomas Elyot writes that 
Affectes and passions of the mynde [... ] yf they be immoderate [... ] 
bringe a man from the use of reason, and sometyme in the 
displeasure of almighty god. Wherefore they [men] do not only 
require the helpe of phisyke corporall, but also the counsell of a 
man wyse and well lerned in morall philosophye. 160 
Elyot's opinion that melancholics should 'flee darknes, moche watche, and 
busynesse of mynde, moche companieng with women' is typically medieval and 
recalls the advice given by the beggar to the melancholic Hoccleve in the Prologue 
to his Regement of Princes. 161 
The textbooks of the Middle Ages commonly recommend a sort of 
occupational therapy. Paul of Aegina suggests 'suitable exhilaration of the mind', 
while Bartholomeus Anglicus advises that the madman refrain from 'busy pou3tis' 
and find some gentle occupation. 162 Reading and rational discourse were 
considered appropriate diversions. The Roman physician Celsus points forward to 
Hoccleve's Dialogue with a Friend when he advises that 
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the patient is to be agreed with rather than opposed, and his mind 
slowly and imperceptibly is to be turned from irrational talk to 
something better. At times also his interest should be awakened; as 
may be done in the case of men fond of literature, to whom a book 
may be read. 163 
Music was also considered to calm the mind. Bartholomew Anglicus follows 
Celsus in recommending that the madman be 'gladed wip instrumentis of musik', 
and in cases of possession, music could mollify evil spirits. 164 Music therapy was 
used to cure Hugo van der Goes, whose case has already been mentioned. The 
account of Hugo's mental breakdown by the painter's biographer Gaspar Ofhuys 
indicates how both the perception and the treatment of madness were influenced by 
biblical tradition. When Hugo became deranged, Ofhuys relates, the prior of his 
monastery was summoned to the scene of his collapse: 
Seeing this sick man and learning all that had happened he 
presumed that brother Hugo was suffering from the same complaint 
that had once afflicted King Saul, and reflecting that Saul's disorder 
had yielded when David played his harp, he immediately gave 
orders to play music frequently in Hugo's presence. 165 
The prior's conduct here is incredible to the modern reader: despite assimilating 
thoroughly the particular details concerning the onset of Hugo's madness, his 
instructions are finally based on biblical precedent. To the medieval mind, both 
the diagnosis and the treatment of madness were inextricably bound up with 
tradition. 
The survey of medieval attitudes towards madness provides a number of 
conclusions. First, it is clear that the symptoms of madness in real life conform 
closely to literary, especially biblical, precedents. This makes any firm distinction 
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between fictional and real cases of madness extremely difficult -- a point to which 
we will return later. 
Other conclusions challenge certain assumptions about medieval medical 
approaches to madness. Although madness was considered principally as a somatic 
affliction, it was sometimes recognized and treated in mentalistic terms. Thus the 
medical practices of late Middle Ages point forward to the modern concept of 
madness as a disease of the mind rather than the body: hence Hoccleve's view, 
discussed in Chapter 5, that a man's mental condition cannot always be detected 
by his appearance. 
For other reasons, generalized views of the Middle Ages or its approach to 
insanity are untenable. Madness, it has been seen, was habitually interpreted by 
the churchmen as a sign of moral taint. Yet theological interpretations of madness 
did not prevent rational investigation, especially as the prestigious medical schools 
developed in the late Middle Ages. Even the widespread superstitious belief in 
demonic possession was not credited by all sections of medieval society. In fact, 
rational and spiritual explanations of madness co-existed throughout the Middle 
Ages. This means that the theme of madness could be used in literary texts to 
produce diverse effects ranging from moral condemnation to sympathy. The 
chapters that follow attempt to describe some of the ways in which these effects 
are manipulated by medieval authors. 
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Chapter 2 
'Knightes that ar so wood': The Meanings of Madness 
in Middle English Romance 
Cultural historians have detected an increased preoccupation with, and sometimes 
incidence of madness in various epochs. Thus Michael MacDonald holds that 
'interest in insanity quickened about 1580', while Lynn White Jr contends that a 
number of factors, such as the experience of famine and warfare, made the period 
1300-1650 the most 'psychically disturbed' era of European history., Whatever 
the merits of these necessarily vague claims, it is a true generalization that in the 
twelfth century madness, which was receiving increasing attention as a subject of 
study in the medical schools, emerged as a common theme in Western literature. 2 
The renewed interest in madness is most evident in the medieval romances. 
These works tend to present insanity in a stereotypical fashion, illustrating the 
paradigms of mad behaviour and certain conventional interpretations of madness. 
These traditional ideas about madness have deep historical roots: although the texts 
discussed here are primarily English works of the late Middle Ages, their 
portrayals of madness are typical of the continental romances on which they are 
generally based. This typicality makes the romances a useful starting point for a 
discussion of madness in Middle English literature. 
There are contradictory critical opinions about the general attitude towards 
madness in the romances. Many years ago John Revell Reinhard, in his 
introduction to the French romance Amadas et Ydoine, stated that 'the Middle 
Ages did not understand lunacy, and so, in literature at least, it was always cured 
by miraculous, unexplainable means'. 3 Reinhard is correct in part: although they 
are perfectly explicable within a Christian framework of sin and punishment, 
supernatural cures of madness are common in the romances. Nevertheless, rational 
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explanations and treatments also abound. In the 1930s, Elizabeth A. Wright found 
that 'medieval French romances and plays reflect a worldly, comparatively 
realistic view of mental illness, little influenced by the doctrines of the 
churchmen'. 4 The romances often eschew fantastical and supernatural explanations 
of madness. To take one example, romance heroes do not, like Nebuchadnezzar or 
the Irish hero Suibhne, physically metamorphosize into beasts during their periods 
of madness. Despite being referred to as a 'creature' throughout his madness, 
Chretien de Troyes' Yvain remains a man. 5 Clearly, the romances incorporate 
both supernatural elements and realistic description. Here, as in other genres of 
medieval literature, madness has a double nature, attesting both to the power of 
God to chastise sinners and to more secular concerns. 
In the non-chivalric romances, the moral interpretation of madness tends to 
prevail. The hero's madness marks a transition from sinful to holy folly, as in the 
remarkably popular metrical romance King Robert of Sicily. 6 Like 
Nebuchadnezzar, Robert is a proud and powerful king who oppresses his subjects 
and whose crimes are eventually punished by madness. In all the versions of the 
story, he is chastened by an angel after boasting of his great might. Robert's 
claims to kingship are taken to be the delusional ravings of a madman; his head is 
shaved and he becomes a fool.? His appearance alters so much that he is 
unrecognisable, even to his own brothers, and he is forced to sleep every night 
with dogs. At his lowest point, he becomes a maniac, tearing his hair and 
wringing his hands. In the English version of the tale, Robert compares his plight 
to that of Nebuchadnezzar. Eventually, like his biblical predecessor, he 
acknowledges the superior might of God and is immediately restored to his senses. 
A similar pattern is apparent in the fourteenth-century poem Sir Gowther, 
the English version of the popular Robert the Devil legend. 8 Gowther, the duke of 
Austria, is born of a union between his mother and the devil. Like Robert, he 
abuses his power to oppress the weak, especially those in religious orders. After 
learning about his diabolical origins, however, Gowther goes to Rome to be 
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absolved of his sins by the pope. The penance he receives is to adopt the standard 
trappings of the madman: 
'Pow shalt walk norp and sowpe, 
And gete pi mete owt of houndis moue; 
Pis penaunce shalt thow gynne. 
And speke no word, even ne odde, 
Til pow have very wetyng of Godde 
Foryevyn be all by sinne. ' (283-288)9 
Gowther faithfully follows these directions. First he wanders into a 'fer contree' 
for three days, where he is fed by a greyhound. He then enters a castle, where he 
sits in silence beneath the king's banqueting table gnawing a bone brought to him 
by a spaniel. The courtiers regard him as a madman. After a suitable period of 
abjection, he becomes 'Godes child' and undergoes a spiritual and social 
regeneration. By the end of the tale, Gowther has become a saint with the power 
to cure the insane. 
The hero of the fifteenth-century English romance The Tale of Beryn 
undergoes a comparable transformation. 10 Beryn is the spoiled son of a Roman 
Senator, Faunus, and his wife Agea. As a young man he oppresses and attacks the 
poor and innocent, behaviour that recalls that of Robert the Devil and which has a 
similar outcome. Beryn also plays at dice, a conventional fool activity; in short, he 
is caught in the snare of folly. Eventually the destitute Beryn is forced to wear 
rags (1295-1298). In this wretched and distracted state he shuns the town and 
wanders to the church. Like Gowther during his exile, he begins to show the 
symptoms of insanity, such as an inability to speak (1321-1322). 
Naked and held in general 'disdeyn', Beryn begins to repent his youthful 
folly. Visiting his mother's tomb, he is so bitterly afflicted with grief and remorse 
for his previous neglect that he loses his senses and collapses (1336-1344). That 
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Beryn becomes mad through an internal passion rather than some external agency 
suggests that he has more in common with the knights of Arthurian romance than 
with figures like Robert of Sicily. When he regains consciousness, he displays the 
conventional symptoms of mania: 
So atte last, when Beryn a litill wakid were, 
He trampelid fast with his feet, & al to-tare his ere 
And his visage both, ry3t as a woodman, 
With many a bittir tere, that from his eyen ran; 
And sighid many a sore sigh, & had much hevynes; (1349-1353) 
Only now, in his greatest abjection, does Beryn ask mercy of God for his 
'mys-dede & foly' (1362). As in many works of late-medieval literature, madness 
constitutes a spiritual turning point in the life of the sinner. Like Gowther, Beryn 
is made to recognize his sinfulness through a period of penitential madness; also 
like Gowther, he determines to atone for his misdeeds. Beryn now becomes a fool 
in the eyes of the world by abandoning his worldly privileges and journeying to a 
foreign and hostile land. Finally, the theme of 'wise folly' is introduced through 
Beryn's association with a tonsured fool named Geffrey, who helps the hero to 
overcome his enemies. 
Clearly, the heroes of all of these romances progress from the sinful folly 
of youth to Christian foolishness, via a brief period of insanity. This pattern, so 
common in didactic contexts, is apparent in a variety of medieval literary works, 
including The Book of Margery Kempe. 11 Madness was clearly an attractive theme 
to medieval religious writers, who often adapted or interpolated non-Christian 
material to meet the didactic requirements of their texts. From the viewpoint of the 
'religious' romances, madness is a useful metaphor for sinfulness. 
The same value is often attached to madness in the chivalric or Arthurian 
romances, especially, perhaps, in England. In her comparison of the English and 
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French Yvain poems, for example, Penelope Doob has argued that the English 
romance shows a greater concern with the moral condition of its hero than its 
continental source. 12 Nevertheless, the briefest comparison of these works with 
those discussed above indicates the diversity of the works categorized as romances 
and suggests other, secular meanings of madness. In his article 'The Nature of 
Romance', W. T. H. Jackson warns against interpreting all medieval romances 
according to a Christian framework. A secular work, he points out, 'may have its 
own context of interpretation, its own rules, and its own existence'. 13 Works like 
Sir Gowther and King Robert of Sicily present madness as an isolated blow of fate 
involving only one individual; moreover, the attitudes towards madness in these 
romances are uniformly negative. The Arthurian romances, by contrast, present a 
broader canvas and include a variety of responses to the insanity of their heroes, 
often depending on the observer's social class; in short, they encourage 
speculation about the social milieu of madness. 
The circumstances of the mad knights of romance are certainly quite 
different to those of Gowther or Robert of Sicily. First, the madness of the 
romance knights always takes the form of wildness, the chief symptoms of which 
are blackness and hairiness and a great capacity for physical violence. 14 Not all 
wild men, of course, are insane. Perhaps the best-known medieval English Wild 
Man, the figure of the Giant Herdsman in the fourteenth-century romance Ywain 
and Gawain, is kindly and helpful. 15 Moreover, the sexual aggressiveness of true 
wild men is not a characteristic of the wild heroes of romance. Finally, genuine 
wild men, unlike the insane knights, are permanently wild. Thus, as Judith 
Neaman summarizes, 'the wild knight was a madman not a true wild man'. 16 
The earliest romance featuring a wild hero is Chretien de Troyes's 
astonishingly influential Yvain. Realising that he has breached his promise to his 
lady, Yvain is ashamed and 
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would rather be banished alone in some wild land, where no one 
would know where to seek for him, and where no man or woman 
would know of his whereabouts any more than if he were in some 
deep abyss. '7 
This melancholia quickly develops into mania:. 'Then such a storm broke loose in 
his brain that he loses his senses; he tears his flesh and, stripping off his clothes, 
he flees across meadows and fields'; grief-stricken, he runs to the forest, 
'senseless and deprived of speech'. 18 Here he finds sustenance at the lodging of a 
old hermit, who charitably leaves food outside his door, as if for an animal. Yvain 
also frightens the hermit, who will not venture outside his hut until the deranged 
knight has departed from the area. Throughout Yvain's period of madness 
Chretien, like the author of the Irish Buile Suibhne, refers to his hero as if he were 
describing an animal. 
In the English version of Yvain, the fourteenth-century metrical romance 
Ywain and Gawain, the hero's animality is exaggerated. Like Chretien's knight, 
Ywain wanders in the forest 'Als it wore a wilde beste'; but the English author 
gives the story a grotesque twist by having his hero drink the 'warm blode' of a 
freshly killed deer. 19 Penelope Doob suggests that blood-drinking is a traditional 
remedy for melancholy madness and that its failure to cure Ywain suggests the 
spiritual nature of his madness. 
20 Whatever the case, the poet departs significantly 
from his usual practice of omitting or 'toning down [... ] cruel or bloody 
passages'. 21 
Given this emphasis on the bestial nature of the mad romance hero, it is 
appropriate to examine late-medieval attitudes towards wildness. The mixture of 
horror, amusement and admiration that characterized the late-medieval attitude 
towards wildness is well exemplified in the late romance Valentine and Orson. 
Here the Wild Man, Orson, so terrifies the townsfolk that 'also sone as the men of 
the vyllage sawe the wylde man, they ranne into their houses, and for great fere 
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shytte their dores so that none myght entre', an action which recalls the response 
of the hermit to the wild Yvain; similarly, when Orson's civilized brother 
Valentine attempts to take Orson to Orleans, the porters shut the gates in fear. 22 
These reactions are rational: Orson has already proved his capacity for a variety of 
criminal activities, including theft and rape. 23 From the point of view of civilized 
society, the wild man is a dangerous and disruptive figure of fantastic carnal 
appetite. Little wonder that the wildmen or 'wodwos' in Sir Gawain and the Green 
Knight rank among the hero's bestial adversaries. 24 
In Sir Gawain there is also, however, a degree of thinly disguised 
admiration for the wildness of Bertilak, who represents the inexorable laws of 
nature. By the late fourteenth century, wild men had become figures of fascination 
to civilized people. They were even associated with the royal court: thus Charles 
VI of France was entertained by men dressed in animal skins; in Capgrave's 
words, the king was even 'arayed lich a wodwous' himself; and in The Receyt of 
the Ladie Kateryne, three 'woddosys' pull a pageant before the king. 25 
In Valentine and Orson, the positive aspects of wildness are even clearer. 
When defeated in combat by his brother, Orson submits to his conqueror with 
good will: 
And whan that he [Valentine] had bound hym fast he mounted on 
horsebacke and ledde him with hym as a beast tyed, without that 
euer this same Orson didde hym any harme, or made hym an euyl 
semblaunt, that was a thyng myraculous. 26 
As the final comment here indicates, the wild man's magnanimous behaviour 
confounds the pessimistic expectations of civilized society. 
By the end of the Middle Ages, then, the Wild Man could be seen as a 
vehicle for social criticism, like the 'noble savage' favoured by the satirical writers 
of a later age. The prestige of the Wild Man is indicated by the fact that the 
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recognition of his nobility is the preserve of the upper class: thus the king in 
Valentine and Orson praises the Wild Man's innate courtliness, remarking that 
'how wel that he is roughe, yf he were clothed as we be, he wolde seme a right 
fayre knyght'. 27 As well as functioning as a warning of what may happen to the 
unwary civilized man, wildness may also disguise true nobility. 
The Wild Man is clearly a morally ambiguous figure. Hayden White 
observes that 
by the end of the Middle Ages, the Wild Man has become endowed 
with two distinct personalities, each consonant with one of the 
possible attitudes men might assume with respect to society and 
nature. If one looked upon nature as a horrible world of struggle, as 
animal nature; and society as a condition which, for all its 
shortcomings, was still preferable to the natural state, then he would 
continue to view the Wild Man as the antitype of the desirable 
humanity, as a warning of what men would fall into if they 
definitively rejected society and its norms. If, on the other hand, 
one took his vision of nature from the cultivated countryside, from 
what might be called herbal nature, and saw society, with all its 
struggle, as a fall away from the natural perfection, then he might 
be inclined to populate that nature with wild men whose function 
was to serve as antitypes of social existence. 28 
White further suggests that the increasingly positive status of the Wild Man in the 
late Middle Ages is related to social changes 'in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, when the social bonds of medieval culture began to d is integrate'. 29 As 
Larry Benson puts it, the positive presentation of wildness 'seems to have had an 
especially strong appeal to the later period, in which the chivalric ideals of the 
earlier Middle Ages no longer held unquestioned dominance'. 30 It is easy to see 
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the imaginative appeal of wildness in an age so often described as one of social 
unrest and spiritual turmoil. 
31 
To the medieval mind, wildness, insofar as it involved exclusion from 
society, implied a loss of humanity. Medieval thought about the relationship 
between individuals and society followed Aristotle's Politics, whose principles are 
summarized as follows by Scott Meikle: 
Society is a natural growth, something constituted by nature. Man 
is by nature a social animal, and society is not an artificial construct 
imposed on natural man but a manifestation of human nature itself. 
Society is the natural form of existence for man, and the capacity 
for social life is what is specific to humans alone among gregarious 
animals. [... ] One who can exist separately from society and be 
self-sufficient is either a lower animal or a god, but not a man. 
32 
The opposition of wildness and order is of great concern to twelfth-century 
theorists. The conservative view of the ideal organization of society is elaborated 
in John of Salisbury's Policraticus, a work of seminal importance for medieval 
political philosophy and which was completed as the wild hero was becoming a 
central figure in literature. 'Civil life should imitate nature', he writes, 'otherwise, 
life is duly called not merely uncivil, but rather bestial and brute'. 
33 While the 
natural world could provide a model for human social organisation, those who 
exist outside society align themselves with anti-nature. From a conservative point 
of view, therefore, the asocial Wild Man is essentially unnatural and irrational. 
Although true wild men and madmen must be distinguished, the 
interpretation of the Wild Man's popularity as a symptom of increasing 
dissatisfaction with civilization as it is currently constituted may account for the 
often positive portrayal of madness in the medieval romances. In the Arthurian 
romances, the knights are affiliated to an institution, the Round Table, which does 
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not and cannot recognize the individual desires of its members. Unlike epic 
heroes, the heroes of romance, as well as fulfilling the demands made on them by 
society and its institutions, are also irresistibly compelled to pursue their own 
apparently self-defined goals. 
The tension the knights feel between their compulsion to pursue their own 
ends and the necessity of knightly service often leads to their madness. This theory 
has been most fully articulated by the Malory critic Robert Merrill, who theorizes 
that 
the general condition of psychosis implies that the "me" or the 
culturally determined component so totally dominates the "I" 
component that the "I" cannot find expression except in violent and 
destructive acts (i. e., marginal behavior), whether against itself or 
the outside world. 34 
This highly schematic formulation describes the nature of many cases of madness 
in medieval literature, such as the maniacal behaviour described at the beginning 
of The Book of Margery Kempe. The romances, in particular, repeatedly illustrate 
its truth. If, as Merrill argues, 'cultural over-determination' is the 'essential 
character of the late Middle Ages', the insanity of Thomas Malory's knights may 
be seen as the inevitable product of the conflict between what he calls institutional 
'indoctrination' and the knights' desire for self-creation. The result is 
a class of psychotics from which a rebel will emerge who will not 
be content until the old model is thoroughly dismantled. This tragic 
pattern underlies the careers of the four best knights whose 
repressed individuality leads to such acts as loving the king's wife, 
fighting their best friends (optimal means of securing worship) or 
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the madness in which they alienate themselves from the society that 
depends on them for its security. 
35 
In Merrill's view, the madness of Malory's knights is due to their 'repressed 
individuality'. 
In the light of much previous medieval scholarship, this view appears 
problematic in a number of ways. Quite apart from the controversial question of 
the historical purchase of the Freudian concept of repression, Merrill's theory 
presupposes that individuality was an intelligible concept in the Middle Ages. 
Many medievalists remain cautious about this possibility. Karl Weintraub, for 
example, suggests that the notion of individuality might have been an 
'embarrassment' for medieval writers so that expressions of individuality of the 
sort found in modern, especially autobiographical, literature were rare. 
36 
Nevertheless, many other commentators detect an increasing interest in the 
individual in the late Middle Ages. 
The term 'individual' must be used carefully in an historical context. In the 
Middle Ages the word individuum belonged not to the discourse of human 
relations, but to that of logic; the semantic shift of the word to its present sense 
did not happen until the Renaissance. 
37 The fact that the Middle Ages had no term 
for 'individuality' or 'individualism' does not imply, however, that what we call 
individuality was unintelligible in earlier periods. 
Colin Morris argues that a variety of factors, including the Church's 
insistence on regular confession and the rise of portraiture and satirical writing, 
contributed to, and resulted from, an increasing awareness of individuality in the 
period 1050-1200.38 A growing concern with expressions of individuality and 
self-consciousness pervaded late-medieval culture. As one authority on these issues 
concludes, it is 'one of the most interesting phenomena of the period from the late 
twelfth century on that we find in entirely different and quite unrelated fields, if 
not an objection to the conscious norm, at any rate a greater inclination to pay 
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attention to the individual's own features'. 39 Stephen Knight notes some of the 
manifestations of this impulse in the later period, including the increased mobility 
created by the development of the market economy and 'the cult of devotio 
moderna which focuses on the private Christian'. 'In literature and art', continues 
Knight, 'there is a marked development of concern with the individual, in the 
'dance of death' motif especially, but also in the development of realism, a mode 
which bases itself on the validity of the individual sensual response'. 40 
The new emphasis on the individual in the twelfth century is accompanied 
by an increasing interest in interiority and the inner lives of individuals. A. C. 
Spearing notes that in the twelfth century there emerged a 'new focus on the inner 
landscape or subjectivity of the human being -- new at least since Augustine's 
Confessions'. 41 This shift is marked by a range of developments in 
twelfth-century culture, especially in the area of religious meditation. It was no 
doubt given impetus by the Lateran Council of 1215, which made it obligatory for 
all Christians to attend confession at least once a year. If confession, by its nature, 
involves 'psychological self-examination' and 'increased self-awareness' it must 
also contribute 'to more refined feelings, to a divided self, to the possibility of 
realising the self as against the crowd'. 42 These new confessional practices 
produced the man of feeling, whose epitome is the romance hero. 
The madness of the romance heroes must be understood against this 
background of an increasing awareness of individuality and interiority. In many 
works of the twelfth century, such as Buile Suibhne, madness is a central theme. 
Yet Suibhne is hardly a fully self-conscious figure like Chretien's Yvain or 
Malory's Tristram. Suibhne becomes mad through an external cause, the curse of 
St Ronan. But while the heroes of romance may also become mad because of 
external events such as the breaking of an agreement (Yvain's situation), they also 
exhibit a high degree of psychological refinement and insight. Judith Neaman 
states that 
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with the develoment of the romance came an increased exploration 
of the subtler emotions which might move a man to break the ties 
which bound him to civilisation. [... ] Internal compulsion, not an 
external curse or spell, drives [Chretien's] hero, Yvain, to plunge 
from the heights of a mannered and lavish civilisation to the depths 
of a shabby and disordered primitivism. 
43 
Indeed, Yvain represents a radical individualism that he himself recognizes as a 
sort of madness. 'My foolish heart draws me there', he remarks at one point; 'I 
will do as my heart wills'. 44 From the Christian perspective, of course, exclusive 
orientation towards the self is inherently sinful; it is included in Augustine's notion 
of cupiditas, 'a motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of one's self, one's 
neighbor, or any corporeal thing for the sake of something other than God'. 45 
In the works of Thomas Malory, the wilfulness of the knights is 
incomprehensible to the representatives of the court, as the story of Balan and 
Balin shows. After pulling the sword from the stone, Balin becomes thoroughly 
socialized, while Balan, who virtually disappears from the tale, comes to 
represent, as Robert Merrill puts it, 'the absolutely unique individual'. 46 
Unsurprisingly, the two brothers are unable to recognize one another when they 
meet again at the end of the tale, leading to the combat and the 'dolerous stroke' 
by which Balin slays his own brother. Merlin's response to this tragedy is 
revealing. At Balin and Balan's tomb he acknowledges only the civilized Balin: 
In the morne cam Merlyn and lete wryte Balyns name on the 
tombe with letters of gold that 'here lyeth Balyn le Saveage that was 
the knyght with two swerdes and he that smote the dolorous stroke. ' 
Also Merlyn lete make there a bedde, that then shold never man lye 
therin but he wente oute of his wytte. (69-70)47 
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For Merlin, Balan's life outside of society has no value; it is simply dismissed as a 
sort of insanity. 
Lancelot and Tristram are judged insane by their peers for similar reasons. 
In a remark to Tristram, Dinadan recognizes the self-destructive nature of 
Malory's two chief knights with a mixture of admiration and aversion: 
'But ye fare, ' seyde sir Dynadan, 'as a man that were oute of hys 
mynde that wold caste hymselff away. And I may curse the tyme 
that ever I sye you, for in all the worlde ar nat such two knightes 
that ar so wood as ys sir Lancelot and ye, sir Trystram! For onys I 
felle in the felyshyp of sir Launcelot as I have now with you, and 
he sette me so a werke that a quarter of a yere I kepte my bedde. 
Jesus deffende me, ' seyde sir Dynadan, 'frome such two knyghtys, 
and specially frome youre felyshyp. ' (379-380) 
Dinadan perceives the anti-social and immoderate aspects of Lancelot and 
Tristram. Like Balin and Balan, whose mighty feats of arms are attributed to 
magical or diabolical influence, Tristram and Lancelot appear super-human. As 
Judith Neaman says, 'the hero is inordinate in relation to other men because even 
his superior qualities arise from a lack of mesure'. 48 For Dinadan, who represents 
prudence, discretion and moderation, Lancelot and Tristram are insane. His 
reaction illustrates Neaman's comment that 'the more the tradition of heroic 
exaggeration pervaded the culture or style of the writer, the more trivial was the 
deviation which evoked the epithet "mad". 49 Dinadan not only testifies to the 
knights' foolhardiness in battle, but also hints that their recklessness and wilfulness 
may lead eventually to outright insanity. 
Tristram's loyalties, of course, are divided between King Mark and Isolde. 
The dilemma of whether Tristram should choose his own or the common good 
becomes pressing when King Helias challenges Mark. Tristram is torn between his 
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duty to champion his uncle in battle and his instinct for self-preservation, for he is 
aware that Mark will try to have him executed later: 
'Sir, ' seyde sir Trystram, 'now I undirstonde ye wolde have my 
succour, and reson wolde that I sholde do all that lyyth in me to do, 
savynge my worshyp and my lyff, howbehit that I am sore brused 
and hurte. And sytthyn sir Elyas proferyth so largely, I shall fyght 
with hym'. (469) 
Tristram's will here is governed explicitly by 'reson', the faculty which is able to 
discern the hierarchy of goods. According to reason, Tristram must defend his 
king, for, as Aquinas asserts, 'right reason judges that the common good is better 
than the good of the individual'. 50 But as Robert Merrill points out, Malory 
'constructs the situation so that Tristram's own good is precisely the opposite of 
the good which is rational'. 51 Of course, Tristram is not insane at this point; but it 
is clear that he can only escape the repressive demands of his fealty by rejecting 
the imperatives of rationality. Indeed, madness seems to have had a radical appeal 
in the late Middle Ages. Margery Kempe, as we shall see, presents madness as a 
token of individual rebellion, while Malory presents Tristram's dilemma in terms 
which suggest his own continual struggles for freedom from authority. Here, as 
elsewhere in medieval literature, madness is associated with the conflict between 
private desire and public expectation. 
Vinaver notes that Malory does not dwell on the causes of Tristram's 
madness. 52 Suspecting Isolde of an affair with Kayhedins, the forlorn Tristram 
rides into the forest, where he is treated harshly by the rustics: 
And than was he naked, and waxed leane and poore of fleyshe. And 
so he felle in the felyshyppe of herdmen and sheperdis, and dayly 
they wolde gyff hym som of their mete and drynke, and whan he 
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ded ony shrewd dede they wolde beate hym with roddis. And so 
they clypped hym with sherys and made hym tyke a foole. (369) 
It has been said that this passage 'has an unusual quality which one would look for 
in vain in the Lay Mortel inserted in the corresponding place in the Prose 
Romance'. 53 Clearly, Tristram's madness has a special resonance for Malory. 
Tristram is perceived as a child or an animal that can only be disciplined by crude 
methods. Despite all his sufferings, however, he nobly defends the shepherds 
when they are set upon by Dagonet and his squires (371). 
Malory emphasizes the pitiable rather than the sinful aspect of Tristram's 
madness. As Judith Neaman points out, although the King Mark of the Folie 
Tristan poems mocks the madman, both Malory's Mark and Lunette in Yvain, 
'explicitly state that kind treatment of a madman is an act of charity'. 54 King 
Mark's court sees Tristram's madness as an unfortunate affliction. Even although 
his identity is at first unknown, Tristram is treated 'with fayrenes' when he is 
found by Mark's knights, who 'keste mantels uppon sir Trystramys, and so lad 
hym unto Tyntagyll. And there they bathed hym and wayshed hym, and gaff hym 
hote suppyngis, tylle they had brought hym well to hys remembraunce' (373). 
The very different treatments of Tristram by the upper and lower classes 
recall the divided attitudes towards the mad Lancelot. Lancelot, according to dame 
Brusen, 'cam into thys contrey lyke a madde man, wyth doggys and boyes 
chasynge hym thorow the cyte of Corbyn' (613). He is treated compassionately, 
however, when he is recognized and eventually restored to his wits by Elaine and 
Brusen. Similarly, the mad French hero Amadas is mocked by 'petit et grant': 
Mais tuit cil qui sevent les estres 
Saillent as huis et as fenestres 
Pour la grant mervelle esgarder [... ] 
Grans est la noise et grans li cris 
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Des garcons, des enfants petis, 
Qui 1'empaignent et qui le batent, 
Qui le descirent, qui le gratent. (2705-2707,2741-2744)55 
As the Amadas editor John Revell Reinhard comments, 'the people of the Middle 
Ages regarded the madman as their just prey'; the author of Amadas, however, 
regards his insane hero with the pity proper to a sensitive and cultured man. 56 
Despite the similarities between the treatments of Malory's Lancelot and 
Tristram at the hands of the upper and lower classes, the two knights undergo 
quite different sorts of cure. Lancelot is healed of his madness by the Holy Grail 
whereas Tristram is cured by common sense methods -- a departure from the 
Prose Tristan, in which the manner of Tristram's cure is unclear. 57 This suggests 
that we are supposed to take a relatively sympathetic view of Tristram's madness. 
From our point of view, if not Tristram's, wildness appears to be an escape from 
social repression. By pursuing the king's wife, he shows that he is 'willing to 
reject the dictates of social order and to assume his otherness as an individual', 
even if such a course leads to insanity. 58 
Lancelot's insanity, like Tristan's, grows out of the conflict he feels 
between his personal desires and courtly expectations. In the early 
thirteenth-century Prose Lancelot he goes mad no fewer than three times. The first 
two episodes of madness-- Lancelot's madness in prison and later when he fails to 
find Galehot -- are not particularly significant. Lancelot's final madness, the only 
one preserved in Malory, is treated more substantially. 59 Here Lancelot is tricked 
by the enchantments of dame Brusen into sleeping with Elaine of Corbenic for the 
second time. When he is discovered by Guinevere, the mortified hero leaps from 
the window and runs wild in the forest for two years (604). 
Despite being cured eventually by a religious relic, those who witness 
Lancelot's madness take a commonsense approach to his cure. When Sir Blyaunte 
encounters Lancelot during his madness he judges that the knight has 'more nede 
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of a slepe and of warme clothis than to weide that swerde' (604). Such reactions 
recall the commonsense approaches to madness discussed in the previous chapter 
and contradict Edelgard DuBrock's comment that 'the medieval Christian saw in 
[the madman] the workings of the devil and had no reason to try to help him'. 60 
Nor is madness, at this point at least, entirely disgraceful. Although capable of 
incredible violence and despite the torments of the townsfolk of Corbyn, 
Lancelot's uncivilized behaviour is often commendable. He even breaks the fetters 
in which he has been placed to save Blyaunte from his attackers (606). Clearly, 
Lancelot, like Tristram, has much in common with the increasingly popular figure 
of the Wild Man. 
Robert Merrill quotes Freud's opinion that 'a person becomes neurotic 
because he cannot tolerate the amount of frustration which society imposes on him 
in the service of its cultural ideals' as a way of explaining Lancelot's madness. 61 
In Merrill's terminology, Lancelot's madness in the Prose Lancelot 
appears whenever he is in a position that demonstrates to him that 
as the flower of knighthood he embodies the explanatory synthesis; 
it appears because he understands that in submitting himself totally 
to the quest for the explanatory center he has relinquished 
everything that might be uniquely his. 62 
Inevitably, then, Lancelot constantly returns to his self-destructive, and socially 
impermissible passion for Guinevere. As Stephen Knight observes, 'the dominant 
theme of "The Tale of Launcelot and Guinevere" is how the private love between 
those two great characters increasingly disturbs the public life of the Round 
Table'. 63 The courtly requirement of secrecy in love affairs demands that 
Lancelot's passion must remain private: Lancelot is 'sette inwardly' on the queen 
'in his prevy thoughtes and in hys myndis' (744). For Lancelot and Tristram, 
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therefore, the pursuit of the ideal of knighthood involves a painful separation of 
emotions and behaviour. 
This point is nowhere more obvious than in Malory's account of 
Palomides's mental breakdown. Palomides possesses a self-consciousness and a 
concern with appearances typical of the ostentatious fifteenth century. Like 
Arthur's other knights, he seeks to win his lady by increasing his 'worship', the 
precious commodity that underpins the social identities of Arthur's knights. After 
his humiliating defeat by Tristram, however, he becomes 'araged out of his witte' 
(400). Following a suitable period of absence from the tale, he reappears as a 
suicidally melancholic wanderer and eventually suffers a complete crisis of 
identity. 'Malory', as Knight says, 'has made the forces of private desire urgently 
pressing' to the extent that they drive the hero to distraction: 64 
So uppon a day, in the dawnynge, sir Palomydes wente into the 
foreste by hymselff alone; and there he founde a well, and anone he 
loked into the welle and in the watir he sawe hys owne vysage, how 
he was discolowred and defaded, a nothynge lyke as he was. 'Corde 
Jesu, what may this mean? ' seyde sir Palomydes. And thus he 
seyde to hymselff: 'A, Palomydes, Palomydes! Why arte thou thus 
defaded, and ever was wont to be called one of the fayrest knyghtes 
of [the] worlde? Forsothe, I woll no more lyve this lyff, for I love 
that I may never gete nor recover. ' (576-577) 
The self-referential language of the passage indicates a deep sense of self-division. 
The faded knight seen in the well is the public man who is perceived by the 'inner' 
Palomides with disgust. This recognition prompts Palomides's determination to 
commit suicide with his sword, the only object which can earn him vital 
'worship'. Since it involves treating oneself as both the subject and the object of 
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the act, suicide is the ultimate expression of self-division: Palomides is unable to 
live with himself. 
A similar scene occurs in Chaucer's Knight's Tale. During his exile in 
Thebes, Arcite suffers the classic symptoms of lovesickness, the 'loveris maladye / 
Of Hereos'. 65 He is also afflicted by a form of madness which Chaucer describes, 
characteristically, in the terminology of faculty psychology: 
And in his geere for al the world he ferde 
Nat oonly lik the loveris maladye 
Of Hereos, but rather lyk manye, 
Engendred of humour malencolik 
Biforen, in his celle fantastik. 
And shortly, turned was al up so doun 
Bothe habit and eek disposicioun 
Of hym, this woful lovere daun Arcite. (1372-1379) 
Despite the equivalence between Arcite's inner condition and his external 
appearance, madness here brings about a split between inner and outer, between 
'habit' and 'disposicioun'. After he has bemoaned his separation from his lady, 
Arcite himself perceives this bifurcation in an act of self-reflection which recalls 
Palomides's: 
[... ] he caughte a greet mirour, 
And saugh that chaunged was al his colour, 
And saugh his visage al in another kynde. 
And right anon it ran hym in his mynde 
That, sith his face was so disfigured 
Of maladye the which he hadde endured, 
He myghte wel, if that he bar hym Lowe, 
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Lyve in Atthenes everemoore unknowe. (1399-1406) 
In both style and content this looks forward to the scene in Thomas Hoccleve's 
Complaint in which the melancholy poet scrutinizes his face in his mirror. As the 
passage switches between Arcite's thoughts and his appearance, Arcite is aware of 
himself as both a suffering subject and a shameful object in the eyes of others. As 
in the works of Hoccleve and Margery Kempe, madness in the romances involves 
an acute sense of self-division. 
In the cases of Palomides and Arcite, madness is spectacular. As the critic 
Duncan Salkeld writes, madmen, until at least the time of Descartes, 'presented a 
spectacular physical image, and bore their illness in the flesh and matter of their 
bodies'. 66 When Malory's Lancelot goes mad and jumps from the window, for 
example, Elaine tells Guinevere that she has lost her lover: 'for I saw and harde by 
his countenaunce that he is madde for ever' (594). However, unlike the Hoccleve 
of the Complaint, whose mirror-searching is discussed later, neither Palomides nor 
Arcite questions whether or not the reflected image he sees is trustworthy; there is 
no room for doubt about his true mental condition. 
Melancholy in medieval romance, then, is characterized by consciousness 
of the body, a body that instantly betrays inner anguish in discolouration and 
disfigurement. In Arthurian romances, as Judith Neaman observes, 'every internal 
change is set forth as an image [... ] so medieval authors externalized states of 
mind, setting them in loci, investing them with movements, portraying them with 
features immediately recognisable to the reader'. 67 The difference between the 
chivalric romances and other literary genres such as epics, however, is one of 
perspective: the spectacle of madness is available not only to those who observe 
the madman, but also to the madman himself. 
Palomides, Arcite and the other distracted knights, then, are exquisitely 
self-conscious during their identity crises. Chretien de Troyes's description of 
Yvain's spectacular madness contains a sense of the hero's sinful falling away 
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from the ideal of knighthood. Thus a damsel reports her discovery of Yvain to her 
mistress: 
My lady, I have found Yvain, who has proved himself to be the 
best knight in the world, and the most virtuous. I cannot imagine 
what sin has reduced the gentleman to such a plight. I think he must 
have had some misfortune, which causes him thus to demean 
himself, for one may lose his wits through grief. And any one can 
see that he is not in his right mind. Would that God had restored 
him to the best sense that he ever he had, and would that he might 
then consent to render assistance in your cause. 
When Yvain regains consciousness after his insanity, he finds himself beneath the 
tree where he has fallen asleep and 
sees that he is as naked as ivory, and feels much ashamed; but he 
would have been yet more ashamed had he known what had 
happened. As it is, he knows nothing but that he is naked. [... ] But 
he is ashamed and concerned because of his nakedness, and says 
that he is dead and utterly undone if anyone has come across him 
there and recognised him. Meanwhile, he clothes himself and looks 
out into the forest to see if any one is approaching. 68 
This sensitivity about madness is shared by many of those who witness madness. 
To spare Yvain unnecessary embarrassment, the lady who discovers Yvain at first 
pretends not to have seen the hero, allowing him first to catch sight of her. Here 
again, madness is associated with an exquisite consciousness of the body. The 
shameful spectacle may be mocked by the lower classes; but as the experience of 
Thomas Hoccleve attests, it is a sight from which the refined avert their gaze. 
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These attitudes towards madness are retained in the English adaptation of 
Chretien's romance, Ywain and Gawain. 69 The association between madness and 
the sleep beneath the tree is, of course, a Celtic motif which features in other 
English romances such as Sir Orfeo. More importantly, however, this detail, 
together with the nakedness and shame of Yvain/Ywain on his recovery, strongly 
suggests the circumstances of Adam and Eve after the Fall. 
Malory's Lancelot, on his recovery from madness, is particularly anxious 
that no-one should hear of his disgrace: 
'Sir', seyde dame Elayne, 'into thys contrey ye cam lyke a mased 
man, clene oute of youre wytte. And here have ye ben kepte as a 
foole, and no cryature here knew what ye were, untyll by fortune a 
mayden of myne brought me unto you whereas ye lay slepynge by a 
well. And anone as I veryly behylde you [I knewe you]. Than I 
tolde my fadir, and so were ye brought afore thys holy vessell, and 
by the vertu of hit thus were ye heled. ' 
'A, Jesu, mercy! ' seyde sir Launcelot. 'Yf this be sothe, 
how many be there that knowyth of my woodnes? ' 
'So God me helpe, ' seyde dame Elayne, 'no mo but my 
fadir, and I, and dame Brusen. ' 
'Now, for Crystes love, ' seyde sir Launcelot, 'kepe hit 
counceyle and lat no man knowe hit in the worlde! For I am sore 
ashamed that I have been myssefortuned. (610) 
Lancelot's shame proceeds from his departure from the codes of knighthood and 
from his sense of sinfulness. As Beverly Kennedy notes, Lancelot now takes the 
name 'Le Shyvalere Ill Mafeete, that ys to sey "the knyght that hath trespassed"' 
(611) and later refers to his 'foly' 'in a way which suggests that he regards his 
madness as a punishment for his sexual sin'. 70 
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Madness and the Fall are explicitly associated in the little-read Partonope 
of Blois, a fifteenth-century English translation of a twelfth-century French 
romance. 71 Having betrayed his mistress, the eponymous hero compares his plight 
to that of Adam, who also 'loste paradyse thorowe hys folye' (6471). He then 
leaves civilization for the forest where, like other melancholic heroes, he wanders 
alone, naked and emaciated (6644-6672). 
The story of the Fall, then, clearly underpins the presentation of madness 
in the romances, connecting the melancholy of the romance heroes with their 
moral trangressions. Norbert Elias argues that the Fall involved a 'step on the way 
to a new form of self-consciousness'. 'In paradise', he explains, 
the ancestors of mankind were unaware of their nakedness; then 
they ate the forbidden fruit of knowledge and became aware of their 
nakedness. We find here a vivid expression of how closely the 
increase in self-consciousness is bound up with an increase of 
conscience. 72 
Elias also notes how the experience of shame leads to the individual's sense of 
himself as a subject: 
It is [... ] this conflict within the individual, this "privatisation", the 
exclusion of certain spheres of life from social intercourse and the 
association with them of socially instilled anxiety, such as feelings 
of shame or embarrassment, which arouses within the individual the 
feeling that he is "inwardly" something quite separate, that he exists 
without relation to other people. 73 
Madness, of course, does not necessarily 'implicate an interiorised condition of 
subjectivity'. 74 Indeed, certain forms of insanity, at least for their duration, entail 
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a diminution rather than an increase in insight. Nevertheless, the experience of 
melancholy madness described in the romances and many other medieval works of 
literature is characterized by guilt, self-consciousness and a sense of social 
alienation of the kind described by Elias. 
In these 'secular' romances, the significance of madness is quite different 
from that in didactic works such as Sir Gowther and King Robert of Sicily. Those 
romances concentrate on the hero's transition from unholy to holy folly and 
present a traditional view of the ideal form of human existence, according to 
which madness is temporary social and moral exile. The chivalric romances, by 
contrast, take a more ambiguous view of madness, challenging Doob's thesis that 
madness always implies spiritual turpitude. In these works madness may be read as 
a form of rebellion against over-determined or repressive society. 
This does not mean that the chivalric romances regard all cases of madness 
alike. In Malory, for example, the madness of Arthur's two chief knights are 
treated very differently. Although he is abused by the shepherds, the mad Tristan 
is treated well by the upper class and is cured by natural means, in keeping with 
Malory's tendency to reduce the importance of the supernatural or marvellous 
elements he found in his sources. Clearly, madness could inspire sympathy, 
perhaps because of the relatively positive late-medieval attitude towards wildness. 
On the other hand, Lancelot's madness, like that of Gowther or Beryn, is the 
shameful token of his sinful 'foly' and it can be cured only by a supernatural 
means. A similar double attitude towards madness is used in a quite different way 
in The Book of Margery Kempe. 
What is common to all of the romances is the conception of madness as a 
spectacle. Sometimes this spectacularity takes the form of public vilification, as in 
the case of Amadas or Lancelot. On other occasions, however, the melancholic 
knights perceive for themselves their inner degradation by scrutinising their 
appearance. In both cases madness entails self-consciousness and self-reflection 
and an awareness of difference from others. This is particularly apparent in 
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Malory, whose works are far more concerned with individual psychology than are 
their sources. From the very beginning, the romances contain the sorts of tortured 
psychological experiences that characterize Thomas Hoccleve's autobiographical 
account of his madness. 
Indeed, the central position of madness in medieval romance, a genre 
frequently denounced by orthodox spokesmen as frivolous and insignificant, 
suggests a general cultural movement towards individualism in a collapsing feudal 
order. Malory's work, as one commentator has said, may be 'a dream of a world 
past, recreated in imagination amid the cruder realities of a changed society'; by 
the same token, however, it also bears witness to the social concerns of its own 
unstable times. 75 Malory's treatment of madness, like that of his contemporaries, 
attests to the tension between individuals and society. Unlike Hoccleve's Series or 
even Kempe's Book, the romances seldom make madness a central concern; 
nevertheless, insanity bears the same meaning here as in those works. Explicit 
moral interpretations of madness do not detract from the significance of insanity as 
a manifestation of cultural alienation, whose existence official culture 
simultaneously denied and made necessary. 
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Chapter 3 
'Reson en bestialite': Madness, Animality and Social Class 
in Book I of Gower's Vox Clamantis 
Eric Auerbach long ago pointed out that courtly culture 'was decidedly 
unfavorable to the development of a literary art which should apprehend reality in 
its full breadth and depth'. I To turn from the medieval romances to John Gower's 
Vox Clamantis is to turn from a genre in which social realities are implicit to one 
which directly and boldly concerns itself with the condition of late 
fourteenth-century England. We also move from presentations of madness as an 
abstract token of moral disruption or cultural dissatisfaction to the specific 
deployment of the language of madness in an account of a major historical event -- 
the Peasants' Revolt of 1381. In short, the Vox shows how the social and moral 
significances of madness revealed in the romances could function at the level of an 
explicit ideology. 
Reason is central in Gower's moral philosophy. As C. S. Lewis points out, 
'nearly all moralists before the eighteenth century regarded Reason as the organ of 
morality'. 2 George Coffman even argues that for Gower, man's ethics are guided 
primarily by this faculty. 
3 Accordingly, sin involves the abandonment of reason. 
Especially important in Gower's major works -- in particular the first book of the 
Vox Clamantis -- is the longstanding clerical association of insanity, sin and 
animality. In its graphic presentation of the 1381 rebels as unreasoning animals, 
the Vox constitutes the most substantial medieval illustration of the polemical use 
of the language of madness. 
Stories of human metamorphosis abounded in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance, functioning as moral exempla in medical as well as literary texts. We 
have already noted the extraordinarily influential story of Nebuchadnezzar's 
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transformation into an ox and its moral significance for medieval writers. As 
Robert Burton explains, the transformation of human beings into animals implies 
vanity and madness: 
We, as long as we are ruled by reason, correct our inordinate 
appetite, and conforme our selves to Gods word, are as so many 
living Saints: but if wee give reines to Lust, Anger, Ambition, 
Pride, and follow our owne wayes, wee degenerate into beasts, 
transforme our selves, overthrowe our constitutions, provoke God 
to Anger, and heap upon us this of Melancholy, and all kindes of 
incurable diseases, as a just and deserved punishment for our 
sinnes. 4 
The man who loses his reason through sin, then, becomes an animal. Like 
Aristotle, late-medieval churchmen saw man as a compound of the two quite 
separate qualities of animality and rationality. As Maria Wickert puts it, 'man 
equals animal plus ratio. By a reversal of the equation, man, if his ratio loses 
control, becomes an animal. That is neither allegory nor poetic display, but a kind 
of theological mathematics'. 
5 As Burton implies, the metamorphosis of a man into 
an animal was a heinous degradation. The Aristotelian definition of man served 
not to link humanity and the beasts, but to expel animals from the privileged realm 
of order and hence from human fellowship. As Michel Foucault puts it, 'why 
should the fact that Western man has lived for two thousand years on his definition 
as a rational animal necessarily mean that he has recognised the possibility of an 
order common to reason and to animality? '. 6 
The wilful adoption of the appearance of animals was regarded as an 
especially sinful perversion in the late Middle Ages. Jacques de Vitry relates the 
following cautionary story: 
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I have heard of one man who, wishing to do penance, even as he 
had likened himself to the beasts in sin, so he would make himself 
like to a beast in his food; wherefore he rose up at dawn and 
browsed on grass without touching it with his hands; and thus he 
would oftentimes eat daily.? 
When this 'voluntary Nebuchadnezzar' wonders what order of angels he should be 
allowed to join after such abject penance, he receives a humbling rebuke from a 
heavenly voice: 
'By such a life thou hast not deserved to be of the Order of Angels, 
but rather of the Order of Asses. For, as saith St. Bernard: "He 
who hath not lived as a man shall live as a beast"'; so this man fell 
8 from discretion into presumption. 
The story exemplifies the intimate connection of sin, madness and brutishness in 
clerical writings. 
The Nebuchadnezzar story was clearly a favourite among didactic authors 
in the Middle Ages, functioning as a warning to the powerful to shun the vice of 
pride; in the Confessio Amantis, Gower himself tells the story of 
Nebuchadnezzar's transformation into an ox-9 The relevance of such stories to the 
lower classes is not immediately obvious: since medieval churls did not wield 
political power, the idea of a mad peasant was largely redundant. The Vox 
Clamantis, however, like many other contemporary texts, reflects a widespread 
official fear at the attempts of the rebels of 1381 to challenge and even seize 
power. Unsurprisingly, such presumption is perceived by Gower as utter madness. 
The chroniclers of the Revolt attribute the mad brutishness of the rioters to 
their sinfulness. If sin is ubiquitous, corrupting even those of high degree, its 
stigma nevertheless attaches most firmly to the lower class. As Chaucer's Parson 
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puts it, 'Every synful man is a cherl to synne'. 10 Despite its apparent 
even-handedness, this remark cynically reinforces the widespread notion of the 
peasantry as a degenerate class. The man of high degree is degraded by his sin; the 
peasant, on the other hand, is of a lower moral calibre by birth. As Lee Patterson 
has argued, this emphasis on the medieval peasant's spiritual inferiority is based 
on a peculiar misrepresentation of Augustinian ideas which resulted in his 
definition as 'belonging to another order of being, as a member of a different race, 
a nonhuman'. II 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the language of madness, possession and 
brutishness dominates clerical descriptions of social disturbances involving the 
lower classes. This is particularly evident in condemnations of popular churchyard 
dances, which often involved transvestism or dressing as animals. Such behaviour 
incurs severe penalties in medieval penitentials. 'If anyone [does] what many do 
on the Kalends of January as was done hitherto among the pagans', says the 
Burgundian Penitential, 'seats himself on a stag, as it is called, or goes about in 
[the guise of] a calf, he shall do penance for three years, for this is demoniacal'. 12 
The Penitential of St Hubert, meanwhile, recommends three years of penance for 
'anyone who performs dances in front of the churches of saints or anyone who 
disguises his appearance in the guise of a woman or of beasts'. 13 
As Judith Neaman writes, 'if men, by indulging in pagan rites, mimic the 
beasts or pervert the human forms which God gave them, they bring upon 
themselves the anathema of the Church'. 14 Thus St Aurelius 'condemns men who 
cover themselves with the hides of animals and dance in the heads of animals so 
that they "do not seem to be men"', and St Peter Chrysologus calls such bestial 
rites 'vanitas, qualis dementia' (a foolishness like a dementia). 15 The following 
citation from Johannes Crysostomus in the pseudo-Bonaventura's Pharetra is 
particularly germane to Gower's vision of the revolters: 
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Comparatus est, ait propheta, homo iumentis insipientibus, et 
similis factus est eis. Peius est comparari quam nasci. Naturaliter 
non habere rationem tolerabile est, verum ratione decoratum 
irrationabili creature comparari voluntatis est crimen non nature. 
[Man is compared, says the prophet, to the foolish beasts of burden, 
and he became like them. It is worse to be likened to one than to be 
born [one? ]. To lack reason by nature is bearable, but to liken a 
creature endowed with reason to a brute beast is to level an 
accusation against his will and not his nature]. 16 
Later in the Middle Ages John of Salisbury complains that 
human dignity is manifestly thrown away if man devotes himself to 
being on the same level with, if not goats and pigs, then lions and 
panthers, leopards and satyrs, peacocks, nightingales and parrots, or 
any beasts or insensate creatures whatsoever. 17 
'Who of those who affect the endowments of beasts', he continues, 'deem it 
proper for themselves actually to be beasts? '. 18 St Maximius comments that 
the langour of those is more serious and incurable who are deceived 
by the sweetness of delusions and are unhealthy in the guise of 
outward health. Are not all of those false and mad (falsa et insana) 
since they were made by God, when they change into sheep or 
beasts or monsters [of depravity]? 19 
Maximius is referring here to internal rather than external changes, which are 'all 
the more iniquitous because they are so hard to detect'. 20 It is precisely such inner 
transformations that Gower detects in the hearts of the rebels of 1381. Clearly, 
118 
while they are generally characterized as outbursts of random, demented action, 
both social revolt and the sorts of church dances described above imply a degree of 
organization that is deeply disturbing to the authorities. 
Book I of the Vox Clamantis constitutes a lengthy and vehement 
denunciation of the sinful, irrational and bestial behaviour of the peasants during 
the Revolt. No doubt civil disobedience provoked allegations of madness in 
England both before and after the Revolt. In 1194 the leader of an uprising in 
London, William Fitzosbert, is called mad in an official account of the event. 
Three hundred years later Adam of Usk refers to the 'savage fury' of the workmen . 
who beheaded the Lord Despencer at Bristol. 21 But as Lee Patterson has shown, 
during the 1381 Revolt the language of insanity and demonic possession is 
ubiquitously invoked by conservative commentators. Thus the leader of the rebels, 
John Ball, is described by Henry Knighton as 'a most famous preacher to the 
laity', who for many years 'had sowed the word of God in a most foolish 
manner'. Thomas Walsingham, meanwhile, blames Ball for spreading 'the 
perverse doctrines of the perfidious John Wycliffe, and the insane opinions that he 
held'. 22 As Patterson says, 
for Walsingham, the Revolt as a whole is an expression of the 
insania nativorum -- the madness of bondmen -- and his account is 
[... ] saturated with terms like dementes, irrationibile, and stulti and 
invokes throughout the language of satanic possession: the rebels 
are ganeones daemoniaci (children of the devil), perhaps even 
pejores daemonibus (worse than devils). 23 
The response of the English rebels to such rhetoric was to insist on their dignity 
and rationality. According to John Ball, for example, the disordered state of 
England could only be set to rights by 'prudent men'. 24 
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The association between madness and social and moral revolt is already 
prominent in Gower's first long work, the Anglo-French Mirour de L'Omme. Here 
Gower identifies the sins with animal nature. The source of all sin in the world, he 
says, is man, the 'Beste [... ] A qui dieus ad reson donne' (MO, 26789-26790). 25 
Like other churchmen, Gower sees the man lacking reason as both bestial and 
immoral. Sin causes man to lose his rationality, turning 'reson en bestialite' (MO, 
24). 
These ideas are elaborated in Book VII of the Vox Clamantis, which was 
written before Book I: 
Et sic bruta quasi perdit humanae racionis 
Virtus, dum vicium corporis acta regit. 
Est homo nunc animal dicam, set non racionis, 
Dum viuit bruti condicione pari. 
Nescia scripture brutum natura gubernat, 
Iudicis arbitrium nec rationis habet: 
Est igitur brutis homo peior, quando voluntas 
Preter naturam sola gubernat eum. (7.1171-1178) 
[And so the power of human reason perishes as if it were that of a 
beast, so long as vice governs the actions of the body. Now, I 
should say that man is an animal, but not a rational animal, as long 
as he lives in a condition like a brute beast's. A nature ignorant of 
learning governs a beast, and it has no power of judgement or 
reason. Man is therefore worse than a beast when his will alone 
governs him contrary to nature]. 26 
Two passages from the Mirour illustrate the social application of Gower's 
theological thinking about madness. The first concludes the section dealing with 
the peasantry in Gower's discussion of the estates: 
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Mais certes c'est un grant errour 
Veoir Testat superiour 
El danger d'un vilein estant. 
Me semble que la litargie 
Ad endormi la seignourie, 
Si qu'ils de la commune gent 
Ne pernont garde a la folie [... ] 
Car ja ne serront arrestuz 
Par resoun ne par discipline. (MO, 26482-26504) 
[But certainly it is a great error to see the higher class intimidated 
by the peasant class. It seems to me that lethargy has so put the 
nobility to sleep that they do not guard against the folly of the 
common people [... ] for they will not be stopped by reason or by 
disciplinel. 27 
Although unique, Gower's prognostication of the Revolt is far from uncanny, 
especially if one regards peasant revolts as natural to seigneurial regimes. 
28 News 
of the French Jacquerie of 1358 no doubt made an impression on English 
imaginations, especially at a time of increasing peasant discontent. 29 Gower 
clearly perceives the danger of a peasant insurrection some five years before the 
event; and the rhetoric of madness which pervades Book I of the Vox is already in 
evidence here. 
The second passage, in which Gower introduces the image of the peasants 
as so many animals, also anticipates the events of 1381: 
Qant pie se lievre contre teste, 
Trop est la guise deshonneste; 
Et ensi qant contre seignour 
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Les gens sicomme salvage beste 
En multitude et en tempeste 
Se lievent, c'est un grant errour; 
Et nopourquant la gent menour 
Diont que leur superiour 
Donnent la cause du moleste, 
C'est de commune le clamour: 
Mais tout cela nest que folour, 
Q'au siecle nul remede preste. (MO, 27229-27240) 
[When the foot rebels against the head the behavior is wholly 
illegitimate; thus when the people rise up like savage beasts in 
tempestuous multitude against the nobleman, it is a great mistake. 
And notwithstanding, the inferior people say that their superiors 
give the cause for their injury -- this is the common cry. But all this 
is but folly for which there is no immediate remedy]. 30 
The first lines invoke what has become known as the 'organic analogy' of society. 
Although of classical pedigree, this social model was first applied to the feudal 
Middle Ages by John of Salisbury in the Policraticus, a work of monumental 
significance for subsequent political philosophy. 
According to John's model, human society is a reflection of a divine ideal. 
A properly functioning society is like a healthy human body; the disordered human 
body, on the other hand, is a metaphor for social disruption and revolt. The head 
of the feudal body, of course, is the sovereign. 'The feet', according to Salisbury, 
'are the name of those who exercize the humbler duties, by whose service all the 
members of the republic may walk along the earth. In this accounting may be 
included all the peasants who always stick to the land'. 31 The organic analogy 
remained popular in the late Middle Ages, appearing in such diverse works as the 
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writings of the fourteenth-century bishop Thomas Brinton and the fifteenth-century 
political poem 'The Descryving of Mannes Membres'. 32 
For conservative theorists such as John 'the human body becomes a useful 
image [... ] because it stresses the subordination of the parts to the whole, and the 
inability of the parts to function as independent and self-sufficient units'. 33 John's 
model of society describes not the teeming aggregate of competing individuals of 
later political philosophy, but a hierarchical structure held together by natural or 
pietal, rather than contractual bonds. This is the ideal form of human society 
whose unattainability is lamented in the Paradiso and the Monarchia and it no 
more corresponds to reality than Dante's vision; indeed, the organic society, as 
radical critics so frequently remind us, seems to have been in decay since its 
inception. 34 
The view that medieval society was homogenous and harmonious has 
nevertheless found many twentieth-century defenders. The classic and much 
attacked articulation of this position is D. W. Robertson's statement that 'the 
medieval world was innocent of our profound concern for tension. [... ] We project 
dynamic polarities on history as class struggles, balances of power, or as conflicts 
between economic realities and traditional ideals. [... ] But the medieval world 
with its quiet hierarchies knew nothing of these things'. 35 Yet Gower's 
community was not as unified as he and other promoters of the organic analogy 
might have wished. Although there is no space to rehearse the arguments here, 
many recent studies suggest that class relations were far from harmonious and that 
market competition threatened the cohesion of late-medieval English society. 36 
Gower did not, of course, perceive the disintegration of feudalism and the rise of 
capitalism; on the contrary, the feudal system is the only social order he could 
have understood. Like many others, however, he is clearly troubled by the 
increasing autonomy of certain social groups. The author of the early 
fifteenth-century Dives and Pauper shares the same concern. 'Euery man', he 
complains, 
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wil ben his owyn man & folwyn his owyn fantasyys & despysyn her 
souereynys, her doom & her gouernance ne 3euyn no tale of Goddis 
lawe ne of londys lawe ne of holy chiche ne han men of vertue ne 
of dignete in worchepe but for pride han hem in dispyt and ben besy 
to worchepyn hemself in hyndryng of opere. 37 
Clearly, by the late fourteenth century an embarrassing disparity is apparent 
between feudal ideology and social realities. 
For Gower, as for the author of Dives and Pauper, the collapse of social 
hierarchy is attributable to individual pride, a sin punishable by madness. But this 
should not prevent us from discussing the economic reasons for social change in 
the late Middle Ages. At the bottom end of society, major economic changes were 
affecting the relationships between peasants and their masters. Peasants began to 
enjoy greater mobility in the labour market, so that laws against higher wages had 
to be introduced to prevent them from leaving their natural lords. Moreover, the 
historian Rodney Hilton observes that during the period from 1350 to 1450 a 
'relative land abundance was combined, for various reasons, with a relaxation of 
seigneurial domination and a notable lightening of the burden on the peasant 
economy' so that 'peasant society, in spite of still existing within (in broad terms) 
a feudal framework, developed according to laws of motion internal to itself'. 38 
The result was a growing economic self-sufficiency and self-confidence among the 
peasantry. 
For Gower, as for many of his contemporaries, the only answer to these 
alarming developments was to restate and attempt to uphold official ideology. As 
John Fisher succinctly says of the two passages from the Mirour de L'Omme 
quoted above: 
124 
both passages represent the practical application of the theories of 
law and order emerging at the end of the Mirour. Reason and 
human law supported the social hierarchy just as natural law 
supported the natural hierarchy. Rebellion against the social 
hierarchy represented rebellion against reason and law, and 
ultimately against the divinely instituted universal order, and it 
reduced the rebels to the level of unreasoning beasts. 39 
The Mirour de L'Omme, then, introduces both the theological framework and the 
social vision informing the first book of Vox Clamantis and reflects the uneasiness 
of the seigneurial class about the increasing autonomy of the peasantry. 
Book I of the Vox was added by Gower as an afterthought to an already 
extensive work. 40 It has many artistic flaws, chiefly a lachrymose monotony. 
Even so, as Eric W. Stockton opines, 'Gower's account of the revolt is the most 
interesting and original part of the Vox Clamantis'. 41 It is also Gower's final 
damning judgement of society. Although an afterthought, Book I graphically 
depicts the disintegration of a community, the various causes of which are 
analysed in more leisurely fashion in the remaining books. Even disregarding the 
first book's overwhelming concern with madness, then, it is not unreasonable to 
restrict our interest in the Vox to the first book. 
The Book begins with an idyllic description of England shortly before the 
Revolt in June 1381. The narrator, basking in sunshine and listening to birdsong, 
admires the plenitude of nature. This paradisiacal experience is, of course, entirely 
ficticious both in terms of the state of English society before the Revolt and from 
the point of view of Gower's own expectations: in the Mirour Gower had already 
acknowledged peasant discontent and had anticipated their rising. Book I's utopic 
vision, then, has dramatic rather than historical validity. A hideous transformation 
of the natural order is about to take place, one which is clearly intended to mirror 
the Fall from Paradise, the event which inaugurated human madness and man's 
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descent into animality. As Robert Burton laments, the Fall made man 'inferiour to 
a beast' and 'much altered from that he was, before blessed and happy, now 
miserable and accursed'. 42 
At the end of the first chapter the narrator falls asleep and his dream-vision 
begins -- even although, bewilderingly, he has already indicated that everything 
hitherto has been a dream. There follows an astonishing version of the Peasants' 
Revolt, in which various bands of peasants metamorphosize into domestic animals: 
Ecce dei subito malediccio fulsit in illos, 
Et mutans formas feceret esse feras. 
Qui fuerent homines prius innate rationis, 
Brutorum species irracionis habent: (175-178) 
[Behold, the curse of God flashed upon them, and changing their 
shapes, it had made them into wild beasts. They who had been men 
of reason before had the look of unreasoning brutes]. 
The first band of rioters is transformed into a group of braying asses, the second 
into oxen, and so on. 
Worse still, each group undergoes a second transformation, so that it 
forsakes nature and becomes wild: 
Sic asini fatui, quos fastus concitat, omni 
Postposita lege condita iura negant. 
Hos intemperies sic aeris inficiebat, 
Quod transformati sunt quasi monstra michi: (221-224) 
[Thus did the fatuous asses, whom arrogance aroused, refuse their 
appointed duties by overthrowing all control. The madness in the air so 
ruined them that they seemed to be tranformed into monsters]. 
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In their pride the animals, which in their proper place partook of the plenitude of 
nature, have now forsaken nature. According to Michel Foucault, animals have 
always been associated with the unnatural and with madness. 'From the start', he 
says, 
Western culture has not considered it evident that animals 
participate in the plenitude of nature, in its wisdom and its order. 
[... ] In fact, on close examination, it becomes evident that the 
animal belongs rather to anti-nature, to a negativity that threatens 
order and by its frenzy endangers the positive wisdom of nature. 43 
For Gower, the commoners, like the animals, are useful in their place; but once 
they have cast off their burdens and refuse to work, they threaten social order. The 
animals have become monsters. 
Such a view is supported by a weight of contemporary rhetoric which 
insisted on the essentially bestial nature of the lower classes. Adam of Usk, for 
example, describes Richard II's Cheshire archers as 'by nature bestial, not drawn 
from the gentlemen of the countryside but from the rustics or tailors or artisans. 
[... ] Men who at home were hardly worthy to take off the shoes of their masters 
have behaved like equals and fellows of their lords'. 44 Peasant resentment at being 
considered as so many animals to be contained is detectable throughout the Middle 
Ages and may very well have contributed to the rising. 'Euery beste that leuyth 
now', laments a popular fifteenth-century song, 'Is of more fredam than thow'. 45 
In the opening chapters of the Vox the description of the rebels as wild 
beasts is complemented by the language of insanity and demonic possession. The 
third rebel band, for example, is transformed into possessed swine: 
Hii fuerant porci, maledictus spiritus in quos 
Intravit, sicut leccio sancta refert. (377-378) 
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[They were swine into which a cursed spirit had entered, just as 
holy writ tells of]. 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, writers such as Carlisle and Swift used 
the parable of the Gadarene swine as a political allegory for the gullibility of the 
masses. Gower, however, subscribes to the moral interpretation found in the 
Glossa Ordinaria, which asserts that not only the sinner in the parable, but also 
the possessed swine, were figuratively sinful, 
lacking speech and reason, given to filthy deeds, grazing on the 
mountain of pride. And unless a man lives thus like a pig, the devil 
receives no power over him, or rather, he receives power only to 
test him, not to destroy him. 46 
The same ideas are present in the later passage: 
Demonis ex stirpe furiens fuit illa propago, 
Horrida facta viris et violenta deo; 
Contemprix superum, seueque auidissima cedis, 
Vt lupus est, ouium dum furit ipse fame. (751-754) 
[This was the mad progeny of the devil's breed, rendered horrible 
in the eyes of men and rash in the eyes of God, contemptuous of 
higher powers and ferociously eager for slaughter, just as the wolf 
is when it goes mad with hunger for sheep]. 
As Maria Wickert remarks, 'the bestial rebel becomes the demonic'. 4' Even after 
the rebels have been subdued, the diabolical stigma persists: 
Sic ope diuina Sathane iacet obruta virtus, 
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Que tarnen indomita rusticitate latet; (2097-2098) 
[Satan's power lay prostrate, overwhelmed by divine might; but 
nevertheless it lurked in hiding among the ungovernable peasantry]. 
Gower's attitude towards madness is evidently that of his fellow churchmen and 
medieval social theorists such as John of Salisbury. 
To a far greater degree than their successors, medieval people developed 
their sense of purpose and identity through their experiences in the civic sphere. It 
is therefore unsurprising that, as John Fisher says, Gower presents London as 'the 
symbol of order'. 
48 The marauding peasantry, by contrast, are presented as the 
bestial and satanic forces of chaos and destruction. But the symbolic nature of 
Book I of the Vox entails major distortions of historical fact. Indeed, Gower's 
version of the events of the Revolt is almost as fictitious as the utopian vision of 
England with which the poem begins: the rebels did not, for example, sack or 
defile churches as the narrator claims. Gower includes this allegation because it 
makes sense that the devil's servants would do such things. 
Book I of the Vox, then, is one of the most sustained and vitriolic pieces of 
English writing to use the language of madness. What makes it significantly 
different from other literary descriptions of madness is its concern with the 
derangement of an entire social class rather than one individual. Moreover, 
madness here is a metaphor for insurrection and political subversion. We must 
therefore question the assumption that madness was not yet considered a 'problem 
of the city' and that it had not yet taken on a 'political, social and ethical 
49 status'. 
Indeed, the association of madness, demonic possession and serious civil 
disorder is found in many medieval accounts of urban dancing frenzies. 50 The 
third-century Christian writer Minucius Felix attributes to the pagan gods 
responsibility for 
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the madmen, whom you see running out into the streets, themselves 
soothsayers of a kind but without a temple, raging, ranting, 
whirling round in the dance; there is the same demoniacal 
possession, but the object of the frenzy is different. 51 
In the fourteenth century Robert Mannyng denounces as insane those who took 
part in the semi-legendary dance at Kölbigk three centuries earlier. 
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Of more immediate relevance to the Vox Clamantis, however, are 
contemporary descriptions of the dancing frenzies which swept North-Western 
Europe in 1374. The condition of the participants in these dances is described in a 
monk's eyewitness account: 
Both men and women were abused by the devil to such a degree 
that they danced in their homes, in the churches and in the streets, 
holding each other's hands and leaping in the air. While they 
danced they called out the names of demons, such as Friskes and 
others, but they were unaware of this nor did they pay attention to 
modesty even though people watched them. At the end of the 
dance, they felt such pains in the chest, that if their friends did not 
tie linen clothes tightly around their waists, they cried out like 
madmen that they were dying. 53 
The monk goes on to note that the dancers, who were drawn predominantly from 
the lower classes, considered openly revolting against the clergy, and would have 
done so if the priests's exorcisms had not proved so effective in quelling the 
disturbances. Indeed, the dancing frenzy of 1374 was simply a repetition on a 
grand scale of the frequent popular dances which took place in churchyards 
throughout the Middle Ages. As we have seen, the participants in such dances 
were denounced by the churchmen in the language of madness and demonic 
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possession. It is unsurprising, then, that the English rebels of 1381 were described 
in precisely these terms by the representatives of offical culture. 54 
Given the ubiquity of peasant disorder in the Vox Clamantis, it is no 
surprise that the equanimity of the entire society is jeopardized. As Gower reminds 
us in Book VII of the Vox, 
Sic minor est mundus homo, qui fert singula solus, 
Soli solus homo dat sacra vota deo. 
Est homo qui mundus de iure suo sibi mundum 
Subdit, et in melius dirigit inde status: 
Si tarnen inmundus est, que sunt singula mundi 
Ledit, et in peius omne refundit opus: (7.645-650) 
[Thus man, who alone does everything, is a microcosm; and man 
alone pays sacred devotion to God alone. The man who is pure in 
his own right subjects the world to himself, and accordingly guides 
its circumstances for the better. If he is impure, however, he is 
injurious to everything which pertains to the world, and redirects its 
whole fabric for the worse]. 
This view of the 'little world of man' accords both with John of Salisbury's 
organic metaphor of society and with the essentially somatic approach to illness 
and madness in the Middle Ages. Thus the actions of rebellious or simply 
autonomous sections of society were seen to have a deleterious effect on the social 
body. 'Civil life should imitate nature', writes John of Salisbury, 'otherwise, life 
is duly called not merely uncivil, but rather bestial and brute'. 55 
The remainder of Book I deals with the destruction of a once proud city 
and the dreamer's descent into brutishness. In Chapter 15 of Book I, Gower 
depicts the solidarity of the upper class in its physical and mental anguish: 
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Ora rigant fletus, tremit et formidine pectus, 
Gaudia que fuerant deuorat ipsa dolor, 
Aspiceres alios flentes terraque iacentes, 
Quos dolor alterius proprius atque dolet, (1337-1340) 
[Tears wetted people's faces, and breasts trembled with fear, and 
grief consumed the joys which once had existed. You might have 
seen some lying on the ground weeping for others, and one's own 
sorrow was another's grief]. 
For many, grief leads to outright madness: 
Sic magis orbatas quam sepe maritis 
Femineas vidi corde dolente genas; 
Sepe manus stringi, dirumpere sepeque crines, 
Vngues et propriam dilaniare cutem. (1223-1226) 
[With grieving heart I saw the woman bereaved of her husband 
often wet her delicate cheeks, often wring her hands and tear her 
hair, and her nails lacerate her own skin]. 
As in many medieval romances, grief-madness here is principally intended to 
inspire sympathy rather than imply moral taint. 
The dreamer himself is now afflicted with grief-madness. Like the exiled 
Ovid of the Tristia, on which Gower now draws frequently, he endures an abject 
exile in the 'wild woodlands' in order to escape the angry mobs (1382). He even 
comes to resemble the hero of the French romance Renaus et Montauban, hiding 
from his enemies and living 'like a hunted animal': 56 
Attamen ad tantam rabiem pedibus timor alas 
Addidit, et volucris in fugiendo fui. 
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Sic vagus hic et ibi, quo Bors ducebat euntem, 
Temptaui varia cum grauitate loca: 
Pes vagat osque silet, oculus stupet et dolet auris, 
Cor timet et rigide diriguere come. 
Sicut aper, quem turba canum cicumsona terret, 
Territus extrema rebar adire loca. (1389-1396) 
[Nevertheless, fear of this great madness added wings to my feet, 
and I was like a bird in my swift flight. So, wandering here and 
there as chance led me as I went, I made a serious attempt for 
several places. My steps wandered, and my lips were silent; my eye 
was struck with amazement and my ear was in pain; my heart 
trembled and my hair stood stiffly on end. Panicky as a wild boar 
which a pack of dogs frightens by barking around it, I thought 
about withdrawing to very remote places]. 
The dreamer's comparison of himself to a bird recalls the experience of the Irish 
hero Suibhne, who becomes so deranged with fear at the battle of Magh Rath that, 
'through Ronan's curse he went, like any bird of the air, in madness and 
imbecility'. 57 Indeed, however much they owe to classical sources, the dreamer's 
desire for remoteness, his aimless wandering, his muteness, his meagre diet of 
acorns and his bed of grass all recall the physical hardships of the Irish hero. 
Gower also clearly draws on the wild man tradition of medieval romance as 
he 'begins to resemble the beasts who attack'. 58 Nevertheless, his madness is 
presented sympathetically, like that of the bestial heroes Yvain and Tristan. 
Moreover, the dreamer's abject condition links him with John the Baptist, the 
figure most commonly associated with the phrase to which Gower's title alludes -- 
'the voice of one crying in the wilderness'. In the Cursor Mundi, for example, the 
prophet appears as an English Wild Man subsisting 'wit rotes and wit gres'. 59 In 
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the light of these precedents, the dreamer's madness takes on a quite different 
moral significance from the frenzy of the city rebels. 
The dreamer later refers to the 'insane look upon my anxious face' 
(trepidoque insania vultu [1479]) and in various places to his speechlessness, 
pallor, sleeplessness, leanness, loss of appetite and thoughts of suicide. All of 
these, of course, are conventional manifestations of melancholy madness. Like the 
distracted heroes of the romances, he is so changed that he loses his human 
appearance and becomes quite unrecognisable even to himself (1480). The 
dreamer's mental state is throughout connected with his physical degeneration: 
Sic magis a longo passum quod corpus habebam, 
Vix habuit tenuem qua tegat ossa cutem; 
Sicque diu pauidas pariter cum mente colorem 
Perdideram, que fui sic nouus alter ego. 
Vix fuerat quod ego solida me mente recepi. (1487-1491) 
[I underwent long suffering because of the fact that my body 
scarcely possessed even a thin skin to cover my bones. And 
suffering just as long a time in mind, too, I lost my color, and so I 
was like another self. It was with difficulty that I kept myself in 
sound mind]. 
The dreamer suffers -- from the inside, as it were -- a crisis of identity analogous 
to that of the romance heroes. Although he is haunted by recollections of the 
violent events of the past, his memory seems constantly to be in jeopardy: 
Ha, quociens fuerat mea mens oblita quid essem, 
Dum status anterior posteriors tenet! (1421-1422) 
[Alas! How many times did my mind forget what I was, as [in] its 
wonted way it clung to the past]. 
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Elsewhere he tells us that 'Vt lapis a mente sepe remotus eram' (1574) 11 was 
often far out of my mind [and] like a stone]. 
Like the madness of the grieving woman in Chapter 15, the dreamer's 
madness is intended to inspire sympathy rather than condemnation, and it too is 
caused by grief. 'Grief', he tells us, 'was my mind's principal concern' (1449). 
Fear and sorrow, of course, are also prominent emotions throughout the entire 
vision; the dreamer's madness, then, is caused by one or a number of the 
'passions', which implied far less moral taint in the Middle Ages than demonic 
possession. Also, unlike the frenzy of the rebels, the dreamer's madness has a 
penitential aspect: the dreamer suggests that his co-sufferers must take some 
responsibility, however limited, for their inability to maintain social order. This 
sense of collective responsibility for the calamitous Revolt is echoed in 
contemporary analyses of its causes. 'Let us acknowledge that we are all to 
blame', writes Thomas Walsingham after the Revolt, 'and amend as best we can 
those sins which we have knowingly committed'. 60 Like John the Baptist, the 
dreamer seeks the regeneration of the faithful through a renunciation of sin. 
Clearly, 'Gower's tears and those of his audience are intended, as rueful 
tears of the sacrament of penance, to lead to a reconciliation with God and to a 
regeneration of the individual as well as of the people'. 61 What the dreamer fears 
most, even more than a grisly and ignoble death at the hands of the rebels, is that 
his temporary alienation from God will become permanent: 
Plura dolens timui tunc temporis, et super omne 
Ira dei magni causa timoris erat: (1455-1456) 
[Even as I was grieving over these many things, I was very much 
afraid at this time; and above all, the wrath of God was a 
considerable cause of fear on my part]. 
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As Penelope Doob has argued, the exile of the lone madman has always a 
penitential aspect. 62 The outcast dreamer, however pathetic, is therefore 
spiritually as well as socially alienated. 
Indeed, the dreamer's wildness has much in common with Gower's 
description, in Confessio Amantis, of Nebuchadnezzar's transformation and 
pathetic life in the wilderness. Gower tells this story in great detail and from a 
subjective point of view; he is also sympathetic towards the fallen king: 
Upon himself tho gan he loke; 
In stede of mete gras and stres, 
In stede of handes longe Iles, 
In stede of man a bestes Tyke 
He syh; and thanne he gan to syke 
For cloth of gold and for perrie, 
Which him was wont to magnefie. 
When he behield his Cote of heres, 
he wept and with fulwoful teres 
Up to the hevene he caste his chiere 
Wepende, and thoghte in this manere; 
Thogh he no wordes myhte winne, 
Thus seide his herte and spak withinne: 
'0 mihti godd, that at hast wroght 
And at myht bringe ayein to noght, 
Now knowe I wel, bot at of thee, 
This world hath no prosperite. ' (I. 2992-3008) 
As Doob comments, Nebuchadnezzar's 'madness is subordinated to his bestiality'; 
in this way it invites comparison with the madness of the dreamer in the Vox. 63 
Nebuchadnezzar's subsequent confession and his pledge of amendment also recall 
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the penitential aspect of the dreamer's sylvan existence. It is even possible that 
Gower had Book I of the Vox in mind when he turned his attention to 
Nebuchadnezzar in the later work. In these passages Gower draws on a very 
different sort of rhetoric about madness to that which prevails at the beginning of 
the Vox. 
Huizinga and others have characterized the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries as a period of melancholy pessimism in which the nobility felt 'a 
sentimental need of enrobing their souls in the garb of woe'. 64 Gower's 
unrelentingly apocalyptic view of a doomed world overrun by merciless madmen 
is in this sense typical of his age. For Gower, the frenzied events of the Revolt are 
both signs and causes of the world's end. Thus Gower anticipates the destructive 
images of late Gothic art. In Michel Foucault's solemn words, 'it is the tide of 
madness, its secret invasion, that shows that the world is near its final catastrophe; 
it is man's insanity that invokes and makes necessary the world's end'. 65 In 
fifteenth-century literature, certainly, the madness of men ushered in the world's 
end. In 'The Fiftene Toknys Aforn the Doom', Gower's follower John Lydgate 
gives a macabre description of mute madmen in the last days which recalls the Vox 
in tone: 
The tenth day, from kavernys & ther kavys 
Men shal come out, lyk folk that kan no good, 
And renne abrood lyk drounke men that Ravys 
Or as they weren frentyk, outhir wood, 
Dedly pale, and devoyde of blood; 
Nat speke a woord Oon vnto anothir, 
As witles peple of resoun and of mood [mind], 
No queyntaunce maad, brothir vnto brothir. 66 
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The jaundiced sentiments of the Vox also prefigure Villon's hopeless vision 
of humanity in his Ballade (de bon conseil): 
Hommes faillis, bersaudez de raison, 
Desnaturez et hors de congoissance, 
Desmis du sens, comblez de desraison, 
Fols abusez, plains de descongoissance, 
[0 soul sick men, barred from reason, 
perverted, beyond consciousness, 
deranged, no longer rational, 
deluded fools filled with ignorance]. 
67 
Like Villon, the Gower of the Vox believes that the only solution to this general 
madness is repentance before the Last Judgement. Although the peasants are 
chiefly to blame for the violence of 1381, the insanity of the Revolt is an 
abomination for which all men must take some responsibility and which affects all 
sections of society. In this sense, the significance of madness as a cosmic drama 
intertwines with quite specific historical and political concerns. 
A concern with madness and sinfulness, of course, is not uncommon in late 
fourteenth-century literature. In the poem Pearl, for example, the maiden calls the 
worldly dreamer mad on several occasions and the dreamer finally comes to realise 
his spiritual turpitude with the Gowerian sentiment, 'Lorde, mad hit am that agayn 
the stryven'. 68 The Vox Clamantis, however, couches both moral and civil 
disorder in terms of madness. Gower applies the traditional warning that the 
-disordered human society is bestial and unnatural to the more immediate social 
concerns of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, a period in which, as John 
Bellamy puts it, 'the preservation of public order was very often the biggest 
problem the king had to face. Neither before that time nor since has the issue of 
public order bulked so large in English history'. 69 Gower also illustrates the 
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theological and social concepts underlying the relationship between madness and 
social class with all the gloomy pessimism of his age. Nevertheless, that epoch, 
like every other, was by no means one of literary homogeneity. As the works of 
Chaucer demonstrate, Gower's is not the only possible reaction to the apparent 
madness of the Peasants' Revolt. 
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Chapter 4 
'Thou mayst nat werken after thyn owene heed': Madness and 
Rationality in Chaucer's Miller's and Summoner's Tales 
The enormous stylistic differences between the works of Gower and Chaucer can 
frustrate comparative literary criticism. As John Fisher notes, 'to modern readers, 
Chaucer's and Gower's treatments of the same material are so different that 
comparison appears fruitless, if not downright wrongheaded'. 
I Nevertheless, since 
Chaucer and Gower were both active writers during the Peasants' Revolt, it should 
not surprise us that Chaucer's Miller's and Summoner's tales explore, albeit in a 
quite different tone, the same powerful connection between madness and social 
class that Gower exploits in the Vox Clamantis. 
Neither psychiatric historians nor literary critics have had much to say 
about the theme of madness in Chaucer. The nineteenth-century historian Daniel 
Hack Tuke remarked disappointedly that 'there is not much to be found in Chaucer 
[... ] bearing in any way upon the insane'. 2 Tuke's statement is fair insofar as it 
refers to examples or discussions of actual madness. Melibee is afflicted with 
grief-madness when he learns of the injury done by his enemies to his wife and 
daughter. There are also examples of anger-madness scattered throughout the 
Canterbury Tales; and Rose Zimbardo has argued for the insanity of the narrator 
of The Book of the Duchess. 3 Madness, however, is rarely a prominent theme. 
Not even Chaucer's works of romance contain insane protagonists. Although each 
becomes lovesick for his love of Emily, Palamon and Arcite cannot properly be 
described as mad; not even Troilus's love languishment, as Judith Neaman 
observes, develops into a full-blown psychosis. 4 Nevertheless, examples of 
feigned or spurious insanity are relatively common in the Canterbury Tales. The 
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Miller's and Summoner's tales, in particular, show a sophisticated awareness of the 
rhetorical uses of the language of madness. 
A discussion of these tales is conspicuously absent from Penelope Doob's 
study of the conventions of madness in Middle English literature. 5 One reason for 
this omission is that any discussion of madness in the tales involves close attention 
to historical detail, whereas Doob is concerned principally with the literary 
manifestations of the trans-historical Christian association between madness and 
sin. The value and persuasiveness of Doob's thesis has already been noted; but the 
application to medieval literature of conventional ideas about madness should not 
preclude investigation into social context. 
The current ideas about madness at any historical point, of course, are 
never easily separable from conventional or traditional ones. Throughout the 
Middle Ages the rhetorical use of the language of madness, in particular, is often 
remarkably similar from one genre to another. This becomes clear when one 
compares the language of madness in religious and secular texts. The cleric Dan 
Michel writes that heretics, unbelievers and those who commit sacrilege are 'ase 
wode hounder / bet bitep and ne knawep na3t hare lhord'. 6 Clearly, Michel is 
talking about the madness of sin. But substitute a secular for a heavenly 'lhord' 
and the remark could be drawn from any of the official invectives on the Revolt of 
1381: Book I of the Vox, it has been seen, presents the revolting peasants as so 
many insane and ungovernable animals. Similarities between clerical and other 
fields of discourse about madness are evident even in writings of different 
historical periods; indeed, Michel's work predates the Revolt by some forty years. 
Despite such overlaps between historical and conventional detail, Chaucer's 
concern with insanity in the Miller's and Summoner's tales may be fully 
understood in relation not to conventional Christian ideas about insanity, but to the 
political climate of England in the early 1380s. From this point of view, the fact 
that the Miller's Tale -- and arguably the Summoner's Tale -- falls into the fabliau 
genre poses a particular problem. Literary criticism has tended to focus on the 
148 
continental sources of the fabliaux, perhaps hindering attempts to set the tales in 
their historical contexts. Yet, as John Hines suggests of the English fabliaux, 'it is 
often more productive to refer [... ] to their immediate historical context to achieve 
a critical understanding and appreciation of this literature than to compare them 
with foreign-language counterparts'. 
7 Such an approach seems particularly fruitful 
in the case of the Miller's Tale, in which some of the most prominent themes -- 
such as madness, astrology and the scholarly life -- are Chaucerian additions to the 
basic fabliau story. 8 
Hitherto, the only critic to have examined the theme of madness in Chaucer 
in the light of its historical context is Lee Patterson. 9 Patterson shows that the 
historically-charged language of madness at the end of the Miller's and 
Summoner's tales reflects the vocabulary used in the invectives of the seigneurial 
class against the peasantry at the time of the 1381 Revolt. Direct political 
commentary is not, of course, a Chaucerian trait: the Revolt is only explicitly 
mentioned by Chaucer in the Nun's Priest's Tale. 10 Nevertheless, echoes of the 
Revolt are detectable in the Miller's and Summoner's tales. This chapter shows 
how the conventions of insanity which permeate these texts are manipulated so as 
to denaturalize the concept of madness and reveal its constructedness. More 
particularly, it is argued that in these tales the perceived madness of the peasantry 
is contrasted ironically with the superior rationality of clerks and scholarly 
discourse. 
The interplay between madness and rationality in the Miller's narrative 
invites comparison with the preceding tale. Throughout the Knight's Tale, the 
Theban cousins act irrationally: Arcite in particular is referred to habitually as 
'wood'. Yet their deranged behaviour is described coolly. Donald W. Rowe says 
of the Knight's Tale that 'in its [... ] measured pace, its distancing of the 
emotionally disruptive, its highly stylised and deliberate order, it enacts 
rationality'. 
11 The Miller's Tale, too, is a tour-de-force of narrative 
craftsmanship. By telling a tale even more polished than the Knight's, the Miller 
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provocatively establishes order and rationality as aesthetic priorities in his own 
tale, despite the madness of the action he narrates and his own intimidating 
animality. 
Indeed, the drunken Miller himself offers a clue to the understanding of the 
function of insanity in the Miller's Tale. Lee Patterson observes that the Miller is a 
deeply 'irrational' figure. 12 Walter Clyde Curry long ago discussed how the 
Miller's physiognomy, described in the General Prologue, betrays his gross, 
foolish, lawless and lecherous nature. 13 It is also possible, however, that Chaucer 
modelled the Miller after an historical individual. It has been suggested, for 
example, that the Miller recalls 'Robert or Robyn the knavish apprentice of John 
de Seinte Fredeswide of Oxford in 1355, involved in that year in the riot during 
which townsmen dislodged or broke down the doors of gownsmen'. 14 This 
suggestion, made all the more credible by the Miller's proven way with doors, 
seems significant in view of the tale's concern with town-gown tensions and 
allegations of peasant irrationality. 
Whatever the case, the Miller's description emphasizes his bestial and 
uncivilized nature. His massive size, his beard as red 'as any sowe or fox', his 
huge mouth and black, hairy nostrils and his predilection for physical violence all 
authenticate his self-confessed vilain status. More particularly, these details evoke 
the descriptions of wild men which fascinated and repelled medieval people. 
Indeed, the Miller resembles King Claudas in the vulgate Lancelot. A handsome 
knight from the neck down, Claudas sports the grotesque head of a Wild Man: like 
the Miller, he has an ugly nose, a red beard, a large mouth and an intimidating 
physique. 15 The Wild Man, the traditional antitype of the chivalric hero, is a 
fitting identification for the Miller, who seeks to undermine the courtly world of 
the preceding tale. 
The suggestion that the Miller possesses the stock characteristics of the 
Wild Man implies his irrationality. Moreover, drunkenness was regarded as a form 
of madness in the Middle Ages, as Harry Baily implies when he calls the Miller a 
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'fool' whose 'wit is overcome' (3135). 16 The sophistication of the churl's 
narrative therefore comes as a surprise. This reversal of expectation again links the 
Miller with the Wild Man, whose rough appearance often belies a superior 
rationality. Chaucer's principal interest, however, is in the subversive political 
significance of such undercutting of expectations. By presenting his peasant 
narrators 'with intellects far higher than those of brute beasts', Chaucer hints at 'a 
potentially egalitarian levelling of differences between social classes'. 
17 Both the 
Miller's and Summoner's tales, it emerges, are concerned with the relationship 
between rationality and social class. 
The theme of madness is central in the Miller's Tale; but before 
considering its structural and political importance, we may say something about 
the deranged psychology of the characters who inhabit what David Williams has 
aptly called the 'mad world' of the tale. 
ig Although madness is directly imputed 
only to Nicholas and John in this tale, Absolon's addiction to fantasy and his 
ridiculous behaviour border on insanity. At the root of Absolon's distracted 
condition is, of course, the sin of pride. But Chaucer also hints at the instrumental 
physical cause of his detachment from reality. In terms of medieval faculty 
psychology -- a branch of medicine in which Chaucer shows interest in many of 
his works -- Absolon's 'maladye' until his shocking cure is consistent with a 
derangement of the faculty of imaginatio or phantasia. This faculty, medieval 
physicians and philosophers agreed, was responsible for apprehending images; 
damage to the imaginatio could therefore make things seem other than they are. 19 
Thus Patrick Gallagher echoes medieval psychological terminology when he notes 
that 'for Absolon, fantasy begins to outrun perception, the imaginary to usurp the 
real'. 20 
Absolon's errors spring more immediately from the fact that his faculty of 
cogitatio or imaginativa -- the discriminatory faculty responsible for combining 
and separating impressions received by the brain into imaginatio -- is acting on 
false information. Absolon consequently becomes a 'veritable zany of 
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indiscrimination', whose every action betrays his 'extreme inability to make 
proper distinctions'. 21 His physical gaucheness and his inappropriate speech are 
symptoms of the perilous diminution of proper perspective and judgement which 
culminates in the misdirected kiss. 
Chaucer uses the language of madness throughout the tale to satirize the 
deluded vanity of all the main characters. The term 'fantasie', for example, is 
applied first to Nicholas, and it comprehends several of the scholar's dubious 
attributes. Nicholas's 'fantasie' indicates his lack of discrimination, which is 
shown by his mixing of secular and religious songs and his later ill-fated decision 
to 'surpassen al the jape' on Absolon. 'Fantasie' also has the meaning of 'amorous 
fancy', a sense which applies equally well to the tale's other male characters. 22 
The term also has senses more specifically relevant to Nicholas. In medieval 
psychology, as in modern usage, 'fantasie' or 'imaginacioun' is the faculty 
necessary for 'speculating about the future' and the 'devising of works of art', 
activities for which Nicholas shows flair later in the tale. 23 
Most pertinently, 'fantasie' is a term which in the late Middle Ages -- and 
especially in Chaucer -- is intimately connected with the self-delusion that springs 
from social isolation and self-absorption, Chaucer's 'privetee'. In the Merchant's 
Tale, for example, January's short-sighted choice of a young wife results from his 
'heigh fantasye' and his culpable rejection of others' counsel: 
For whan that he hymself concluded hadde, 
Hym thoughte ech oother mannes wit so badde 
That inpossible it were to repplye 
Agayn his choys; this was his fantasye. (1607-1610) 
Such abstracted isolation is intolerable in the quotidian fabliau world, where sanity 
means conforming to the common laws of nature. In the Miller's Tale 'fantasie' 
suggests Nicholas's wilful solitude: as far as John is concerned, Nicholas is 
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dangerously detatched from reality. In fact, of course, it is John who is finally, 
and publicly, seen as mad; nevertheless, John's judgement has some validity. Like 
the other male characters in the tale, Nicholas is eventually brought to a 
humiliating awareness of the supremacy of reality over fantasy. 
The rhyming of 'fantasie' with 'astrologye' at the beginning of the tale 
associates Nicholas's delusion with his scholarly learning (3190-3191). The theme 
of astrology is the most conspicuous of Chaucer's narrative additions to the fabliau 
as it exists in continental analogues. In fact, the detailed description of Nicholas's 
astrological equipment and other scholarly possessions is quite unprecedented in 
medieval literature; it is included in order to account not only for Nicholas's 
prediction of the flood, but also for the feigned madness which precedes it. 
Chaucer's own interest in the subject of astrology no doubt made him 
sensitive to the suspicion in which it was often held. As we have already seen, 
those who attempted to restrict the majesty of God through the insolent art of 
astrology were necessarily mad. In John's eyes, the apparently deranged Nicholas 
recalls the man described contemptuously in the fourteenth-century Northern 
Homily as 'a mased man al out of minde, pat vses for fantasy forto stare upward at 
pe scy'. 24 In a passage of the Troy Book which recalls the language of the Miller's 
Tale, John Lydgate also describes astrologers as insane: 
Lat be, lat be! for no wi3t is so wood, 
Pat hak his witte, to 3eue ker-to credence, 
pat any man by crafte or by science, 
pat mortel is, hab konyng to devine 
Fortunys cours, or fatys to termyne. 
Swyche causis hid, conselid in secre, 
Reserued ben to goddis priuete. 25 
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Moreover, astrologers, as we have seen, were supposed to risk dire divine 
punishment, including blindness and madness. Little wonder, then, that the 
carpenter is easily duped by Nicholas's pretended madness, immediately 
interpreting it as the inevitable 'punishment of knowledge and its ignorant 
presumption'. 26 But although clerical proscriptions against astrology explain 
John's response here, the tale is not exclusively or even primarily concerned with 
the moral implications of madness; in this amoral fabliau, madness assumes its 
fullest significance on the social and political, rather than the theological level. 
Nicholas's feigned insanity alerts the reader to the difficulty of identifying 
real madness in any circumstances. This difficulty proceeds not only from 
Nicholas's skill in counterfeiting the symptoms of melancholia, but also from the 
miscellaneous reactions of those who witness his pretence. When the carpenter's 
servant glimpses Nicholas 'capyng upright / As he had kiked on the newe moone' 
(3444-3445), the implication is that the student's 'madness' is attributable to lunar 
influence. The idea that the phases of the moon affected human health negatively 
was accepted by even the most prestigious medical authorities; the superstitious 
belief invoked here, however, is that madness can be induced by simply looking at 
a full moon. The carpenter himself ventures some other causes of Nicholas's 
madness, suggesting that it results not from the malign influence of the stars, but 
from Nicholas's over-curious observation of them. 'This man is falle', he 
suggests, 'with his astomye, / In some woodness or in some agonye' (3451-3452). 
By explaining Nicholas's madness as the result of his scholarly endeavour, John 
displays the sort of cocky class antagonism to which he will fall victim at the end 
of the tale. John's opinion that Nicholas's madness is the result of over-study in 
intellectual matters is perfectly conventional; but it has a particularly powerful 
historical significance given the heightened anti-intellectual and, by extension, 
anti-clerical sentiments of the peasantry at the time of the Peasants' Revolt, when, 
according to the contemporary commentator Thomas Walsingham, 'it was 
dangerous to be seen with an inkhorn at one's side'. 27 
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The carpenter now determines to force the secluded Nicholas 'out of his 
studiyng' (3467). John is arrogantly confident that scholarly activity is the cause of 
his lodger's distracted state: 
I thoghte ay wel how that it sholde be! 
Men sholde nat knowe of Goddes pryvetee. 
Ye, blessed be alwey a lewed man 
That noght but oonly his bileve kan! (3453-3456) 
Nevertheless, he unaccountably revises his diagnosis when he sees Nicholas for 
himself: 
This carpenter wende he were in despeir, 
And hente hym by the sholdres myghtily, 
And shook hym Karde, and cride spitously, 
'What! Nicholay! What, how! What, looke adoun! 
Awak, and thenk on Cristes passioun! 
I crouche thee from elves and fro wightes. (3474-3479) 
Now John is of the opinion that Nicholas is possessed. It has already been 
suggested that demonic possession was more often credited by the uneducated than 
by the learned. If the possibility of possession by demons was rejected by many 
educated people in the late Middle Ages, the near-obsolete belief in possession by 
elves must have seemed even more preposterous to Chaucer's sophisticated 
audience. By indicating a relationship between ideas about madness and level of 
education and social status, John's superstitious beliefs anticipate the circumstances 
of his own humiliation at the end of the tale. 
The sheer variety of explanations of madness here also makes John appear 
ridiculous. Although multiple explanations of insanity were common in the Middle 
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Ages, John's suggestion of one conventional cause of madness after another is 
absurdly rapid and arbitrary. Nicholas's pretence of insanity, then, is more than a 
crude narrative device: it testifies to the Miller's self-consciousness about madness 
in this tale and solicits a critical wariness of accepting subsequent allegations of 
madness at face value. 
Not only the causes, but also the attitudes towards insanity in the tale are 
various: John's supposed madness results in public mockery; but Nicholas's 
equally spurious insanity evokes the sympathy of the carpenter and his servant. 
This compassionate response to madness only highlights the decidedly insensitive 
attitude of the townsfolk towards John at the end of the tale. Madness, the Miller 
takes pains to show, is not a simple or self-evident phenomenon; it is attributable 
to no single cause and refuses simple explanations and responses. In short, the 
Miller draws attention to the constructedness of insanity. 
Once he has been brought out of his supposed stupor, Nicholas proceeds to 
spin his fantastic yarn about the second flood and gives the carpenter his 
instructions for saving the company. He then threatens John with madness should 
he disclose his advice to anyone: 
to no wight thou shalt this conseil wreye, 
For it is Cristes conseil that I seye, 
And if thou teile it man, thou art forlore; 
For this vengeaunce thou shalt han therfore, 
That if thou wreye me, thou shalt be wood. (3503-3507) 
The final ominous line contains multiple ironies. First, by disbelieving God's 
promise not to send a Second Flood the carpenter already shows his lack of 
reason. Another irony becomes clear only in retrospect: although John follows 
Nicholas's directions to the letter he is nevertheless finally proclaimed mad. The 
implicit theological argument of the scholar's threat follows a conventional 
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pattern: betrayal of 'Cristes conseil' amounts to a rejection of God-given reason -- 
a sin punishable by madness. This traditional clerical explanation of madness as a 
divine chastisement is undermined at the end of the tale, where the imputation of 
insanity appears to be simply a crude form of social victimisation. 
In lines 3559-3560 Nicholas reasserts that John should not question him, 
again on pain of madness: 
Suffiseth thee, but if thy wittes madde, 
To han as greet a grace as Noe hadde. 
Nicholas requires John to be obedient to authority; to think for oneself -- to 
challenge apparently divine instruction -- is to court insanity. This line of 
argument -- and the pessimistic view of human reason it implies -- is commonplace 
in the late Middle Ages. But its introduction here is a shrewd ploy on Nicholas's 
part: by stressing the virtues of a passive intellect, Nicholas appeals to the 
carpenter's self-satisfied bias against learning and his naive belief that a man who 
acts out of simple faith cannot fall into insanity. Nicholas tells the peasant that he 
can only save the threatened company by renouncing his own rationality: 'werken 
after loore and reed', he advises John; 'Thou mayst nat werken after thyn owene 
heed' (3527-3528). 
Nicholas, clearly, is directly responsible for the carpenter's ridiculous 
delusion or 'ymaginacioun' of the flood engulfing his cherished wife. Unlike 
Absolon, who willingly abandons all reason in his wooing of Alison, John is 
encouraged in his delusion by Nicholas, who plays on the carpenter's fears and 
presumably hopes to make easier the job of convincing him by plying him with ale 
(3498). 
But the Miller himself is not entirely sympathetic towards the carpenter. If 
Nicholas endeavours to suppress John's rationality with threats and alcohol, the 
Miller distances us from the carpenter's consequent hallucination by describing it 
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in terms which parody Arcite's sorrow in the Knight's Tale (1219-1222). The most 
obvious stylistic feature of this passage, however, is its mocking use of scholastic 
vocabulary: 
Lo, which a greet thyng is affeccioun! 
Men may dyen of ymaginacioun, 
So depe may impressioun be take. 
This sely carpenter bigynneth quake; 
Hym thynketh verraily that he may see 
Noees flood come walwynge as the see 
To drenchen Alisoun, his hony deere. 
He wepeth, weyleth, maketh sory cheere; 
He siketh with ful many a sory swogh; (3611-3619) 
The passage recalls contemporary medical descriptions of the cataclysmic 
delusions suffered by melancholy madmen. John's hallucination is explained as a 
disorder of his 'ymaginacioun', the psychological faculty responsible for receiving 
impressions from the senses. The immediate cause of such derangement is the 
passion of sorrow. Indeed, John's reaction illustrates Avicenna's observation that 
in the melancholy man, the strength of the imagination of sorrowful 
things makes them appear to him, so that the thing whose likeness is 
represented in his soul seems to be really there, and therefore he 
persists in his continual sorrow. 28 
Psychologically, then, John, like Absolon and Nicholas at other points in the tale, 
loses contact with reality and, as Patrick Gallagher puts it, 'gives in to fantasy'. 29 
The Miller ridicules John's experience by relating it in the conspicuously 
inappropriate technical language of philosophical and medical discourse -- 
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'affeccioun', 'ymaginacioun', 'impressioun' -- which a 'lewed man' could not 
understand. The passage anticipates John's final public humiliation: in both cases, 
the carpenter's fantastic delusion is described in scholarly language and the 
madman becomes an object of ridicule. 
In the last forty-one lines of the tale the word 'wood' occurs no fewer than 
five times. The first two of these occurrences are apparently commonplace tags 
used to describe Nicholas's frantic crying for water after the branding incident: 
As he were wood, for wo he gan to crye, 
'Help! Water! Water! Help, for Goddes herte! ' 
This carpenter out of his slomber sterte, 
And herde oon Grien 'water! ' as he were wood, (3814-3817) 
Along with a preponderance of active verbs, the repetition ý of 'wood' here gives 
the scene the necessary qualities of farce and exaggeration. 30 But the association 
of the word 'wood' with water twice within four lines also recalls Nicholas's 
earlier description of the 'wilde and wood' rain which he says will fall to create 
the flood (3517). This produces a subtle irony: at the very point when the 
carpenter supposes the flood to have arrived, the term 'wood' describes not the 
predicted ferocity of the imaginary deluge but the real agony of its too-clever 
inventor. This link between madness and flood prepares us for the irony of the 
following passage, in which the faithful carpenter -- prohibited from discussing the 
flood on pain of madness -- is held insane by the townsfolk despite his loyalty. 
Thus the comic justice meted out to both John and Nicholas is pointed up by the 
ironic use of the language of madness. 
After John's humiliating fall, Nicholas again -- this time with Alison's help 
-- attempts to suppress the carpenter's rationality. Despite John's attempts to 
explain himself, 
159 
he was anon bore doun 
With hende Nicholas and Alisoun. 
They tolden every man that he was wood; 
He was agast so of Nowelis flood 
Thurgh fantasie that of his vanytee 
He hadde yboght hym knedyng tubbes thre 
And hadde hem hanged in the roof above; 
And that he preyed hem, for Goddes love, 
To litten in the roof, par compaignye. (3831-3839) 
John Hines suggests that 'the pun on "wood" in its sole surviving modern sense 
makes the imputed insanity of the carpenter -- a would-be second Noah, the 
shipwright -- adhere to John the more firmly'. 
31 The word ' wood', then, links 
John's insanity with his lowly social status, preparing us for the class antagonism 
which ends the tale. By their supercilious attribution of the phrase par compaignie 
to a humble carpenter, Nicholas and Alison further underline John's 'lewednesse'. 
Nicholas and Alison also employ technical terms to explain John's 
madness. The word 'fantasie', applied earlier in the tale to Nicholas, is common in 
medieval medical textbooks. According to the three-ventricle theory of classical 
and medieval psychological works, the foremost ventricle of the brain (the 'celle 
fantastik' of the Knight's Tale) runs amok if ungoverned by reason. By 
emphasising John's foolish 'fantasie', Nicholas and Alison follow philosophical 
authority. Avicenna, for example, asserts that in the melancholy man, 'the intellect 
is distracted from rational actions by sense and phantasia'. 32 ' Vanytee' , of 
course, is perhaps the most traditional and morally damning cause of madness. 
Nicholas and Alison, then, invoke conventional psychological and theological 
explanations of insanity to account for the carpenter's supposed madness. These 
explanations, of course, enjoyed greater prestige and credibility among the 
educated than John's outmoded and superstitious explanations of Nicholas's earlier 
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'madness'. For the second time in the tale, the technical terminology of medical 
and theological discourse estranges us from the experience of the 'sely carpenter'. 
The language of the passage, then, attests to the power of clerical reason over 
peasant credulity. 
The constructed nature of John's madness is by this stage obvious to the 
reader. It is not, of course, acknowledged by Alison and Nicholas, nor is it 
recognized by the crowd which assembles to enjoy John's misfortune. Ironically, 
however, the scoffing mob unwittingly attests to the contingency of madness by 
itself behaving unreasonably: 
The folk gan laughen at his fantasye; 
Into the roof they kiken and they cape, 
And turned al his harm unto a jape. 
For what so that this carpenter answerde, 
It was for noght; no man his reson herde. 
With othes grete he was so sworn adoun 
That he was holde wood in al the toun. (3840-3846) 
John is now a ridiculous spectacle, as the verbs 'kiken', 'cape' and the earlier 
'gauren' (3827) imply. His humiliation, unlike that of the equally unfortunate 
miller in the Reeve's Tale, is public. As we have already implied, madness, or 
'woodness', is the concept through which this bourgeois society condemns the 
shameful excesses of individual desire. ' "Woodness"', according to William 
Woods, 'is, in effect, the inevitable inversion of "privetee": the deeply motivated 
search for privacy develops as an ego-driven fantasy, extends itself above or 
across the boundaries of the private, and is recognised as "woodness" by the 
unerring judgment of the small-town public gaze'. 33 
As many commentators have noted, medieval madmen were generally 
considered spectacles. In his Madness and Civilisation Michel Foucault says that 
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It was doubtless a very old custom of the Middle Ages to display 
the insane. In certain of the Narrtürmer in Germany, barred 
windows had been installed which permitted those outside to 
observe those chained within. They thus constituted a spectacle at 
the city gates [... ]. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century 
[... ] madmen remained monsters -- that is, etymologically, beings 
or things to be shown. 
34 
John is indeed objectified and denied a voice. The spectacular or visible nature of 
his madness recalls the circumstances of Nicholas's feigned insanity. The 
apparently study-crazed scholar is observed first by the carpenter's servant, who 
'looked in ful depe' through the cat-flap in the lodger's door (3442). Moreover, 
the verbs 'kiken' and 'cape' -- used here to describe the neighbours' gleeful 
peering into the carpenter's roof -- are precisely those used to describe Nicholas's 
astrological vision. Thus 'the "folk" here align themselves with Nicholas -- and 
with Nicholas the trickster -- not Nicholas of the branded bum'. 
35 Once again, 
through his careful choice of words, the Miller denaturalizes the concept of 
madness, inviting us to compare and contrast the different attitudes towards 
madness at different points in the tale. 
In this final section of the poem we feel some sympathy for the carpenter. 
Now the Miller, who had previously mocked John's delusion of the flood, grants 
John what Nicholas has persistently and effectively denied him -- rationality or 
'reson'. The primary meaning of 'reson' here is 'explanation' or 'speech' and not, 
strictly speaking, 'reason'. But the two senses are necessarily connected in the late 
Middle Ages. For the proto-rationalist Reginald Pecock, 'reson' denotes 
principally the psychological faculty of reason; but the workings of reason are 
obviously dependent on this faculty. Pecock draws attention to the close relation of 
the two meanings: 
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In anopir maner "reson" is oft takun for Pe worchingis and Pe 
doingis of Pe resoun now bifore in Pe first manere takun: as ben 
argumentis, profis, skilis and euidences, which resoun, in pe first 
maner takun, fyndip, conceiuep and formep, and in pis maner 
"resoun" is takun in commune speche. 36 
The two senses of 'reson' as speech and as a psychological faculty were closely 
related in an age in which muteness was a symptom of insanity. More importantly, 
the emphasis on the theme of madness in the final section of the tale invites us to 
consider the full range of implications of the word 'reson'. In the context of John's 
humiliation as a madman, the term here becomes ambiguous, denoting the 
carpenter's latent intellectual faculties as well as his fruitless attempts to explain 
himself. The carpenter, in short, is simultaneously granted rationality and denied 
self-expression. 
The gaping onlookers, on the other hand, conduct themselves in a most 
unreasonable manner. The logic of the couplet: 'With othes grete he was so 
sworne adoun / That he was holde wood in al the toun', points up their lack of 
reason and their gullibility. John is held or believed to be mad -- the sense of 
contingency is highlighted here -- because he is sworn down with oaths. Thus the 
leering mob, in the height of its mockery of John's madness, itself exhibits 
symptoms of irrationality. 
All of the carpenter's neighbours -- 'bothe smale and grete' -- emerge from 
their houses to deride the injured carpenter. Thus John receives the kind of casual 
opprobrium customarily heaped upon fools and madmen by mischievous bourgeois 
throughout the Middle Ages: a long comparison may be drawn with the mad 
Lancelot or the French hero Amadas, who are mocked by entire towns. As we 
have seen, such abuse could inspire the compassion of some. The university 
students who mock John, however, are not moved to pity by his plight. Rather, 
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they provide a final, damning diagnosis of the carpenter and give the townsfolk's 
general derision a socio-historical twist: 
For every clerk anonright heeld with oother. 
They seyde, 'The man is wood, my leeve brother'; 
And every wight gan laughen at this stryf. (3847-3849) 
This assertion of John's insanity is far more emphatic than the allegations of 
madness with which the tale began. Yet the Miller takes pains to show that the 
judgement of the clerks is just as spurious as John's earlier diagnoses of Nicholas. 
The immediacy of this judgement -- conveyed by 'anonright' -- and the phrase 
'heeld with oother' imply consensus or agreement among the clerks rather than 
true conviction. Finally, the cosy tag 'my leeve brother' reinforces the sense of 
class solidarity, making the attribution of madness to John appear all the more 
contingent to social factors. As Lee Patterson observes, the carpenter's 
'punishment, however merited, is nonetheless enacted in the distasteful form of 
class victimisation'. 37 
The final irony of the mocking scene is only apparent if we compare John's 
'madness' with Nicholas's earlier predictions. Nicholas had warned the carpenter 
that any disobedience to 'Cristes conseil' would bring upon him the divine 
punishment of madness. But by emphasising the contingency of the clerks' 
allegations of insanity at the end of the tale, the Miller undermines traditional 
theories of madness as a divine chastisement for sin. The scene is therefore the 
culmination of the Miller's attempts to show madness as a social construction 
rather than a divine chastisement. 
The Miller's radicalism can only be properly understood in historical 
context. Neither the antagonism between townsfolk and scholars nor the 
association of the peasantry with the demonic and the insane is, as Lee Patterson's 
article might imply, unique to late fourteenth-century England. Throughout the 
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late Middle Ages in Europe, town-gown tension of the sort found in the Miller's 
Tale was part of daily life in university towns; but it became especially prominent 
at times of civil revolt. In his Reason and Society in the Middle Ages, Alexander 
Murray writes, 
It may be asked, if education really did encourage elitism of the sort 
that rained abuse on rustics, and if the elite really did get into 
positions where rustics might feel the weight of this contempt, why 
the rustics should rarely be heard complaining. The answer is that 
medieval rustics are rarely heard saying anything. They generally 
had to revolt in order to be heard in their own time. It is only the 
greater of their revolts that can be heard by us at six centuries' 
distance. Nevertheless, if a historian listens carefully to these great 
medieval peasant revolts he will, in the appropriate milieux, hear an 
expressly anti-academic note. 
38 
Scholars were granted special privileges, the most significant of which was 
'ecclesiastical immunity, or exemption from normal civil judicial processes'. 39 
That whole communities were fined when a scholar met with injury or death 
indicates both the extensive protection enjoyed by clerks and the possibility of 
serious attacks on them. The multiple grievances often provoked townsfolk to open 
violence. As Sheila Delany writes, 
The so-called "slaughters" at Oxford (1228 and 1354), Toulouse 
(1332) and Orleans (1387) are only a few of the best-known in a 
long series of raids, assaults and brawls. Some of these conflicts 
were provoked by specific trivial incidents, but the results are so 
disproportionately violent that most of them are only understandable 
as manifestations of a relation that was strained at best. 40 
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Murray also gives examples of town-gown conflicts in university towns in both 
England and France, ranging in seriousness from individual practical jokes to 
organized and outrageous acts of violence. 
41 
However widespread they may have been, such tensions were felt nowhere 
more strongly than in England in 1381. The English peasantry had their own 
concerns about the universities. After the plague in mid-century, labour shortages 
were a frequent problem, and 'rural unease about the drain of farm-labour through 
the schools is in evidence in the years before and after the revolt'. 
42 The petty 
bourgeoisie, such as Chaucer's John, also had their grievances against the 
scholars. Of particular relevance to the Miller's Tale is the fact that 'rents and 
repairs in all houses letting to students were controlled by a University 
commission'. 
43 In fact, the universities appear to have regulated many aspects of 
town life, and were even allowed to investigate the morals of the laity. 
44 Little 
wonder, then, that 
in the revolt of 1381 antipathy to the scholar was occasionally 
explicit. Some of the rebels in the eastern counties burned the 
privileges of Cambridge university. Nor was that entirely a matter 
of tenant fighting landlord: for at the bonfire an old woman cried 
'Away with the learning of the clerks, away with it! '. 45 
According to one historian, by the middle of the fifteenth century, Oxford 'had 
been crushed, and was almost entirely subjugated to the authority of the 
University. The burghers lived henceforth in their own town almost as the helots 
or subjects of a conquering people'. 
46 The comparison is provocative; clearly, 
however, the actions and attitudes of the characters of the Miller's Tale, however 
traditional in the fabliau genre, reflect contemporary antagonisms between 
university and town. 
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More importantly, the language of insanity was ubiquitously employed in 
official accounts of peasant behaviour during the 1381 Revolt. Book I of Gower's 
Vox Clamantis is only the most dramatic example of such invective. Through his 
subtle yet constant undermining of clerical allegations of insanity, the Miller 
mounts a challenge to one of the most powerful pieces of anti-peasant ideology of 
the late Middle Ages. 
The precariousness and contingency of allegations of madness is also 
apparent in another fabliau, or near-fabliau, by Chaucer. Like the Miller's Tale, 
the Summoner's Tale is 'permeated' by 'the image of sickness'. 47 The first part of 
the tale concerns a friar's attempts to wring a donation from a reluctant, bedridden 
peasant named Thomas. Thomas is presumably in mourning for his child, who has 
died less than two weeks previously (1852). If so, it is unlikely that we are 
intended to think of his apparent grief as excessive and therefore morally culpable. 
Rather, Thomas's illness links him with the pathetic old woman from whom the 
summoner tries to extort money in the preceding Friar's Tale. 
Various analogues of the Summoner's Tale feature conflicts between 
avaricious friars and ailing peasants. In one of these, Rutebeuf's anti-fraternal 
poem The Peasant's Fart, the narrator's attitude towards peasants is couched in 
language similar to that of Chaucer's Friar John. For Rutebeuf's narrator, 
People who are charitable have 
A great share in the spiritual paradise, 
But those who don't have charity in them 
Or sense or goodness or truth 
Fail to attain that joy. 48 
Similar sentiments are evident in the Summoner's Tale, in which Friar John 
teaches his audiences -- and by implication Thomas -- 'to be charitable, / And 
spende hir good ther it is resonable' (1795-1796); thus John masks his selfish 
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desire for a donation with a veneer of reasonableness. Predictably, however, the 
language of reason is turned against the friar at the end of the tale. 
In the opening interchanges among Thomas, his wife and the friar, Thomas 
is virtually ignored. Like the injured carpenter in the final scene of the Miller's 
Tale, he is treated as an object, a mere topic of conversation. The wife's use of 
animal similes to describe her husband undermines Thomas's status as a rational 
being: Thomas, she tells the friar, is 'as angry as a pissemyre' (1825) -- a word 
which anticipates the scatalogical humour of the end of the tale -- and 'groneth lyk 
oure boor' (1829). 49 Friar John relishes Thomas's passive state. Since Thomas 
has been unable to attend church, John offers to summarize the day's sermon for 
him: 
I have to day been at youre chirche at messe, 
And seyd a sermon after my symple wit -- 
Nat at after the text of hooly writ; 
For it is hard to yow, as I suppose, 
And therfore wol I teche yow al the glose. (1788-1792) 
The passage recalls the episode in the Miller's Tale in which Nicholas warns the 
carpenter not to think for himself; it also prefigures the lord and lady's rejection of 
peasant rationality later in the Summoner's Tale. 
The friar tells Thomas that anger is caused by the devil and he proceeds to 
deliver a prolix warning to Thomas on the dangers of ire. Within the frame of the 
Canterbury Tales, this discourse on anger-madness is clearly aimed by the 
Summoner -- who is himself presented as a choleric buffoon -- at his bitter enemy 
Friar Huberd. 'Upon this Frere his herte was so wood', says Chaucer in the 
Summoner's Prologue, 'That lyk an aspen leef he quook for ire' (1666-1667). But 
the theme of anger-madness also functions ironically within the tale itself. First, 
Friar John has chosen to lecture a peasant on a sin that pertains to himself, as the 
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many references to his angry demeanour indicate. Moreover, anger-madness is 
most commonly associated with the upper orders of society. The friar's warning to 
Thomas -- 'Withinne thyn hous ne be thou no leon; 
/ To thy subgitz do noon 
oppression' (1989-1990) -- is a classic injunction against anger-madness; but it is 
flagrantly wrenched from its proper penitential context. As Penelope Doob says, it 
is not the lowly peasant, but 'the political leader, the proud king, who is prey to 
both temporary and permanent forms of anger-madness'. 
50 Thus the friar's 
harangue is couched in terms that are entirely inappropriate to one of Thomas's 
social rank. Anger-madness is perhaps the most class-specific of all the medieval 
categories of madness, affecting principally men of 'heigh degree'. It is therefore 
fitting that Friar John -- who prides himself on his elevated social status -- should 
himself succumb to this form of insanity. As in the Miller's Tale, madness seems 
to be alleged by those who are most deluded. 
The enraged Thomas now plays his trick on his tormentor. He agrees to 
give the friar 'swich thyng as is in [his] possessioun' on the condition that the friar 
share it equally among his fellows, and invites him to search his buttocks for the 
donation (2124). The predictable 'gift' of the fart can be seen as an act of 
madness. As Penelope Doob says, 'habitual anger is madness; it is not simply like 
madness'. 51 The angry man, according to Chaucer's Parson, is 'out of alle 
juggement of resoun' (537). Friar John himself implies this connection between 
anger and madness when he ironically warns Thomas to 'be no felawe to an irous 
man, / Ne with no wood man walke by the weye' (2086-2087). As provocative as 
Thomas's 'probleme' of the division of the fart proves to be, then, the fart itself is 
an act of anger-madness. 
Nevertheless, Thomas's madness is not immoral. In certain cases, 
anger-madness could be sanctioned. One such circumstance was sickness. Aquinas 
notes that 'if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion 
as deprives him of the use of his reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, 
and he is entirely excused from sin'. 52 Thomas's madness certainly seems to 
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proceed from his illness, as the Summoner implies by his remark: 'This sike man 
wax wel ny wood for ire' (2121). But Thomas's explosive retribution may be 
sanctioned on moral, as well as medical grounds. For Chaucer's Parson there are 
two types of ire, bad and good. 'The good Ire', he explains, 'is by jalousie of 
goodnesse, thurgh which a man is wrooth with wikkednesse and agayns 
wikkednesse; and therfore seith a wys man that Ire is bet than pley (538). 
Boccaccio also distinguishes between two sorts of anger, one which is 
'unreasonable', another which 'may be reasonable, as is indignation about some 
injustice'. 53 Thomas's anger-madness, then, is entirely justified. 
The Summoner emphasizes the ludicrousness of the friar's anger, on the 
other hand, by his use of comically inappropriate language. If Thomas was as 
'angry as a pissemyre' and groaned like a domestic pig, Friar John rises up 'as 
dooth a wood leoun' (2152) and 'looked as it were a wilde boor' (2160). These 
animals, of course, have a courtly pedigree and are commonly invoked to illustrate 
the battle-rage of romance heroes. Thus the Summoner mockingly describes the 
friar's fury in terms normally reserved for the knights of chivalric romance. 
Yet the friar seeks redress not in physical conflict but in an impassioned 
appeal to the lord of the local manor, where Thomas's 'probleme' of the division 
of the fart is met with a mixture of fascination and incomprehension. At first, the 
lord struggles to credit the peasant with intellectual ability: 
'How hadde this cherl ymaginacioun 
To shewe such a probleme to the frere? (2218-2219) 
The word 'ymaginacioun' is particularly intriguing to the historian of madness, 
since it has associations with both madness and reason. 
John Hines points out that 'it was a current supposition of some medieval 
socio-religious thought that churls were as brute beasts, possessed only of 
imagination rather than reason'. Thus he maintains that 'the general attitude' of the 
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lord and lady 'seems to be that the churl has stumbled upon this riposte to the friar 
blindly' rather than through any rational process. 
54 The idea that peasants have 
only imagination can be explained with reference to medieval faculty psychology. 
According to the physicians, the faculty of imaginatio, situated at the front of the 
brain, receives sensory impressions. But the term 'ymaginacioun' in the 
Summoner's Tale clearly denotes not imaginatio, as Hines's comment might 
suggest, but the higher faculty of imaginativa or cogitativa. This faculty, housed 
in the middle ventricle of the brain, is responsible for combining sensory 
impressions in different ways to create new and sometimes impossible forms. 
55 
From the time of Avicenna onwards, this latter faculty is referred to as cogitativa 
in human beings and imaginativa when it is under the guidance of the rational 
soul. Thus the 'power which relates the sensible forms in imaginatio to each other 
is called imaginative in beasts, cogitative when controlled by the rational soul'. 
56 
In this sense, the lord's comment echoes Gower's equation of peasants and 
animals; Chaucer seems to be sending up contemporary anti-peasant rhetoric. 
On the other hand, the association of the Middle English word 
'ymaginacioun' with the middle rather than the anterior ventricle of the brain 
means that it also carries positive connotations. Far from implying a diminution of 
rationality, 'ymaginacioun' can also denote 'power of reasoning'. 
57 Thus it seems 
that the lord is impressed, however reluctantly, by the peasant's rationative 
powers. Furthermore, as Timothy O'Brien notes, the word 'imagination' had a 
particular scholarly application, appearing 'most commonly in the phrase 
secundum imaginationem, which describes the process of proving a solution via 
rationis, that is, according to a consistent line of logic without regard for the 
observable world'. 
58 In this sense, the lord's comment prepares us for Jankyn's 
display of scholastic reasoning at the end of the tale. 
'Ymaginacioun' also denotes innovation or originality. 59 The lord is 
repeatedly struck not only by the reasonableness of Thomas's problem, but also by 
its novelty: 
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'Nevere erst er now herde 1 of swich mateere' (2220) 
'In ars-metrike shal ther no man fynde, 
Biforn this day, of swich a question' (2222-2223) 
'Who evere herde of swiche a thyng er now? ' (2229) 
Thomas's question shocks the lord because it shows the peasant's disturbing 
capacity to think independently of authority. 
This display of inventiveness is simultaneously dismissed by the lord and 
lady as the product of a deranged, even possessed mind. The lady of the manor, 
who eventually comes to praise the peasant's powers of reasoning, initially regards 
Thomas as insane: 
His sike heed is ful of vanytee; 
I holde hym in a manere frenesye (2208-2209) 
The lord, meanwhile, recalls the friar's sermon on the diabolical nature of 
madness, attributing Thomas's ingenuity to satanic influence: 
I trowe the devel putte it in his mynde (2221) 
I holde hym certeyn a demonyak! (2240) 
These reactions are understandable given the high value the inhabitants of the 
manor later set on the ability to reason. As Vieda Skultans observes in a discussion 
of eighteenth-century attitudes towards imagination: 'excess of imagination is 
thought to constitute insanity at a time when reasonableness [is] highly valued'. 60 
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Yet the lord and lady's imputations of madness are undermined by the very 
language in which they are expressed: as in the Miller's Tale, their tenuousness is 
suggested by verbs of uncertainty such as 'trowe' and 'holde'. Even the lord's 
word 'certeyn' implies nothing so much as a lack of conviction. The most 
vehement allegations of madness succeed only in drawing attention to the 
rhetorical status of language and the constructed nature of madness. 
The lord and lady's allegations of insanity and demonic possession take on 
their full significance in the context of contemporary anti-peasant ideology. Of 
course, 'demoniak' is used as a general term of abuse throughout the Middle 
Ages; 61 but such language must be understood in the context of contemporary 
invectives such as the Vox Clamantis. Once again, it seems that Chaucer is 
satirizing -- although not necessarily criticizing -- the readiness of the upper 
classes to dismiss peasants as unreasoning brutes. 
In the third and final movement of the poem the castigation of Thomas's 
supposed insanity gives way to general ridicule of the friar. The lord's squire, 
Jankyn, now offers a solution to Thomas's problem of the division of the fart 
among the friars. He suggests that thirteen friars, including Friar John himself, be 
summoned to the lord's hall and assemble around a cartwheel to take part in an 
extraordinary experiment: 
Thanne shal they knele doun, by oon assent, 
And to every spokes ende, in this manere, 
Ful sadly leye his nose shal a frere. 
Youre noble confessour -- there God hym save! -- 
Shal holde his nose upright under the nave. 
Thanne shal this cherl, with bely stif and toght 
As any tabour, hyder been ybroght; 
And sette hym on the wheel right of this cart, 
Upon the nave, and make hym lete a fart. 
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And ye shul seen, up peril of my lyf, 
By preeve which that is demonstratif, 
That equally the soun of it wol wende, 
And eke the stynk, unto the spokes ende, 
Save that this worthy man, youre confessour, 
By cause he is a man of greet honour, 
Shul have the firste fruyt, as resoun is. (2262-2277) 
Jankyn's absurd solution is met with unqualified approval by the lord and lady, if 
not the friar. It is a triumph of imagination -- the faculty associated with both 
madness and reason. Jankyn's mockingly precious insistence on the language of 
scholastic reason -- 'By preeve which is demonstratif', 'By cause', 'as resoun is' -- 
parodies the friar's verbosity as well as his earlier instruction to Thomas to spend 
his money 'ther it is resonable' (1796). 
The squire's shrewd solution to the problem of the fart's division shows 
how reason can be manipulated for selfish ends: if the Friar's 'reson' consisted in 
telling people where to 'spend hir good', Jankyn's casuistry is motivated by the 
lord's promise of a new 'gowne-clooth'. But the latter detail suggests a less 
obvious point. Jankyn's role is remarkably like that of a court fool, whose 'major 
office', as Rose Zimbardo puts it, 'was to engage in wit combat or dispute with 
his lord'. 62 Like the court wits described in Enid Welsford's important study 
Fool, Jankyn is licensed to contradict his lord's judgement, to solve riddles and to 
flatter or ridicule freely with the promise of material remuneration; in this case the 
reward is a gown, the garment traditionally provided by a court for its fools. 63 
Jankyn's satirical friar-baiting, in particular, aligns him with those 
'artificial' fools who were permitted to denounce with impunity the hidden vices 
of the powerful. 
64 Moreover, by punning on the words 'ars-metrik' and 'resoun' 
-- the latter of which suggests the 'resonance' of a fart -- Jankyn not only alludes 
to the scatological behaviour for which buffoons were renowned, but also draws 
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upon the fool's traditional rhetorical resources. His sophistry has the effect of 
defusing a highly-charged situation by substituting the manor's class-conscious 
imputations of madness with absurd and politically impotent fool-play. 
Ostensibly at least, the Summoner has evaded the radical implications of 
Thomas's problem. Indeed, medieval fools characteristically satirize the abuses of 
individual figures, imaginary or real, but never the social structures or institutions 
to which they belong. If Heather Arden is right, for example, the popular sotties 
or 'fool plays' of the late Middle Ages are properly seen not as radical subversions 
of official culture, but rather as non-egalitarian and conservative works. 65 In the 
Summoner's Tale folly has an equally stabilizing rationale. The introduction of the 
fool is an attempt to dissolve, rather than point up the unpalatable political 
implications of Thomas's conundrum. 
The tale has now moved into a traditional form of satire. In a sense, the 
historically specific allegations of peasant insanity have been 'translated', as Lee 
Patterson laments, 'back into the dehistoricizing language of antifraternal 
discourse' so that 'we retreat into a world of aesthetic appreciation, in which 
peasant energy, however potentially threatening, is reduced to a playful 
manipulation of the images of official culture that leaves the realities firmly in 
place'. 66 Nevertheless, to see the end of the Summoner's Tale as an escape from 
history is to overlook the extent to which the desire for such an escape is itself a 
feature of official commentaries on the Revolt. The most conservative of these, 
Walsingham's Historia Anglicana, also moves from the disturbing invective of 
peasant defamation to antifraternalism. Walsingham, whose vitriolic description of 
the rebels has already been mentioned, ends his analysis of the rising with a 
conventional tract against the mendicant friars, whom he implausibly blames for 
neglecting their office and causing the commons to rebel. 67 The end of the 
Summoner's Tale therefore mirrors, rather than abandons contemporary 
anti-peasant discourse. 
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Other elements at the end of the tale preclude a comfortable closure or a 
total abdication of historically specific elements. The most obvious of these is the 
tale's fashionable concern with scholarly reason. If the end of the tale represents 
the victory of folly over madness, it also sees the triumph of science over 
demonology, a point neatly underscored by Jankyn's pun on 'demonstratif'. The 
household's excessive praise of Jankyn's cogitative powers recalls the bitter ending 
of the Miller's Tale: by comparing Jankyn's reasoning to that of Euclid and 
Ptolemy, the inhabitants of the manor salute the reasoning of clerks (2287-2289). 
But despite its supposed classical grandeur, Jankyn's reasoning is not far removed 
from the concerns of contemporary England. In fact, the solution to the problem 
of the fart's division recalls the scholarly controversies of the late 
fourteenth-century. As Timothy O'Brien points out, the debate over indivisibility 
was a central issue of debate among scholars during the fourteenth 
century. According to John Murdoch, the debate was between, on 
the one hand, those such as Henry of Harclay, Walter Chatton and 
Nicholas Bonet, who argued that continua are composed of 
indivisibles, and, on the other hand, those Mertonians such as 
Thomas Bradwardine and William Heytesbury, who, with Aristotle 
in the Physics, argued that continua were composed only of 
divisibles. It is likely that the problem of division at the end of the 
Summoner's Tale refers to this debate over indivisibility. 68 
The suggestion is plausible. Chaucer was, after all, a friend of the Oxford fellow 
and mathematician Ralph Strode, who tutored the poet's son Lewis; and elsewhere 
in his work Chaucer exhibits 'a clear understanding of the scholastic terminology 
used at Merton College'. 69 
The end of the Summoner's Tale also reflects a more specific and directly 
relevant concern with division. In a recent article Phillip Pulsiano has convincingly 
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discussed Jankyn's thought-experiment in relation to another contemporary 
problem of natural science, that of the division of the winds according to their 
directions. 7° This suggestion, along with O'Brien's, indicates that Jankyn's satire 
has contemporary as well as traditional targets, sending up not only the friars, but 
also the concerns of university scholars. 
Indeed, O'Brien shows how Jankyn's reasoning relates to 
fourteenth-century philosophical debates between the champions of a traditional 
sort of science which relied on authority and the advocates of the increasingly 
popular phenomenological science, which, following the example of Grosseteste 
and Roger Bacon in the previous century, depended for its conclusions on 
experience and demonstration. 
71 By relying on 'preeve which that is 
demonstratif', Jankyn's clearly endorses the latter scientific method which, as 
O'Brien notes, was particularly fashionable in the English universities in the 
fourteenth century. Finally, O'Brien shows that both the vocabulary and the 
structure of the argument in the final part of the tale conform to the conventions of 
contemporary scholastic discourse. 
72 Jankyn's solution therefore subtly re-invokes 
the antagonism between scholars and peasants that erupts so unpleasantly in the 
final scene of the Miller's Tale. At the end of the Summoner's Tale, then, the 
allegations of peasant madness are not entirely dissolved into traditional 
anti-fraternal satire, nor does the tale end with 'the reestablishment of a happy, 
stable society'. 73 On the contrary, Jankyn's mock pedagogy constitutes an ironic 
but insidious reassertion of class difference. 
As far as Thomas himself is concerned, the endorsement of his reasoning 
by the lord and squire is a mixed blessing. Explicitly at least, Thomas is conceded 
rationality and relieved of the stigma of diabolism: 
Touchynge the cherl, they seyde, subtiltee 
And heigh wit made hym speken as he spak; 
He nys no fool, ne no demonyak. (2290-2292) 
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Having dismissed the dangerous ideas of a mad peasant, the inhabitants of the 
manor jestingly recast Thomas as a champion of reason; if the Miller's Tale ended 
with the mockery of peasant madness, the Summoner's Tale ends with a tribute to 
the rationality of a churl. 
This tribute, of course, is entirely spurious and ironic. In the Summoner's 
Tale, the peasant becomes an object of scientific study. Just as the squire places 
the rustic cartwheel at the centre of his thought-experiment, so the peasant Thomas 
is reduced, in O'Brien's austere words, to the status of a 'mechanical device' or 
the 'narrating Summoner's cooking pot'. 74 Thomas's predictable behaviour means 
that he may be regarded as an experimental constant, or even as a beast, according 
to Aquinas's observation that 'animals show regular and orderly behaviour and 
must therefore be regarded as machines, distinct from man who acts according to 
his rational soul'. 75 This latter idea recalls the lord's earlier reference to Thomas's 
'ymaginacioun', insofar as that term calls into question Thomas's rationality. 
Chaucer's parody of scholastic reasoning here implies a traditional scepticism 
about a scientific methodology which, applied mechanically, acts as a distraction 
from moral values and reduces human beings to the level of objects or beasts. 
Abstract scholastic language, like the language of folly, also causes the new 
scientists of the manor to lose sight of the radical political implications of 
Thomas's assertion of the possibility of dividing his donation equally among the 
friars. In the portentous words of Ernesto Grassi and Maristella Lorch: 
Scientific, intellectual thought can only have a formal character, can 
take place only within the boundaries of a system. Any humanism 
that attempts to transcend formal thinking by taking into account the 
problems of life, of man in his real context, is excluded. [... ] 
Scientific, rational language must of inner necessity be an inhuman, 
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mathematical calculation [... ]. Rationality becomes the terror of the 
human. 76 
Unlike Thomas's problem, Jankyn's sophistry disregards the possibility of social 
change. In fact, Thomas is repeatedly referred to as a 'churl' in the final section of 
the tale, even after his riposte has been vindicated. 
The Miller's and Summoner's tales, we have seen, reflect the widespread 
and often violent antipathy between peasants and scholars which was conspicuous 
during the Peasants' Revolt. This antipathy -- frequently expressed in terms of 
insanity -- erupts spectacularly in the Miller's Tale and is presented more 
ambiguously in the Summoner's Tale. Chaucer does not simply record the 
prevalent attitudes of his day, but manipulates them impressively. In a statement 
typical of early Chaucer criticism, Thomas Warton long ago stated that 'we are 
surprised to find, in so gross and ignorant an age, such talents for satire, and for 
observation of life'. 7' This pronouncement, however patronizing and naive to 
twentieth-century ears, is not wholly untrue. The ludic nature of Chaucer's 
concern with madness is part of his more general reluctance to subjugate his 
writing to ideology. Moreover, by comparing one allegation of madness with 
another for ironic effect or by satirizing these allegations in various ways, Chaucer 
emphasizes the socially-constructed, rather than the natural or divine character of 
insanity. Thus he shows a self-consciousness about madness that is impossible for 
'moral Gower', whose literary objective is vilification rather than exploration. 
However much Chaucer might have shared his friend's horror at the Peasants' 
Revolt, he nevertheless perceives the irony of a situation in which the English 
peasantry, whose radical rhetoric insisted on common human dignity and the 
necessity of 'prudent' rule based on egalitarian principles, were summarily 
dismissed as unreasoning beasts. 
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Chapter 5 
'By cowntynaunce it is not wist' : Thomas Hoccleve and the 
Subject of Madnessl 
No sicknesse suche, as is the griefe of miede - Nicholas Breton 
In many of the literary works discussed so far, madness is both a moral 
abomination and a threat to social and political order. Moreover, these works often 
present the observation of madness from a third-person perspective. By contrast, 
the major, apparently autobiographical poems of the fifteenth-century civil servant 
Thomas Hoccleve present the experience of madness from the viewpoint of the 
sufferer. As Michael MacDonald observes, madness, although 'the most social of 
maladies to those who observe its effects' is also 'the most solitary of afflictions to 
the people who experience it'. 
2 In Hoccleve's works insanity is not merely a 
spectacular moral emblem, but a distressing personal experience. 
That Hoccleve both suffered and wrote about madness should not surprise 
us. Hoccleve seems not to have had any knowledge of his madness while he 
suffered from it; rather, he gleans the details of his madness from his friends after 
the event. 3 Nevertheless, his description of his madness, especially in the 
Complaint, attests to the medieval madman's awareness of the stigma of madness 
and to his acute sense of social alienation. The last few of Hoccleve's major 
works, however, have a different tone, as Hoccleve abandons his autobiographical 
exploration of his insanity in favour of a more public-spirited poetry in which he 
denounces the unruliness of others. 
Early critics tended to value the autobiographical content of the poems 
above all else. This is the element of Hoccleve's work that most excited the poet's 
first editor Frederick Furnivall, whose long introduction to the Minor Poems is rife 
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with groundless speculations about the poet's life. 
4 Some years later, H. S. Bennett 
observed that 'we are always in touch with the poet: we do not feel that his poems 
are mechanical exercises, but the reflection of the poet's own ideas and 
personality', referring to Hoccleve's egotism and what he rather disparagingly 
terms his 'crude immediacy'. 5 Eleanor Prescott Hammond also calls Hoccleve a 
'natural egoist' who 'turns more naturally toward himself than toward literature'. 6 
Hammond implies that in writing about himself Hoccleve managed to escape the 
influences of literary convention, freeing himself to express a natural 
autobiographical impulse. All of these critics see Hoccleve as a proto-humanist, an 
often dull yet historically precocious champion of an individualism completely 
undetermined by social conditions. Indeed, Hammond implies that Hoccleve was 
isolated from his society, that there was 'a poet here and a public world there'. 7 
Absolute distinctions between individual and society or between the 
'immediate' and the conventional cannot, of course, be made. We can agree with 
Bennett that Hoccleve's poetry is 'immediate', so long as we remember that for 
the artist, directness is a literary affectation. 8 We can also agree with Hammond 
that Hoccleve 'turned towards himself', so long as we do not suppose that in doing 
so he was able either to escape the public sphere or to express himself without the 
aid of literary conventions. 
Almost all of the rapidly growing scholarship on Hoccleve's major works 
has been concerned to some extent with the question of autobiography. 
Nevertheless, it is still impossible to say precisely how much of what the narrator 
tells us in the poems corresponds with actual events in the life of Hoccleve. 
Furnivall took for granted the historical veracity of the longer poems. The 'chief 
authorities' for Hoccleve's life, he remarks, are not only historical documents, but 
also his 'Male Regle [... ] his Dialog with the old Beggar in his Regement of 
Princes, his Complaint and Dialogue with a friend'. 9 Furnivall naturally 
concluded that the details Hoccleve describes, including a period of madness, are 
autobiographical. 
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More recently, New Critical and Deconstructive movements in literary 
theory have encouraged a general distrust of autobiographical interpretations of 
texts. Since the 1960s a number of critics have undermined Furnivall's confident 
identification of Hoccleve with his mad narrator. The most influential of these, 
Penelope Doob, is willing to concede that Hoccleve may have been insane. 
10 She 
is quick, however, to point out that Hoccleve's descriptions of madness are 
steeped in literary and medical conventions. As Albert Friedman notes, Doob 
implies that those who have taken Hoccleve at his word when he says that he is 
mad have simply been 'taken in'. 
11 Thus Doob effectively reverses Hammond's 
observation that Hoccleve turned 'more naturally toward himself than toward 
literature'. One eminent critic has gone even further, claiming confidently that 
'no-one could mistake' Hoccleve's work 'for anything other than a fiction'. 
12 
It is clearly fallacious, however, to suppose that the conventionality of an 
experience precludes its veracity. As John Burrow points out, 'it is not safe to 
assume that a real experience will not be described (or indeed experienced) in 
conventional terms'. 
13 The psychosis which afflicts the narrator at the start of The 
Book of Margery Kempe, for example, is described in conventional fashion; yet no 
reader can rule out the possibility that Kempe really was insane. The same might 
be said of the Elizabethan Nicholas Breton, who is in many ways Hoccleve's 
literary successor. Breton lived near Bethlem hospital and seems to have been 
familiar with its insane inmates. His poems are saturated with references to 
madness and madmen, leading Basil Clarke to speculate that the poet 'had chronic 
depressive troubles of his own'. 14 Whatever the truth of these cases, literary 
convention is not the opposite of real life; on the contrary, it can determine not 
only how, but also which experiences are described in an autobiography. In an 
autobiography of the twelfth century, the French abbot Guibert de Nogent tells of 
the beatings he received as a child from his tutor, a detail which recalls the early 
experiences of Augustine. 15 Despite this awesome precedent, the possibility that 
Guibert was indeed thrashed cannot be discounted. 
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Clearly, a strong distinction between conventional and real textual details 
cannot be upheld. It does not follow, however, that the two categories should be 
regarded either as co-extensive or as indistinguishable; rather, we should posit a 
weak distinction between them. As we have already seen, during the Middle Ages 
details of real and fictional descriptions of madness often overlapped. The 
experience of madness -- like any other experience which may be related in an 
autobiography -- is closely, but not inextricably, bound up with convention. 
The poetic and documentary evidence for Hoccleve's madness cannot 
simply be ignored. The major poems are so strewn with verifiable details from 
Hoccleve's life that there is no reason to suppose that they have any less 
truth-value than the autobiographies of, say, Tolstoy or Woolf, even if Hoccleve's 
motivations for self-revelation are typically medieval. Gordon Claridge, Ruth 
Pryor and Gwen Watkins advance another reason for believing that 'Hoccleve is 
describing his own experience', pointing out that 
it would have been professional suicide for a civil servant to 
describe the indignities of derangement and to represent himself as 
having been mad, unless the facts were as well known to his 
colleagues and masters as he says they were; while to try, on the 
other hand, to put his known condition in a better light, as Hoccleve 
does, is sensible only if the fact of his illness was well known but 
his recovery less well recognised, which is what he claims. 16 
Whether or not Hoccleve would indeed have undermined his position as a civil 
servant by identifying himself with an insane narrator, he would hardly have 
jeopardized his considerable opportunities for professional advancement by doing 
so. 
Given the likelihood of Hoccleve's insanity and the fact that his poetry 
'was as autobiographical as any writing can be, given that we are always 
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controlled by the conventions of our age', the narrator of these poems is referred 
to in this chapter as Hoccleve rather than Thomas, as some critics prefer. 17 Not 
everyone will agree that Hoccleve's major works are as autobiographical as is 
claimed here; but this need not invalidate the arguments of this chapter. Few of 
the points made here are dependent on an acceptance of Hoccleve as an 
autobiographer. Stephen Medcalf's forthright caveat to his readers must suffice to 
allay any remaining doubts: 
I shall proceed on the assumption that the proportion of genuine 
experience to the conventions which articulate and enable Hoccleve 
to explore it is very large. You must make your own adjustment to 
what I have to say if you are less convinced than I am of the 
veridicalness of Hoccleve's story. I8 
While the issue of authenticity has a significance for literary history, it has been 
said that it does not matter 'from a literary point of view' whether or not we can 
establish Hoccleve's apparent autobiographies as historical facts. 19 The most 
important point to take from the discussion about autobiography in Hoccleve is 
that the poet wishes us to understand the madness of his narrator as his own 
personal experience. 
Hoccleve has not escaped the attentions of twentieth-century physicians. 
From the evidence of the poems, Dr Anthony Ryle diagnoses him as suffering 
from a bi-polar manic-depressive illness, having experienced a 
minor depressive episode in 1406 (Male Regle) and a worse and 
more prolonged one starting in 1411 (Regement) terminating in an 
attack of mania or hypomania which cleared in 1416 (Complaint 
and Dialogue with a Friend), after which time he was but mildly 
depressed. 20 
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There is documentary evidence that Hoccleve, who worked as a scribe at the Privy 
Seal office in Westminster, was incapacitated for some reason in the period 
preceding his first poetic reference to his madness. The Pells Issue Roll for 18 July 
1416 shows that Hoccleve's half-yearly annuity was paid not to Hoccleve but to 
his three colleagues. 21 In fact, as the historian A. L. Brown states, Hoccleve 'did 
not come to the Exchequer personally between May 1414 and March 1417 to 
collect payments due to him'. 
22 The poet's first reference to his madness occurs, 
significantly, in the Complaint of 1422, in which he claims to have recovered his 
memory some five years previously (50-56). 23 Indeed, what little we know about 
Hoccleve's career is consistent with what he tells us in his poems. 'What he 
wrote', says Brown of Hoccleve, 'was apparently in essence true. His service in 
the Privy Seal, his annuity, his hostel, even to some extent his breakdown, can be 
substantiated from the records'. 24 
The best source of information about conditions at the Privy Seal office 
during the early fifteenth century is still the fifth volume of Thomas F. Tout's 
colossal Chapters in Medieval Administrative History. 25 A consideration of 
Hoccleve's poems alongside Tout's evidence yields a consistent, albeit sketchy, 
picture of the life of the Privy Seal clerk and of the professional and economic 
stresses and grievances which may have contributed to his breakdown. 
Tout notes that the Privy Seal office was understaffed, and this situation 
seems to have worsened during Hoccleve's term of employment. 26 The clerks 
were paid irregularly to put it mildly: one of Hoccleve's predecessors at the office, 
Dighton, received no wages for an astonishing six years and forty-three days; 
Tirrington's arrears were comparable. Their supposedly fixed income was very 
little. And yet, as Tout notes, 'low as were their wages and irregular as was their 
payment, as time went on the privy seal clerks tended to be treated with less rather 
than more liberality'. 27 Hoccleve complains in considerable detail about all of 
these pressures throughout the major poetry. 
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Other hazards tested the poet's sanity. In the prologue to his Regement of 
Princes Hoccleve describes the financial chicanery practised by some of those with 
whom the Seal office had dealings. Many of the wealthier clients employed 
servants as go-betweens in their transactions with the office. These servants often 
refused to pay the clerks. If the clerks demurred, the servants would simply return 
to their lords complaining of the extortions of the clerks. 28 Thus the clerks, like 
the customs controllers in Chaucer's day, were regularly humiliated. 
Not all critics have been moved to pity by Hoccleve's plight. In a severe 
attack on Hoccleve's professional career and personality, Malcolm Richardson 
describes the Privy Seal clerk as 'a conspicuous under-achiever, a man who did 
not or could not avail himself of the opportunities available to him'. 29 Richardson 
argues that the blockish Hoccleve had only himself to blame for the hardship he 
complains of and upbraids the poet for his lack of self-provision and initiative. 
Hoccleve, it is true, effectively debarred himself from ecclesiastical preferment by 
marrying and there is no evidence that he showed much ambition in his business 
affairs. Compared with the shrewd and confident Chaucer and his own more 
professionally vigorous colleagues, Hoccleve certainly appears inept. In what 
DuBoulay has called 'an age of ambition', it is little wonder that the hapless poet 
became depressed; as Thomas Elyot writes in his discussion of melancholy 
madness, 'oftentymes the repulse frome promotion is cause of discomforte'. 30 
As well as professional worries, Hoccleve and his fellow clerks endured 
considerable physical stresses. Writing, Hoccleve reminds us in the Regement, is 
hard work. Twenty-three years of tedious scribal work has given the clerk pains in 
his stomach and back and ruined his eyesight (1016-1029). Moreover, whereas 
workmen can 'make game and play' as they work, a scribe must keep his words to 
himself, devoting 'al his wittes' to his work (1002-1015). Here Hoccleve comes 
close to attributing his melancholy to the conventional cause of over-study, a 
theme to which he returns in his later poetry. 
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Penelope Doob has argued that Hoccleve writes about madness because it 
accords with a penitential impulse running throughout his work. Madness, she 
says, is simply 'the best metaphor' for the narrator's sinfulness, a view reinforced 
by Eva Thornley's comparison of Hoccleve's works with medieval penitential 
lyrics. 31 Interesting as this argument is, it is not the only way of accounting for 
Hoccleve's concern with madness. It has already been argued that a number of 
specific social, economic and physical factors play their part in the onset of 
Hoccleve's insanity. Such a claim is hardly far-fetched: after all, most critics 
would acknowledge that Margery Kempe's madness can be seen not only as part 
of a theological pattern of sin, punishment and regeneration, but also as the result 
of the oppressive conditions of her life. Similarly, in stressing the implicit moral 
significance of Hoccleve's madness, there is a danger of overlooking Hoccleve's 
explicit attribution of his insanity to his working conditions and his thwarted desire 
for social advancement. 
The theme of madness runs through the major poetry, which includes the 
Male Regle (1406), The Regement of Princes (1411) and the sequence of poems 
now known as the Series (1422). Hoccleve's interest in the connection between sin 
and disease has already been well explored by Doob, who argues that madness is 
seen primarily as a token of spiritual sickness in all of Hoccleve's works. 32 Many 
of the minor poems, such as 'Ad Spiritum Sanctum' and 'The epistle of grace sent 
to the seek man', present illness as a result of spiritual negligence; confession and 
repentance are the only effective curative measures. There is, to be sure, an 
awareness of medical practices in these poems. 'The epistle of grace', for 
example, refers to a humoral imbalance which 'wil aske sothly a fleobotomye' 
(28). Nevertheless, the causes and cures of disease here are always framed 
ultimately in religious terms. 
This common religious interpretation of disease helps give the minor poems 
the appearance of a unified body of work. Nevertheless, we should not, as Doob 
does, assume that madness is interpreted identically in Hoccleve's other works. If 
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other medieval authors can express several views about a single subject, there is no 
reason to think any differently of Hoccleve. In the Male Regle, the Regement and 
the Series, various perspectives on madness are explored in diverse styles and 
genres. Hoccleve in places regards his madness as a punishment for his sins; but 
madness is elsewhere seen, more prosaically, as the product of unfortunate but 
unavoidable professional and economic circumstances. Clearly, Hoccleve's 
treatment of madness is not unchanging. In the major poems -- especially in the 
Series -- the emphasis is as much on the social and psychological, as the moral 
dynamics of the poet's 'sycknesse'. 
The ironic begging poem known as the Male Regle -- the earliest work 
referring to Hoccleve's ill-health -- illustrates this point well. Here Hoccleve is a 
melancholic 'only because working conditions have worn him out and his salary is 
inadequate'. 33 The poet begins with a lament for his poor state of health. This 
'seekly heuynesse' (15), he implies, is a divine punishment for the dissolute living 
of his youth, and he goes on to confess the riotous behaviour that led to his illness. 
Some of the detail here is conventional and familiar: Hoccleve's drinking 
activities, for example, would not seem out of place among the confessions of 
Langland's Deadly Sins. There are also similarities between Hoccleve's 
description of his youthful revels and the penitential lyric 'In my youth fulle wylde 
I was'. 34 
Other details are too specific to be conventional. Hoccleve tells us, for 
example, precisely where he drank: at the 'Poules heed' tavern (143). The 
intrusion of everyday detail into conventional works is typically late-medieval: we 
see it in the mystery plays, in medieval art, and in many devotional books of the 
period. In the Male Regle, however, the apparently unmotivated detail is derived 
from personal experience. Just as the Langland of the C-Text Piers Plowman 
presents 'a world of specific places, Cornhulle and London', Hoccleve describes 
his debauched London life in merciless detail. 35 He even describes his shyness 
regarding sexual matters: 
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Had Ia kus I was content ful weel, 
Bettre than I wolde han be with the deede: 
Ther-on can I but smal; it is no dreede: 
Whan at man speke of it in my presence, 
For shame I wexe as reed as is the gleede. (155-159) 
We are reminded here of Chaucer's seemingly autobiographical passages in the 
House of Fame. Hoccleve repeatedly adopts a personal tone in the major works so 
that 'a real human personality emerges from the pages of La Male Regle -- a 
personality which we can watch develop and observe in different circumstances in 
the Prologue to the Regement, the Complaint, and the Dialogue'. 36 
Clearly, while he does not present anything like a modern autobiography, 
Hoccleve studs his conventional passages of poetry with autobiographical details. 
This point is noted by Stephan Kohl, who implies that Hoccleve's apparently 
candid confession of his bashfulness in the company of women may not be entirely 
serious: 
By referring to his continence in unlikely circumstances, [Hoccleve] 
exempts himself from having to give a moralizing account of his 
behaviour and, as if shocked by this deviation from the moral 
framework of his La Male Regle, he concludes this episode with the 
line: 
Now wol I turne ageyn to my sentence. (1.160). 37 
The sudden shift from autobiography to traditional 'sentence' prefigures the 
stylistic fluctuations of the other major poems. As Burrow puts it, 'Hoccleve's 
various confessions of personal inadequacy cast fitful shadows across the adjacent 
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passages of moral and prudential counsel'. 
38 Ethan Knapp has recently argued that 
Hoccleve's 'poetics of selfhood' is parallelled in his professional output as a civil 
servant. Knapp convincingly compares Hoccleve's petitionary verse with the early 
sections of his formulary, suggesting that all of these works present a generic 
bifurcation, for 'the lowly clerk must simultaneously assert the particularities of 
desire, and yet, for the sake of propriety, take shelter in the bureaucratic nature of 
the document'. 39 From our point of view, Hoccleve's candour in his poems shifts 
our attention from the moral to the personal significance of madness. In this way, 
Hoccleve creates an interpretative context for the theme of sickness that is quite 
distinct from that of the shorter religious poems. 
Hoccleve continues with his queasy confession of his youthful follies after 
the fashion of medieval penitential handbooks. He describes his physical 
cowardice (170), refers to his work at the Privy Seal office (188) and his vanity 
and pretentiousness in his dealings with the London boatmen (201-208). The most 
telling of these autobiographical vignettes concerns Hoccleve's fellow clerks 
'Prentys and Arondel' (321), who, like the poet, led riotous lives, drinking all 
night and lying in bed until mid-morning instead of working. Neither of these 
men, complains Hoccleve, has been punished with ill-health as he has been for his 
bohemian lifestyle. Prentys and Arondel's freedom from physical suffering despite 
their sloth does not constitute a reprieve from punishment: Penelope Doob points 
out that 'the absence of disease does not [... ] indicate absence of sin', which could 
be punished either on earth or in the afterlife. 
40 Nevertheless, the absence of a 
visible divine justice is a cause of frustration for Hoccleve. 
Hoccleve's recognition that divine chastisement is visited unequally upon 
the living signals a departure from the depictions of immediate moral justice in the 
minor poems. In 'The epistle of grace sent to the seek man', Grace tells the 
eponymous invalid that his malady has been caused directly by that favourite sin of 
the late Middle Ages, sloth: 41 
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Also I see, at ful art thu withinne 
of corrupte humour al a-bowt[e] spred, 
That rennyth ay betwyn [pi] flesch and skynne, 
That causith pat thu kepist now thi bedde: 
Than ydilnesse and slouthe hath this bred. (29-33) 
In the Male Regle, however, such divine justice is postponed. Hoccleve is thus 
forced to recognize the complexity of the relationship between sin and its 
punishment. His annoyance that men who are as dissolute as he is enjoy perfect 
health adumbrates his insistence in the later Complaint on the discrepancy between 
inward states and outward appearances. 
The uncomplicated moral interpretation of disease in the shorter religious 
poems now gives way to a more personal response to affliction. One indication of 
this is Hoccleve's implication of his colleagues Prentys and Arondel in his 
confession. As a medieval audience would immediately recognize, this is 
strikingly at odds with the explicit injunctions in penitential manuals against the 
revelation of names in confession. 
42 Once again, Hoccleve cannot resist 
introducing personal details into the conventional framework of his poem, 
however inappropriate they may seem. Similar autobiographical intrusions occur 
later in the poem when Hoccleve includes, among his conventional requests for 
money, two specific references to his financial condition: his rents (fixed incomes) 
are low (361-362) and he is owed ten pounds for the year, waiving his arrears 
(417-424). One is inclined to agree with Stephen Medcalf's observation that 'for 
Chaucer, as for Langland, the needs of the poem are the cause of the person in the 
poem: for Hoccleve it seems [... ] that the poem is being led off to manifest the 
character'. 43 In the Male Regle, then, Hoccleve's troubles, whatever their literary 
precedents, are presented in the context of the poet's daily life. 
Hoccleve's next major poem, the Regement of Princes, has been described 
as 'a strangely schizophrenic work'. 44 At over 2000 lines, the massive, 
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autobiographical prologue rivals the Regement in length. Here, as in the Male 
Regle, Hoccleve spends much of his time discussing the causes and nature of his 
bodily decrepitude; indeed, recent criticism has emphasized Hoccleve's concern 
with the sick body in both the prologue and the Regement proper. 
45 
The prologue begins with Hoccleve unable to sleep and oppressed by 
'thought': 
Mvsyng vpon the restles bisynesse 
Which that this troubly world hath ay on honde, 
That othir thyng than fruyt of byttirnesse 
Ne yeldeth nought, as I can vndirstonde, 
At Chestre ynne, right fast be the stronde, 
As I lay in my bed vp-on a nyght, 
Thought me bereft of sleep with force and myght. 
And many a day and nyght that wykked hyne 
Hadde beforn vexid my poore goost 
So grevously, that of anguysh and pyne 
No richere man was nougher in no coost; 
This dar I seyn, may no wight make his boost 
That he with thought was bettir than I aqveynted, 
For to the deth it wel nigh hath me feynted. (1-14) 
This melancholic brooding recalls the opening of the Male Regle and the distracted 
lamentation which begins the Book of the Duchess, although it has a greater 
metaphorical richness and contains fewer redundant phrases than Chaucer's poem. 
Hoccleve now encounters an old beggar, who attempts to restore the poet 
to his right wits. The beggar instructs Hoccleve to make a full confession and to 
avoid solitariness and thought. Drawing on Ecclesiastes, he warns that the man 
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who is alone is likely 'to bere a dotyd heed' (200). Here the beggar is uttering the 
wisdom that will be urged again in the Series: too much brooding leads to 
madness. 'Besy ýoght' may also lead to error, he warns, ominously invoking the 
case of John Badby, a Lollard burnt at the stake for heresy in March 1410.46 This 
leads the beggar to denounce human reason as 'surquidrie' (331). Those who 
meddle in scripture, in particular, are madly presumptuous: 
Pat oure lord god seip in holy scripture 
May not be fals; pis knawit euery whi3t, 
But he be mad. (337-339) 
Presumpcioun, a! benedicite! 
Why vexist you folk with pi franesie? (358-359) 
These splenetic outbursts against the potentially heretical exercise of human reason 
anticipate Hoccleve's diatribe against heresy in one of his more directly political 
poems, To Sir John Oldcastle (1414). For the beggar, as for the Hoccleve of 
Oldcastle, insanity is associated with the presumption and error of heresy. This 
vitriolic use of the language of insanity is strikingly different from Hoccleve's own 
pathetic first-person account of his madness at the beginning of the poem. The 
Regement prologue reminds us, then, of the diverse significances of madness. 
Hoccleve goes on to discuss the causes of his melancholia in 
autobiographical terms. He describes in detail the nature and duration of his 
arduous work at the the Privy Seal office (801-805) and gives particulars, as in the 
Male Regle, of his dire financial circumstances (820-840). Thus he illustrates his 
statement in the Male Regle that 'poore purs and peynes stronge' have caused him 
to 'raue' (395-396). Hoccleve characteristically turns from these personal musings 
to reflect on the proper behaviour for nobles and knights (862-924). But he cannot 
desist from talking about his own circumstances for long. The impoverished state 
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of England's soldiery reminds him that he himself may soon suffer want; and he 
gives futher details of his personal finances (932-935). He tells of the physical 
hardships and mental stresses of life as a clerk (988-1029). His complaint that 
writing spoils the eyes carries special autobiographical weight since Hoccleve 
complains of impaired vision in To the Duke of Bedford and admits in the Balade 
to the Duke of York that he is too proud to wear spectacles. The impression created 
by this accumulation of details is of an anguished and self-conscious man, a 
characterization which Hoccleve develops considerably in his later works. 
The poet and the beggar represent two distinct attitudes towards madness, 
the first positive, the second condemnatory. At one level, these attitudes 
correspond to Hoccleve's moral dilemma: the tension which remains at the end of 
the prologue is, as Penelope Doob says, between 'the Christian injunction to be 
mad to the world and the secular desire for prosperity which entails the madness of 
sin. [... ] It is this tension which may indeed have driven Hoccleve mad a few 
years after writing the Regement'. 
47 This is no doubt true; yet in reducing 
Hoccleve's dilemma to Christian terms we should not forget the secular pathos of 
Hoccleve's description of his madness or the specific economic and physical 
pressures which underlie it. 
Hoccleve's final work is the string of poems now known collectively as the 
Series (1422), which comprises a prologue to the Complaint, the Complaint itself, 
the Dialogue with a Friend, Lerne to Die, The Tale of Jereslaus's Wife and The 
Tale of Jonathas. The first three parts of this sequence, in particular, are 
concerned with what A. G. Rigg has called the 'social consequences of 
madness'. 48 Four centuries after Hoccleve's death, Lord Shaftesbury remarked: 
What an awful condition that of a lunatic! His words are generally 
disbelieved, and his most innocent particularities perverted; it is 
natural that it should be so; and we place ourselves on guard -- that 
is, give to every word, look, gesture a value and meaning which 
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oftentimes it cannot bear, and which it would not bear in ordinary 
life. 49 
Such public hypersensitivity to madness and its effect on the madman were quite 
familiar in the Middle Ages. Indeed, these are the subjects of Hoccleve's 
Complaint. 
The Complaint prologue is remarkably similar to that of the Regement. 
Again, Hoccleve laments his melancholic state: 
and in the ende of novembar, vpon a nyght, 
syghenge sore as I in my bed lay, 
for this and othar thowghts whiche many a day 
before I toke, sleape cam none in myne eye, 
so vexyd me the thowghtfull maladye. 
I see well, sythen I with sycknes last 
was scourged, clowdy hath bene the favoure 
that shone [on] me full bright in tymes past; 
the sonne abatid and the derke showre 
hildyd downe right on me and in langour 
he made [me] swyme, so that my wite 
to lyve no lust hadd, ne [no] delyte. 
The grefe abowte my harte so [sore] swal 
and bolned evar to and to so sore, 
that nedes out I must[e] there-with-all; 
I thowght I nolde it kepe cloos no more, 
ne lett it in me for to olde and hore; 
and for to preve I cam of a woman, 
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I brast oute on the morowe and thus began. (17-34) 
The final stanza indicates that Hoccleve's immediate purpose in writing his 
Complaint is to exorcize his madness. Madness, we have already said, was a 
source of poetic inspiration for classical and Renaissance poets. Although this 
particular relationship between madness and authorship was unknown in the 
Middle Ages, Hoccleve nevertheless presents his insanity as his reason for writing. 
Indeed, as Julia Kristeva writes, 'for those who are racked with melancholia, 
writing about it would have meaning only if writing sprang out of that very 
melancholia'. 50 
Hoccleve begins the Complaint itself by relating an apparently genuine 
experience of madness: 
Allmyghty god as lykethe his goodnes, 
visytethe folks alday as men may se, 
with lose of good and bodily sikenese, 
and amonge othar he forgat not me; 
witnes vppon the wyld infirmytie 
which that I had, as many a man well knewe, 
and whiche me out of my seife cast and threw. (36-42) 
Hoccleve clearly states that his madness was divinely ordained. But it could be 
argued that the focus of the Complaint is on the social and psychological, rather 
than the moral dynamics of Hoccleve's madness. Certainly, the phrases 'as men 
may se' and 'as many a man well knewe' foreshadow Hoccleve's almost paranoid 
concern throughout the Complaint with other people's responses to his madness. 
The following stanza, moreover, describes the reactions of Hoccleve's friends to 
his insanity. His affliction was well-known and became the talk of the town -- 
'how it with me stode was in every mans mowthe' -- and his friends undertook 
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pilgrimages for his cure (46-49). Thankfully, continues Hoccleve, God restored 
his memory five years ago, a detail that is consistent with the documentary 
evidence for the poet's incapacity and recovery. 
Despite Hoccleve's assurances, the poet's friends are not convinced that 
Hoccleve is fully recovered from his insanity: 
for thowgh that my wit were hoom come again, 
men wolde it not so vnderstond or take; 
with me to deale hadden they dysdayne; 
a ryotows person I was and forsake; 
myn olde ffrindshipe was all ovarshake; 
no wyte withe me lyst make daliance; 
the worlde me made a straunge continance. (64-70) 
Hoccleve's obsessive repetition of the word 'continance', which occurs no fewer 
than six times in the Complaint, indicates a heightened self-consciousness. The 
poet's Westminster colleagues react to him with suspicion, shying away from him, 
'as they not me sye' (77) or simply fleeing from him: 'they that me sye fledden 
a-wey fro me' (79). 51 Feelings of shame and embarrassment, of course, figure 
prominently in many medieval cases of madness. For Hoccleve, the taint of 
insanity is a private torment as well as a public disgrace. 
Hoccleve now relates his friends' reports of his behaviour during his 
insanity. These testimonies are extremely conventional, in both literary and 
medical terms. Hoccleve's observers compared him to an ox, a buck and a deer, 
images which, as John Burrow points out, 'suggest Hoccleve's degradation (like 
Nebuchadnezzar) to a bestial state'. 52 Hoccleve's eyes, these friends observed, 
'sowghten every halke' (133), a phrase which recalls Bartholomeus Anglicus's 
description of the madman's 'meuynge and castinge about the y3en'. 53 During his 
insanity Hoccleve also ran about 'here and there', another traditional indication of 
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insanity. Such symptoms were, of course, handed down from classical writers and 
codified in medieval medical works. It does not follow, however, that Hoccleve 
was not really insane or that his friends' reports were not based on observation. 
During the fifteenth century 'works in the vernacular on medicine and surgery of 
every description were in circulation in some numbers'; the ideas contained within 
them may well have influenced Hoccleve's contemporaries. 54 As Bennett Simon 
remarks in his study of madness in ancient Greece, 'there is a good deal of 
evidence, both cross cultural and historical, that culturally defined categories shape 
both the patient's vision of his inner experience and others' reports of his 
behavior' , 
55 
As well as describing the poet's conduct while insane, Hoccleve's friends 
offer their prognoses of his condition. They say that madness endures and that 
even if Hoccleve is temporarily recovered, a relapse is inevitable given his age. As 
Penelope Doob notes, these are both medical conventions. 56 The latter prediction, 
however, also has a ring of plausibility: Hoccleve was fifty-three years old when 
he wrote the Complaint, a ripe age by medieval standards. Finally, the friends 
opine, again conventionally, that the arrival of the hot weather will precipitate 
another bout of madness (92-93). It may be that Hoccleve added or embellished 
some of these details in order to inspire sympathy. Whatever the case, Hoccleve 
presents the interpretation of his madness as the central problem in his struggle for 
identity. A principal question raised by the Complaint is one which has been, and 
continues to be, vigorously disputed in the twentieth century: who has the 
authority to identify madness? 
Whatever the status of his friends' gloomy clinical forecasts, Hoccleve 
points out that they were proved wrong: 'thanked be god', says the relieved poet, 
'it shoop nought as they seide' (98). As if to discredit further his friends' medical 
speculations, he spends the next three stanzas explaining the cause of his quondam 
madness as he understands it, in Christian terms. 'It is a lew[e]dnesse', he warns, 
to pretend to know what will happen in the future (101-105). Sickness, he reminds 
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us, is sent by God; therefore only He can predict the onset of disease. But this 
reflection ends with characteristic abruptness -- 'To my mater streit wol I me 
dresse' (119) -- and we are returned in the next stanza to the things 'men seyden' 
about Hoccleve's illness (120). Through such shifts of perspective our attention is 
directed to the controversial nature of explanations of madness. Hoccleve counters 
his friends' purely physiological theories about his insanity with his own 
supernatural explanation. We are reminded here of the diverse theories about the 
probable causes and outcomes of madness in the cases of Charles VI of France and 
the painter Hugo van der Goes, whose temporary madness was considered a 
natural disease by some and a divine chastisement by others. 
It is worth noting that despite all the speculation about Hoccleve's 
madness, demonic possession is not once suggested as a cause of it, a fact that 
must confound the many psychiatric historians who continue to regard possession 
as the cornerstone of medieval approaches to madness. Moreover, despite their 
avoidance of him, Hoccleve's friends are sympathetic towards the man they 
believe to be mad. Their responses parallel courtly responses to the insane knights 
of the romances, showing that a compassionate attitude towards insanity was 
possible long before the sentimental fiction of the post-romantic period: 
but some dele had I reioysynge amonge, 
and gladnese also in my spirit, 
that thowghe the people toke hem mis & wronge, 
me demynge of my syck[e]nesse not quite, 
yet for they compleyned the hevy plit 
that they had sene me in with tendernesse 
of hertes cherte, my grefe was the lesse. (281-287) 
This lessens Hoccleve's discomfort and goes some way towards dispelling the 
widespread view that the medieval insane were regarded only with disgust. But 
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however well-intentioned Hoccleve's friends may be, their gossip has profoundly 
humiliating effects of the self-conscious man. In fact, Hoccleve's public behaviour 
is consistent with what might now be called a phobic disorder or agoraphobia with 
distinct features of paranoia: 
My sprites laboryd [euere] bysyly 
to peinte countinaunce chere and loke, 
for that men spake of me so wonderingly, 
and for the very shame and fere I qwoke; 
thowghe myne herte had be dypped in the broke, 
It wete and moyste I-now was of my swot, 
whiche was nowe frostye colde, now firy hoot. (148-154) 
Hoccleve's fluctuating physical sensations recall the tortured Boethian meditation 
on instability with which the Complaint began. The poet's shame, 
self-consciousness and anxiety at this point are far greater than Michel Foucault's 
history of madness might lead us to expect in a medieval text. 
Indeed, Hoccleve's is not, to recall Foucault's phrase, an 'easy wandering 
existence'. The poet begins to eschew company for fear of uttering some solecism 
which might convict him of insanity (134-140). His madness is not simply a 
spectacular or visible phenomenon, but a lurking menace which is at any moment 
liable to betray its presence. To avoid this danger, Hoccleve retreats from public 
view altogether into the privacy of his home. It has already been seen that the 
insane in the late Middle Ages were generally cared for by friends or relatives; 
Furnivall's conjecture that Hoccleve was tended during his illness by his wife is 
therefore plausible, albeit unsubstantiated. 57 But Hoccleve's isolation from daily 
life has deleterious effects on his state of mind. His self-imposed exile ominously 
recalls the beggar's warning to Hoccleve in the prologue to the Regement: 
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O ping seye I, if you go feerlees 
Al solytarie, & counsel lakke, & rede, 
As me pinkep, pi gyse is doutelees, 
Pou likly art to bere a dotyd heed. 
Whil you art soule, poght is wastyng seed, 
Swich in be, & bat in grete foysoun, 
And you redeles, nat cant voyde his poysoun. (197-203) 
Indeed, Hoccleve is once again assailed by 'besy J oght'. Moreover, as James 
Simpson writes of Hoccleve's home, 'paradoxically, this place of privacy is 
registered as being no defence against public scrutiny'. 
58 In fact, Hoccleve's 
self-consciousness is felt most acutely at exactly this point in the poem, in the 
extraordinary 'mirror scene'. 
The melancholic heroes of romance are given to self-reflection in mirrors 
and wells, gaining insight into their identities from their external appearances. In 
the Complaint, Hoccleve describes a rather different sort of mirror gazing. Here 
the poet practices looking sane before his 'glas' and once again determines to 
correct any irregularities he might detect: 
And in my chamber at home when I was 
my seife alone I in this wyse wrowght: 
I streite vnto my myrrowr and my glas, 
to loke how that me of my chere thowght[e], 
yf any [other] were it than it owght[e]; 
for fayne wolde I yf it had not be right, 
amendyd it to my kunynge and myght. 
Many a sawte made I to this myrrowre, 
thinkynge, 'yf that I loke in this manere 
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amonge folke as I now do, none errowr 
of suspecte loke may in my face appere, 
this countinance, I am svre, and this chere, 
If I forth vse, is no thinge reprevable 
to them that have conseytes resonable. ' (155-168) 
Initially, then, Hoccleve is satisfied that his face betrays no marks of insanity, at 
least to those who have 'conseytes resonable', or 'reliable perceptions'. 
But of course, this comfortable conclusion presupposes the reliability of his 
own perceptions, a fact which Hoccleve suddenly realizes with a characteristic 
volte-face. He now perceives the folly of regarding himself as entirely other, of 
failing to take into account his subjectivity. What if, he begins to wonder, he is 
unable to perceive his real state after all? 
And there-with-all I thowght[e] thus anon: 
'men in theyr owne case bene blynd alday, 
as I haue hard say many a day agon, 
and in that [same] plyght I stonde may; 
how shall I doo which is the best[e] way, 
my trowbled spirit for to bringe at rest[e]? 
yf I wist howe, fayne wolde I do the best[e]. ' (169-175) 
The implication of this is that Hoccleve's own senses may be untrustworthy. In the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance, of course, sight was often considered to be the 
sense most prone to error. 
59 But given the context of Hoccleve's doubt, we may 
infer that Hoccleve attributes the unreliability of his perceptions to the possibility 
of his enduring madness. Perhaps his apparent sanity, he thinks, is merely an 
insane delusion. Once this suspicion has entered his mind, his attempt to see 
himself as others see him is doomed. Hoccleve had begun his self-scrutiny in the 
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hope that his mirror image would return to him an unmediated reflection of his 
true condition and therefore vouchsafe his sanity. The awful realisation of the 
fallibility of his perceptions, however, undermines any such confidence. 
The mirror scene has important implications for anyone interested in the 
histories of madness and subjectivities. In particular, it shows that madness, far 
from being spectacular or visible, could be seen in the Middle Ages as a hidden 
and subjective affliction. Hoccleve's presentation of madness in the Complaint is 
certainly difficult to reconcile with certain widespread ideas about the medieval 
view of insanity and the psychology of medieval people. Chief among these, 
perhaps, is the view that madness in the Middle Ages was always conceived as a 
spectacle. Michel Foucault, for example, says that madmen were then regarded as 
'monsters -- that is, etymologically, beings or things to be shown'. 
60 Roy Porter 
takes this point much further. In the Middle Ages and Renaissance, he argues, 'it 
was the essence of madness to be visible, and known by its appearance'. 61 Before 
the nineteenth century, men 'trusted to Nature's legibility'; 'outward signs', 
continues Porter, 'encoded inner realities. Hence madness gave itself away'. 62 
According to the literary critic Duncan Salkeld, madmen, until at least the time of 
Descartes, 'presented a spectacular physical image, and bore their illness in the 
flesh and matter of their bodies'. 63 
It has already be shown that in medical texts madness was regarded 
principally, although not exclusively, as a somatic affliction, the result of a 
malfunctioning of one of the ventricles of the brain or an imbalance of the 
humours. The symptoms of madness were easily detectable. The maniac screamed 
and tore both his flesh and his clothes; the melancholic had a surplus of black bile 
and was therefore recognisable by his swarthy complexion. In short, a man's 
mental and physical condition were discernible at a single glance. As Roy Porter 
says, it was only in the wake of Cartesian dualism that physicians started to think 
seriously about madness as a disorder of the mind rather than the body. In 
England, he argues, it was not until the publication of Locke's Essay. on Human 
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Understanding (1690) that the concept of madness as a purely mental affliction 
began to gain anything like widespread academic respectability. 
64 In the early 
nineteenth century, mentalistic explanations of madness -- although highly 
contentious -- gained increasing popularity. 
65 By the time of Freud, of course, 
madness had become the 'enemy within', whose secret workings could be brought 
to light and analyzed only through the specialized skill of the psychiatrist. 
Historians of psychiatry, then, have charted a gradual shift from the 
medieval understanding of madness as a spectacular disease to the modern 
interiorization of madness. Michel Foucault, for example, talks of the 
'psychologization' of madness in the nineteenth century, when madness became 
'inscribed within the dimension of interiority'. 
66 Art historians have noted the 
same historical trend. In an article on the early nineteenth-century painter 
Gericault, for example, Margaret Miller discusses how shifting paradigms of 
mental illness affected artistic representations of the insane. Before the nineteenth 
century, says Miller, the madman in art was often represented in terms of demonic 
possession or witchcraft and was identified by his spectacular appearance or 
behaviour. In his portraits of the mentally ill, however, Gericault 
interprets insanity not in terms of behaviour, but as a state of mind. 
[... ] Hidden in the "likeness, " in the colour of the skin, the eyes, 
the veins, are the pathological "emblems" of their malady which are 
only there for the psychiatrist to read. 67 
For Miller, the demonic representation of the mad in medieval art obliterated their 
individual features; Gericault's paintings of madmen, however, established the 
insane as 'understandable individuals', an achievement which was dependent less 
on the painter's individual insight than on what Miller calls 'the conceptions of his 
time'. 68 Miller's comments about the artistic representation of madness in history 
are consistent with many historian's and critic's pronouncements on medieval 
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madness. The Complaint shows that these ideas constitute a caricature of medieval 
depictions of madness which cannot be applied to all works of medieval literature. 
As the treatment of the carpenter in the Miller's Tale suggests, madness in 
literature is often spectacular. In the romances, for example, madness is instantly 
identifiable by appearance. Medieval drama offers an even more blatant example 
of the spectacular medieval madman in the figure of Herod, whose raving madness 
and eventual death constitute a spectacular warning to shun the sin of pride. The 
stage directions for the Coventry Pageant of Shearmen and Taylors even require 
Herod to rant in the streets as well as on stage. 69 
In the Complaint, however, the identification of madness is more 
problematic, as Hoccleve continually draws attention to the discrepancy between 
inner, subjective impressions and outer appearances. As Hoccleve's Letter of 
Cupid (1402), a translation of Christine de Pisan's Epistre Au Dieu D'Amours, has 
it: 
fful herd yt is to know a manys hert; 
for outwarde may no man the trouthe deme; (36-37) 
In fact, the madman's interiority is stressed in all of the major poems. Throughout 
the Male Regle, the Regement of Princes and the Complaint, the madman is 
presented not so much as a stock figure or a featureless demoniac as a unique 
human subject. In this way these poems highlight the discrepancy between artistic 
stereotypes and everyday experiences of madness. 
Hoccleve's sense of a disjunction between inner and outer is made explicit 
in a sententious admonition later in the Complaint: 
Vpon a looke is harde, men them to grownde 
what a man is there-by the sothe is hid; 
whither his wittes seke bene or sounde, 
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by cowntynaunce it is not wist ne kyd. (211-214) 
The only reliable method of discovering the truth about a man's mental condition, 
says Hoccleve, is by conversing or 'comunynge' with him (217), a conclusion that 
might be endorsed by a modern psychiatrist. Far from being spectacular, madness 
is seen by Hoccleve as a secret, hidden affliction. 
The point is reinforced a little later in the Complaint when Hoccleve writes 
angrily: 
Now let this passe god wott, many a man 
semythe full wise by cowntenaunce and chere, 
whiche, and he tastyd were what he can, 
men myghten licken hym to a fooles pere; 
and some man lokethe in foltyshe maner[e] 
as to the outward dome and ludgement, 
that at the prese descrete is and prudent. (239-245) 
The wordplay on 'taste' here indicates that 'pere' is also to be understood as a 
pun. Since pears, as Burrow says, 'often seem good when they are rotten', the 
image cleverly suggests the discrepancy between appearances and reality. 70 'God 
wott', meanwhile, is not merely a simple expression of exasperation or a metrical 
filler: it reinforces Hoccleve's insistence throughout the Complaint that only God 
can tell the mad from the sane. For man, on the other hand, madness is inherently 
subjective and undetectable. 71 
This conclusion has implications for cultural, as well as psychiatric history. 
Many historians are still reluctant to accept the existence of expressions and 
experiences of subjectivity in medieval literature. In his controversial book The 
Tremulous Private Body, Francis Barker argues that experiences of inwardness or 
interiority were simply not possible in the Middle Ages. 'Pre-bourgeois 
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subjection', writes Barker, 'does not properly involve subjectivity at all, but a 
condition of dependent membership in which place and articulation are defined not 
by an interiorised self-recognition [... ] but by incorporation in the body politic'. 72 
For Barker, any talk about the inwardness of medieval people would be 
inappropriate. As David Aers exasperatedly notes, interest in medieval 
subjectivities has often been dismissed as a sign of 'one's benighted "humanism", 
one's incorrigible "anachronism"'. Yet this position has no historical foundation. 
'There is no reason', continues Aers, 'to think that languages and experiences of 
inwardness, of interiority, of divided selves, of splits between outer realities and 
inner forms of being, were unknown before the seventeenth century, before 
capitalism, before the "bourgeoisie", before Descartes'. 73 
Many medievalists nevertheless remain unwilling to acknowledge 
expressions of subjectivity in literature. In his study of the psychology of 
late-medieval writers, Stephen Medcalf argues that medieval people perceived no 
significant difference between reality and their interpretations of it. In his 
discussion of Hoccleve's poetry, Medcalf notes that 'body is close to spirit: this 
world to the supernatural: appearance is straightforwardly related, in truth and 
falsehood, to reality'. The medieval world, as he memorably puts it, 'was more 
single'. 74 Medieval philosophers, he explains elsewhere, were 'less bothered than 
later philosophers by any gap between subjectivity and the external world'; 
consequently, for literary authors, 'the division between inner and outer does not 
run deep'. 75 Pre-modern perception, Medcalf argues, was based on Aristotelian 
principles which permitted no distinction between the knower and the known. 'In 
Aristotelian theory', he writes, 
what men perceive is an actual aspect of the thing perceived, not 
any interpretation or decoding of impressions received from it. [... ] 
It was not until toward Descartes' time that ancient sceptical doubts 
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were raised again about whether our perceptions correspond to 
external reality. 76 
While there can be no doubt that such doubts became keener in the seventeenth 
century, they are already apparent in Hoccleve's Complaint; in fact, the mirror 
scene foreshadows Descartes's philosophical concern with madness in the 
Meditations in a number of ways. 
First, Hoccleve anticipates Descartes's double awareness of himself as both 
subject and object, observer and observed. Also like Descartes, although for very 
different reasons, Hoccleve entertains the idea that his perception of reality might 
be distorted by madness. 77 In the latter respect Hoccleve goes even further than 
the philosopher. For Descartes madness strikes first of all the foundation of 
knowledge, the senses; but rather than pursue the possibility of his insanity, 
Descartes simply excludes it by fiat. 'These are madmen', he writes of the 
melancholics who believe their bodies to be made of glass, 'and I would hardly be 
less extravagant if I were to follow their example'. 78 As Harry Frankfurt 
comments, Descartes 
simply dismisses the possibility of his madness with the remark that 
it would not be reasonable to entertain it. [... ] The fact that error 
may arise out of madness suggests that he should be suspicious of 
all his opinions until he can establish that he is not insane. He does 
not, however, attempt to establish his sanity, or even to establish a 
procedure for doing so. 79 
Hoccleve's apparently objective procedure for establishing his sanity -- and 
its predictably subjective result -- points forward to Renaissance imagery. In his 
discussion of the iconography of madness at the end of the Middle Ages, Michel 
Foucault writes: 
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The symbol of madness will henceforth be the mirror which, 
without reflecting anything real, will secretly offer the man who 
observes himself in it the dream of his own presumption. Madness 
deals not so much with truth and the world, as with man and 
whatever truth about himself he is able to perceive. 80 
This experience of madness is encapsulated in one of Holbein's illustrations for 
Erasmus's Praise of Folly, in which a man observes his mirror-image sticking out 
its tongue at him, ridiculing his vanity. 81 Hoccleve's search for truth in the mirror 
results in a similar sort of self-mockery, as the poet loses all grounds for certainty. 
Hoccleve's text illustrates perfectly Max Pensky's perceptive statement that 
'melancholia is a discourse about the necessity and impossibility of the discovery 
and possession of "objective" meaning by the subjective investigator'. 82 
Like Descartes after him, Hoccleve takes refuge in dogma rather than 
pursue his insights so far as to threaten a relapse of madness or to achieve a truly 
modern existential awareness of self. The only bearable option open to him now is 
to abandon his 'busy' investigation into his mental condition and return to the 
security of faith. Stephan Kohl remarks of the mirror experiment that 'if ever there 
was a program of self-education not rooted in ethical maxims, then this is one'. 83 
As the Series progresses it becomes clear that only an act of faith -- a commitment 
to 'ethical maxims' -- can deliver Hoccleve from solipsism into truth. 
Hoccleve's alternating thoughts as he gazes into his mirror suggest the sorts 
of pathological self-consciousness described in R. D. Laing's seminal book The 
Divided Self. 'The schizoid individual', writes Laing, 'is frequently tormented by 
the compulsive nature of his own processes, and also by the equally compulsive 
nature of his sense of his body as an object in the world of others'. 84 For 
Hoccleve, such fears are renewed in a public setting when he returns one day from 
Westminster, 'vexid full grevously withe thowghtfull hete' (184). This association 
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between mental torment and body temperature recalls the disturbing alternations in 
Hoccleve's physical state between 'frostye colde' and 'firy hoot' in the earlier 
street scene. 
There are also echoes of the poet's mental vacillation before his mirror. 
Hoccleve now reflects dejectedly that he is a 'great fole' to show himself in public 
when he stands 'out of all favour and grace' (189). But this thought is immediately 
followed another consideration, namely, that to remain indoors would only fuel 
gossip: 
And then thowght I on that othar syde: 
'If that I not be sene amonge the prees, 
men deme wele that I myne heade hyde, 
and am werse than I am it is no lees. ' (190-193) 
Concern about the opinions of others now gives way to stubbornness and 
frustration. Hoccleve cannot, he says, prevent people from speculating about his 
condition - 
I may not lette a man to ymagine 
ferre above the mone, yf that hym lyst (197-198) 
- but the poet will not heed their talk. 'Of suche ymaginynge I not ne reche', he 
says emphatically, 'for evar sythen set haue I the lesse / by the peoples 
ymagination' (307; 379-380). In the dispute over his sanity, Hoccleve's reiteration 
of the word 'ymagination' is a significant counter-tactic. As the lord in Chaucer's 
Summoner's Tale asserts, excess of imagination implies detachment from reality 
and even madness. Thus Hoccleve not only attempts to escape the stigma of 
insanity but turns the tables on the rumour-mongers, implying that the truly 
deluded are those who think him still mad. 
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In order to stress the temporary nature of his madness, Hoccleve invokes 
the conventional analogy between madness and drunkenness: 
If a man ones fall in dronkenesse, 
shall he contynewe there-in evar mo? 
nay, thowghe a man doo in drinkynge excesse 
so ferforthe that not speake he ne can, ne go, 
and his wittes welny ben reft him froo, 
and buryed in the Cuppe he aftarward 
Comythe to hym seife agayne, ellis were it hard. 
Right so thowghe my witt were a pilgrime, 
and went[e] fer fro home he cam agayne. (225-233) 
Indeed, by the end of the Complaint Hoccleve apparently sounds a new note of 
self-confidence: 
This troubly lyfe hathe all to longe enduryd, 
not have I wyst how in my skynne to turne; 
but now my seife to my seife have ensured, 
for no suche wondrynge aftar this to morne. (302-305) 
Moreover, Hoccleve now appeals to the conventional figure of Reason for 
consolation: 
This othar day a lamentacion 
of a wofull man in a boke I sye, 
to whome word[e]s of consolation 
Reason gave spekynge effectually; 
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and well easyd myn herte was ther-by; 
for when I had a while in the boke red, 
with the speche of Reason was I well fed. (309-315) 
As Stephen Medcalf writes, Hoccleve 'takes refuge, after such painful and surely 
personally reminiscent details such as the mirror, in a convention like the 'wofull 
man' consoled by Reason whom he took from Isidore of Seville'. 
85 By the end of 
the Complaint, then, Hoccleve is beginning to reject autobiography in favour of 
more conventional modes of expression. Rather than relying on his own resources 
to guarantee his sanity as he does in the mirror episode, Hoccleve finally seeks the 
support of moral authority. 
In the Dialogue with a Friend, however, Hoccleve is still ghoulishly 
self-conscious about public opinion. Here he returns, 'as if compelled' to the 
subject of his supposed insanity. 
86 He wishes to publish his Complaint, against his 
friend's advice, to prove that he is not ashamed of his previous 'wildhede' (52) 
and to give praise to God for restoring his sanity (80-84). The cathartic value of 
the act of writing in the prologue to the Complaint has already been noted. Now 
Hoccleve determines to use his writing to prove his sanity to others. In his study 
of autobiographies by the insane, Roy Porter remarks that 'for people judged 
insane but trying to prove their sanity, the very act of putting pen to paper, 
"composing" a testament, was clearly significant in itself -- evidence, surely, of 
"composure". 87 In this sense, Hoccleve stands at the beginning of an English 
tradition of unstable writers including Carkesse, Smart and Cowper, who 'clearly 
resorted to authorship to maintain their sanity'. 88 
The excessive length and repetitiveness of the Dialogue suggest the poet's 
exasperation at having to prove his mental stability. Clearly, Hoccleve's aim in the 
Dialogue is to reconcile himself with his friend and to conform to his expectations. 
But the Dialogue may also be read as a sort of inner drama. Stephan Kohl regards 
the friend as Hoccleve's unconscious mind. 89 Similarly, Lillian Feder has 
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suggested that the friend is the externalisation of a 'threat within', suggesting that 
madness is a 'perennial determinant of human nature'. 90 But the extent to which 
Hoccleve's dialogue is oriented towards social reintegration should not be 
underestimated: Hoccleve's lengthy and apparently spurious invective against the 
abominable practice of coin-clipping may be accounted for as an attempt to find 
more respectable poetic material. 91 
In the following section of the Dialogue the friend alleges that Hoccleve 
has become insane again due to overstudy in literary matters and recommends that 
Hoccleve postpone his plans to write: 
Thy bisy Studie aboute swich mateere 
Hath causid thee to stirte in-to the plyt 
That thow were in as fer as I can heere; 
And thogh thow deeme thow be there-of qwyt 
Abyde and thy purpos putte in respyt 
Til pat right wel stablisshid be thy brayn; 
And ther-to thanne I wole assente fayn. (302-308) 
The friend represents conspicuously conventional beliefs: 'thyng of thoghtful 
studie kaght, / Perillous is, as Pat hath me been taght' (398-399, my italics). This 
is the view of Ecclesiastes -- 'of making many books there is no end; and much 
study is weariness of the flesh' (Ecclesiastes 12: 12) -- and of Hoccleve's master 
Chaucer in the House of Fame (29-30). Indeed, we have already seen that negative 
attitudes towards scholarly work were widespread in the late Middle Ages; the 
friend's comments therefore have behind them a weight of tradition. 
Nevertheless, Hoccleve bravely meets the repeated charges of overstudy 
with equally solid protestations of sanity. As if to emphasize his philosophical 
wisdom he quotes Solomon and Cicero. He also repeatedly uses the words 'reson' 
and 'resonable' to describe both his mental state and his literary aspirations. As 
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Lillian Feder says, 'the Reason that led to acceptance of the very experience of 
madness in the Complaint is now the inner faculty that provides confidence in his 
own judgement'. 92 
Hoccleve's recovery from madness, then, is presented as an inner 
transformation. His 'fear of madness', Feder claims, has 'yielded to his individual 
observation and his effort to rediscover restorative powers within his being'. 93 
This comment is consistent with the trend in liberal literary criticism which sees 
Hoccleve as a bold pioneer of individualism. It also brings Hoccleve's cure into 
line with certain contemporary liberal ideas about psychiatric healing, according to 
which, as Roger Scruton sceptically observes, 'not only the process of recovery, 
but its end result, are described in terms that are internal to the individual. He 
must simply "actualize" his "possibilities"'. 94 Obviously, such a desocializing 
explanation of the cure of madness is not entirely appropriate here. The mirror 
experiment has already shown Hoccleve the dangers of self-reliance; in the 
Dialogue, by contrast, Hoccleve assimilates the advice of Reason and the wisdom 
of authority. Nevertheless, Hoccleve does present his madness and his recovery 
from it in individual and psychological terms, even if, as Feder grudgingly notes, 
his self-examination is 'blocked by a prescribed moral conclusion'. 95 
As James Simpson has argued, Hoccleve's successful defence of his sanity 
derives from his confidence in his uniqueness as an individual. 'The turning point 
in the Dialogue', says Simpson, 'when the friend is persuaded of Thomas's 
stability, comes when Thomas puts it to his friend that the friend should not 
presume to judge another completely': 96 
'ffreend, as to pat, he lyueth nat pat can 
Knowe how it standith with an othir wight 
So wel as him self; al-thogh many a man 
Take on him more than lyth in his might 
To knowe pat man is nat ruled right 
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Pat so presumeth in his iugement: 
Beforn the doom good were auisament. ' (477-483) 
This passage recalls and reinforces Hoccleve's insistence in the Complaint that a 
man's mental condition is hidden and unknowable to any mortal other than 
himself. As Simpson observes, 'here Thomas is not seeing himself simply as 
'other', through the eyes of other people. Instead, he is defending his intimacy and 
integrity'. 97 
Now that Hoccleve has relinquished the sickly self-consciousness of the 
mirror scene, the friend reveals that he has been merely testing Hoccleve's sanity 
(484-490) and at last endorses the frustrated poet's plans to write, so long as 
Hoccleve promises not to work too hard: 
'I preye thee in al maneere way 
Thy wittes to conserue in hir fresshnesse; 
Whan thow ther-to goost take of hem the lesse; 
To muse longe in an harde mateere, 
The wit of man abieth it ful deere. ' (493-497) 
With this conditional endorsement, Hoccleve can begin a process of social 
reintegration. 
In order to prove his public spiritedness, Hoccleve now praises the Duke of 
Gloucester in a fitting display of piety. Next he tells the friend that since he has 
often chided women in the past -- an allusion to his adaptation of Christine de 
Pisan's Letter of Cupid -- he will write a piece in praise of women. This turns out 
to be a translation of the Gesta Romanorum story of Jereslaus's Wife. The 
conventionality of this choice indicates that Hoccleve has now abandoned the 
autobiographical mode; the public poet now takes over from the poet of private 
complaint. 
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The view of physical suffering in Jereslaus's Wife is similar to that in the 
shorter religious poems. Sickness is once again seen 'from the outside', as it were, 
as spectacular phenomena; moreover, it is presented as the consequence of sin, not 
of poverty or poor working conditions, as both the Male Regle and the prologue to 
the Regement implied. The Shipman in Jereslaus's Wife, for example, is punished 
for his lechery with madness: 
The Shipman had also the franesie, 
That with this Emperice hadde ment 
ffulfillid his foul lust of aduoutrie, 
Which was in him ful hoot and ful feruent: 
See how all hem that to this Innocent, 
This noble lady had y-doon greuance, 
Our lord god qwitte with strooke of vengeance. (715-721) 
As this didactic conclusion shows, Hoccleve is now the moralistic observer of 
madness rather than its pathetic victim. 
Hoccleve also now deflects attention from the irregularities of his own life 
which he described in the earlier long poems by focussing on the theme of female 
unruliness. In a recent article on Jereslaus's Wife and Tale of Jonathas, Karen 
Winstead argues that 'taken together' the two poems 'form an artfully constructed 
anti-feminist joke, which mocks disorderly women'. 98 Jereslaus's Wife concerns 
the wife of an emperor who is left to manage her husband's realm in his absence. 
The emperor's brother, the steward of the land, takes advantage of the emperor's 
absence by oppressing the poor, robbing the rich and attempting to rape the 
emperor's wife. For these crimes the empress has him jailed. Pitying the steward's 
appeals for mercy and believing his promises to reform, she eventually releases 
him. Inevitably, the steward repays her kindness by renewing his advances 
towards her and, when she refuses, hanging her by the hair in an oak tree. By 
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ridiculing the empress's passivity and general incompetence Hoccleve, argues 
Winstead, disparages women's capacity to keep order. The arguably 
autobiographical nature of the earlier parts of the Series suggests that this 'baiting 
of fractious women' also has a personal significance for Hoccleve. Whatever the 
case, by upholding the claim of the friend in the Dialogue that women are unfitted 
for 'rule and governance' (718), Hoccleve diverts attention from the unruliness of 
his own early life. 
The Series ends, at the friend's instigation, with the grim Tale of Jonathas. 
Like Jereslaus's Wife, this tale is a translation of the Anglo-Latin version of the 
tale in the Gesta Rontanorum. It too emphasizes the importance of order and 
reason, transgression of which leads to appalling and graphically described 
physical punishment. John Burrow comments on Hoccleve's choice of tale: 
To produce a moral tale for the benefit of his friend's erring son is 
a comfortable sort of commission. The poet, at last, has the 
advantage of his worried friend, and it is now Hoccleve who speaks 
for society, uttering the common wisdom of the elders of the tribe. 
It is a very different sort of utterance from the solitary grieving with 
which the Series began; and it seems intended to mark the poet's 
struggle to rehabilitate himself. 99 
However comfortable this process of rehabilitation is for the poet, it nevertheless 
involves the unpleasant anti-feminism which was built into the 'common wisdom' 
of Hoccleve's age. 
The Tale of Jereslaus's Wife and the Tale of Jonathas are not, of course, 
the only anti-feminist pieces in Hoccleve's works. Hoccleve reproaches unruly 
women in his poem To Sir John Oldcastle of 1414: 
Some wommen eeke, thogh hir wit be thynne, 
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Wele argumentes make in holy writ! 
Lewde calates! sitteth down and spynne, 
And kakele of sumwhat elles, for your wit 
Is al to feeble to despute of it! (145-149) 
This, of course, is a standard anti-feminist and anti-Lollard piece. It is possible, 
however, that it is written with a particular target in mind -- the unruly and 
potentially heretical Margery Kempe. 
It is. possible that Hoccleve is again thinking of Kempe when he presents 
the duplicitous Fellicula in the Tale of Jonathas: the patron to whom Jonathas is 
dedicated -- Lady Westmoreland -- was a known acquaintance of 
Kempe. 
Fellicula, pretending to have lost the magical brooch which Jonathas has given 
her, feigns insanity: 
Shee mente it nat, but as shee had be mad, 
hir clothes hath shee at to-rent & tore, 
And cryde, 'alias, the brooch away is bore! 
For which I wole anoon right, with my knyf 
My self slee, I am weery of my lyfe. (332-336) 
Fellicula's madness is a devious ploy which, like the boisterous behaviour for 
which Margery Kempe became notorious, is treated with suspicion by others. The 
advice of Jonathas's mother to her son -- 'The compaignie of wommen riotous I 
Thow flee' (353-354) -- is possibly intended by Hoccleve as a veiled warning to 
Lady Westmoreland to avoid the disruptive influence of Kempe. As Chaucer's 
Melibee understands from Solomon, '"it were bettre to dwelle in desert than with 
a womman that is riotous"'. 100 
Whether or not Kempe is the intended target here, Hoccleve's 
condemnation of female 'riot' -- the term Hoccleve uses in the Complaint for his 
224 
own youthful dissolution -- establishes him as a sober and responsible member of 
society who, by condemning female wiles, is finally 'uttering the common wisdom 
of the elders of the tribe'. Hoccleve has rehabilitated himself not by carrying out 
his avowed purpose of pleasing women, but by denouncing their unruliness. 
It is unsurprising that the Complaint, which is so different from the minor 
poems in other respects, also registers a very different attitude towards sickness. 
We may regard Hoccleve, as Eva Thornley does, primarily as a didactic poet; and 
we may, like Penelope Doob, regard the principal function of madness in medieval 
literature as didactic. We may also feel that 'the immediate interest of medieval 
poetry for us [... ] is as poetry, products of literary art, not as documents of 
individual psychology'. 101 But Hoccleve's poetry shows the danger of 
generalizing about either literary or psychiatric history. As we have seen, the 
major works are stylistically diverse; always alongside the conventional moralizing 
there is the relation of personal experience; and Hoccleve describes his madness in 
a personal and exploratory, rather than a didactic manner. One of the dominant 
features of Hoccleve's major poetry is a frequent insistence on a personal 
experience inaccessible to public scrutiny and therefore beyond the purview of 
conventional explanations. 
Although Hoccleve's friends describe the poet's madness in terms of 
medical and literary conventions, Hoccleve presents his madness in individual 
rather than diabolical or stereotypical terms; moreover, he insists that madness is 
an essentially private experience. This is consistent with other aspects of the 
Complaint, such as its anachronistic insistence on its textuality, a feature usually 
associated with private rather than public poetry. 102 At all events, Hoccleve's 
personal description of madness brings into question many entrenched assumptions 
of psychiatric and cultural history; as Hoccleve says regarding his friends' clinical 
speculations: 'it shoop nat as thei seide'. 
Hoccleve not only conceives of madness in subjective terms, but also 
reestablishes himself as a man of reason by stressing his uniqueness and 
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unknowability as a man. Having regained his self-confidence, however, he 
reintegrates himself into his society by very different means. If Hoccleve's 
public-spiritedness extends to a willingness 'to make amends for his own faults by 
burning Oldcastle and heretics, and uttering moral precepts', we should not be 
surprised that his autobiographical account of insanity eventually gives way to 
more didactic uses of the theme of madness. 
103 By the end of the Series, insanity 
is no longer the pitiable affliction of the overworked and underpaid, but the 
spectacular punishment and token of sin. 
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Notes to Chapter 5 
1A brief treatment of some of the ideas in this chapter is given in my 
forthcoming article in History of Psychiatry: '"By cowntynaunce it is not 
wist": Hoccleve's Complaint and the Subject of Madness'. 
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Chapter 6 
'So euyl to rewlyn': Madness and Authority in The Book of 
Margery Kempes 
The Book of Margery Kempe is the work of an illiterate housewife born in the year 
1373 in the Norfolk town of King's Lynn (then known as Bishop's Lynn or simply 
Lynn). It was transcribed by an unknown amanuensis after Kempe's dictation and 
was later rewritten and expanded by a second scribe, a priest of Kempe's 
acquaintance. The only surviving manuscript, the Butler-Bowden manuscript, was 
copied around 1450 and was for many years in the possession of the Carthusians 
of Mount Grace Priory in Yorkshire. The Book is remarkable not least for its 
sophisticated presentation of the significance of madness in the life of an 
uneducated late-medieval laywoman. 
The extent to which the Book is Kempe's personal testimony is unclear. 
Certain passages appear to have been authored or rewritten by the priest-scribe; it 
is even conceivable that although Kempe wrote the Book she invented the scribe. 
In either case, however, it is likely that she had complete control over and 
knowledge of the Book's contents. 2 There is still no scholarly consensus, either, 
on the Book's generic status. Some commentators, including many of those 
interested in the theme of madness, regard the Book as an autobiography. Other 
scholars have been more cautious, pointing out the lack of documentary evidence 
for some of the most significant events in Margery's life. 3 It seems likely that the 
Book is, amongst other things, an early attempt at self-presentation; Kempe would 
hardly have undermined her narrator's spiritual credibility by noting that she is 
considered an epileptic if this were not indeed the case. It is unnecessary, 
however, to decide finally whether the Book is autobiographical or fictional. As in 
237 
the case of Hoccleve's Series, what is important is that the Book gives the 
impression or illusion of autobiography. 
'Madness', says Douglas Gray simply, 'is an important strand in the 
Book'. 4 As well as suffering from a lengthy psychosis at the age of twenty-one, 
Kempe endures allegations of insanity throughout her life. Her early madness, like 
that of the romance heroes Gowther and Beryn, is presented as a moral turning 
point; indeed, madness has a spiritual significance throughout the Book. We need 
not, however, consider Kempe's madness solely in relation to theological ideas. 5 
On the contrary, madness in the Book must be seen in the context of the social and 
psychological pressures which bear on Kempe as she pursues her controversial 
career as a housewife-saint, torn between the active and the contemplative lives. 
This chapter attempts to explain Kempe's psychosis, her spectacular religious 
ecstasies, and the allegations of madness levelled at her in relation to her lifelong 
search for a degree of autonomy and spiritual respectability in the face of domestic 
stress, public obloquy and ferocious clerical opposition. 
In his anthology of autobiographies by madmen, Roy Porter concludes that 
'if the copious writings of the mad are about one thing, it is above all the desire to 
cease to be misunderstood'. 6 Like Hoccleve, Kempe is defensive about her 
boisterous behaviour and continually solicits the understanding and respect of 
others. She wishes to be seen as a Fool for Christ, suffering patiently the reproofs 
of a sinful world for the greater glory of God. Nevertheless, her own frank 
analysis of her early worldly ambitions -- 'Alle hir desyr was for to be worshepd 
of the pepul' (9) -- aptly summarizes her motivation for writing.? As various 
critics have noted, Kempe is 'almost obsessively concerned with the reactions of 
others' and is 'tirelessly absorbed in what she conceives as setting the record 
straight about herself'. 
8 This is hardly surprising, as Kempe's 'cryings' or 
'roarings' are interpreted as evidence of insanity by many in her community. In 
this climate of opposition and controversy Kempe uses the theme of madness both 
to vindicate her own actions and to criticize the behaviour of others. 
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The Book begins with a dramatic event. Soon after the birth of her first 
child, Kempe becomes seriously ill. Until this sickness, she had gone to 
confession, but had avoided confessing one particular sin which is left intriguingly 
unspecified. 'Sche had a thyng in conscyens', we are told, 'whech sche had neuyr 
schewyd be-forn kat tyme in alle hyr lyfe' (6-7). For this sin Kempe had hitherto 
done penance 'be hir-self a-Toone' on the grounds that 'God is mercyful j-now' 
(7). Illness, however, sharpens her sense of duty. Fearing for her life and taunted 
by the devil with threats of damnation, she eventually calls for a priest; yet she is 
deterred from revealing her sin by the severity of her confessor and becomes mad: 
whan sche cam to be poynt for to seyn at ping whech sche had so 
long conselyd, hir confessowr was a lytyl to hastye & gan scharply 
to vndyrnemyn hir er an sche had fully seyd hir entent, & so sche 
wold no mor seyn for nowt he mygth do. And a-noon, for dreed 
sche had of dampnacyon on be to syde & hys scharp repreuyng on 
pat oiler syde, is creatur went owt of hir tuende & was wondyrlye 
vexid & labowryd wyth spyritys half 3er viij wekys & odde days. 
(7) 
The mania which ensues has attracted the attentions of numerous professional and 
amateur psychiatrists, who have variously labelled it a case of 'postpartum 
psychosis, postpartum hysteria, postpartum depression at its manic phase, hysteria, 
and postpartum depressive psychosis with features of agitation'. 9 Postpartum or 
puerperal psychosis is a severe but usually self-limiting alienation which sets in 
shortly after childbirth and can last from between a day and several months. 10 Its 
onset is sudden, and its symptoms include 'confusion, disorientation, 
hallucinations, delusional elements, and profound changes in mood'. 11 It occurs 
most commonly after first deliveries. These features are consistent with the timing, 
circumstances and symptoms of Kempe's illness. 
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The cause of Kempe's condition is harder to determine. As the psychiatric 
historians Hunter and Macalpine note, our knowledge of the precipitating event of 
postpartum pyschosis brings into focus the question of whether the condition 'is 
due to the physical or to the psychological circumstances associated with 
childbearing'. 
12 Unfortunately, the answer to this question remains a matter of 
debate among physicians. The lack of consensus about the etiology of postpartum 
psychosis raises the further question of whether or not the condition is a proper 
subject for sociological analysis. Indeed, one historian who usually insists on 
setting madness in its social context excludes postpartum psychosis from such 
consideration because of its apparently 'physiological basis'. 
13 It is fruitless, 
however, to proceed with such caution in the interpretation of Kempe's psychosis. 
As Sarah Beckwith says, to regard Kempe's madness as entirely organic in origin 
is to isolate her 'in the society of her own madness'. 
14 In any case, such an 
approach is invalid on literary, if not medical grounds. Kempe does not allow us 
to foreclose speculation about her madness by sidestepping its social dimensions; 
on the contrary, she encourages us to consider her mania in the light of her own 
testimony and to regard madness as a social construction. 
The immediate causes of Kempe's insanity are her fear of damnation and 
her humiliation after her tactless confessor's 'scharp repreuyng' -- terms which 
Kempe uses in connection with her detractors at several points in the Book. 15 In 
this sense, religious convention and experience go hand in hand. Like the pious 
but peevish Hoccleve, Kempe combines a deep understanding of the supernatural 
significance of madness with bitter expressions of personal grievance against the 
world. 
Guilt obviously plays a major part in the onset of the psychosis. Kempe 
evidently bears the guilty memory of her unspoken sin. 16 Less obviously, 
perhaps, her confession to a priest after a long period of solitary penance is also a 
source of guilt and confusion. Late-medieval handbooks frequently stressed the 
necessity of full confession. The Book of the Knight of La Tour-Landry contains a 
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cautionary tale about a woman who is damned for failing to confess a sexual sin. 
The grim moral is delivered in the woman's own words: 
beware by me, for whanne y was yonge, for the lust of my flesshe, 
y laye with a monke; &y durste neuer tell it to my confessour, for 
drede of encursinge, dredinge shame and the bobaunce of the 
worlde, more thanne spirituel uengeaunce of myn synne. And yet y 
sende and gaue my good for Goddes sake, herde masses, and saide 
my seruice diligently, wenyng that the good and the abstinence that 
y dede shulde haue clensed the synne that y durste not tell the 
preest, and therein y am deseiued, and lost; for y saie you all, who 
that dothe a dedly synne and confessith hym not therof, and deith 
so, he is dampned perpetuelly. 
17 
The woman's circumstances are uncannily reminiscent of Kempe's. Her story 
illustrates the unconfessed sinner's real fear of damnation and suggests the severity 
of the orthodox condemnation of headstrong women. 
Confessional negligence could also earn dire punishment on earth. The first 
autobiographer of the Western Middle Ages, the German monk Otloh of Saint 
Emmeram, became mad after failing to confess fully his sins. 'Although I had 
done penance in the abbots's presence', says Otloh, 'yet, because I had failed to 
do it before God, against whom alone I had sinned, after a few days I fell into a 
sickness'. 
18 Such precedent lends credibility to Denise Despres's assertion that 
it is Margery's lack of faith in the cleansing power of confession, 
her fear that her sin is too great a burden even for the cross to bear, 
that leads her to the despair and madness that signify both spiritual 
and physical sickness. 19 
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Kempe's anxiety about these issues is understandable given the peculiar conditions 
of the late-medieval laywoman's confession. A late twelfth-century penitential 
gives the following advice to confessors: 
The priest shall have a lowly countenance in confession, and he 
shall not look at the face of the confessant, especially of a woman, 
on account of the obligation of honour; and he shall patiently hear 
what she says in a spirit of mildness and to the best of his ability 
persuade her by various methods to make an integral confession, for 
otherwise he shall say that it is of no value to her. 20 
The need for advice of this sort suggests that priests were not renowned for their 
sensitivity during confession, particularly towards female penitents. 
Later in the Middle Ages the possibilities for the abuse of penitents 
increased. By this time 'repentance and the call to penance were among the most 
popular sermon topics of the day' and penitents were subject to increasingly close 
scrutiny. 21 From the second half of the thirteenth-century onwards, 
the sacrament of penance consisted, for every member of medieval 
English society, of enforced regular confession to the parish priest. 
This was one of the several ways in which thirteenth-century church 
reforms, designed initially to improve pastoral care, exercised 
increasing control over people's daily lives. The rule which obliged 
every layman to confess his intimate misdeeds regularly and in 
minute detail to his parish priest was a considerable intrusion of the 
institutional church into a relationship which had hitherto been a 
private matter between God and the individual. 22 
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This new intrusive spirit is reflected in confessional manuals which 'elaborated a 
rhetoric of sin and censure; intended to instruct, the rhetoric could also be 
deployed by individual confessors to constrict the spirits in their care'. 23 That 
confessors were under considerable pressure to extract complete confessions from 
their parishioners is clear from the frequent warnings against confessional laxity in 
the late Middle Ages. 
The discrepancy between Kempe's confessional practices and clerical 
expectations is clearly another source of anguish for Kempe. Kempe's emphasis on 
her personal relationship with God is not necessarily heretical: it can be seen as 
part of an orthodox movement, encouraged by such works as The Imitation of 
Christ, towards more personal forms of religious devotion. Nevertheless, as David 
Aers remarks, 'unlike Lollards, Margery had not rejected the sacrament of 
confession, but she had sought a potentially Lollard-like autonomy of her 
"souereynes" and the institution'. 24 Moreover, Kempe's unmentioned sin has been 
interpreted biographically as her known association with William Sawtre, a priest 
of Lynn until 1399 and the first Lollard to be burnt for his beliefs under the De 
heretico comburendo statute of 1401.25 That Sawtre is not mentioned in Kempe's 
account of the confession episode may be due to the prohibition against the 
disclosure of names during confession. 26 Whatever the case, Sawtre's name is 
conspicuously absent from the Book: perhaps Kempe, who was acquitted of the 
charge of heresy on several occasions, did not wish to provoke the church 
authorities too far. In this connection, it is significant that the late-medieval 
Church insisted on regular confession partly so that a pastor 'could know his sheep 
and thus not fail to detect heresy'. 27 
Whether or not Kempe is under suspicion of heresy at this point, her tart 
comments about her confessor's attitude suggest a barely muffled animosity. The 
confessor is 'a lytyl to hastye' in rebuking her: an ironically understated phrase 
considering that he is partly responsible for the onset of a terrifying psychosis. 
Whatever other factors played their part, Kempe's madness is related to her 
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confusion about the validity of her pursuit of religious autonomy and to her 
resentment towards an unsympathetic clerical authority. 
Kempe's famous description of her eight-month madness is one of the 
fullest accounts in English literature of a psychotic experience. Unlike Hoccleve, 
who reconstructs his psychosis from the reports of his friends, Kempe appears to 
recall the details of her madness. Internalising her conflict with those around her, 
she substitutes the rebukes of her aggressive confessor with the tormenting 
promptings of devils. These encourage her to speak 'repreuows' words to her 
family and friends, just as her confessor had done to her: 
And in pis tyme sche sey, as hir thowt, deuelys opyn her mowthys 
al inflaumed wyth brennyng lowys of fyr as bei schuld a swalwyd 
hyr in, sum-tyme rampyng at hyr, sum-tyme thretyng her, sum-tym 
pullyng hyr & halyng hir boge nyghth & day duryng pe forseyd 
tyme. And also pe deuelys cryed up-on hir wyth greet thretyngys & 
bodyn hir sche schuld forsake hir Crystendam hir feyth, and denyin 
hir God, hys Modyr, & alle pe seyntys in Heuyn, hyr goode werkys 
& alle good vertues, hir fadyr, hyr modyr, & alle hire frendys. And 
so sche dede. Sche slawndred hir husbond, hir frendys, and her 
owyn self; sche spak many a repreuows worde and many a 
schrewyd worde; sche knew no vertu ne goodnesse; sche desyryd 
all wykkydnesse; lych as be spyrytys temptyd hir to sey & do so 
sche seyd & dede. Sche wold a for-done hir-self many a tym at her 
steryngys &a ben damnyd wyth hem in Helle, & in-to wytnesse 
perof sche bot hir owen hand so vyolently pat it was seen al hir lyfe 
aftyr. And also sche roof hir skyn on hir body a-3en hir hert wyth 
hir nayles spetowsly, for sche had noon Ober instrumentys, & wers 
sche wold a don saf sche was bowndyn & kept wyth strength boge 
day & nygth pat sche mygth not haue hir wylle. (7-8) 
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Compared to Hoccleve's account of mania, this passage is striking for its violence; 
Kempe's madness, unlike Hoccleve's, takes the form of a explicit confrontation 
with those around her. 
The supernatural colouring of Kempe's experience of madness is also 
remarkable. Discussing Kempe's account of her insanity, Charlotte Garrett 
remarks that 
we who read Margery's Book are separated from her account and 
the depths of her experience through time and an acculturation that 
may appear to raise insurmountable barriers. The paradigmatic shift 
from medieval theology to modern scientificism leaves a gap in 
credibility, especially if one looks through a Cartesian or Freudian 
lens. 28 
Nevertheless, Kempe's experience of madness recalls much later cases of religious 
mania. A number of eighteenth-century women confined in a Montelimar hospital 
became affected by similar thoughts of despair and punishment after a mission 
held in the city. One of these women 'absolutely refused to undergo any cure, 
convinced that she was in Hell and that nothing could extinguish the fire she 
believed was devouring her'. 
29 The nineteenth-century French physician Esquirol 
describes the case of another madwoman who exhibits behaviour like Kempe's, 
including sexual anxiety and 'extreme ardor in religious devotion'; also, like 
Kempe throughout her life, she makes vows of chastity, has visions of Christ, and 
suffers delirium and diabolical torments. 
30 These examples, like Kempe's 
experience with her confessor, show the potentially ruinous effects of over-zealous 
religious rhetoric on the minds of pious women. 
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Kempe's psychotic behaviour also follows the conventions surrounding 
literary madwomen. In particular, her self-mutilation recalls the psychotic outburst 
of the grief-stricken Heurodis in the romance Sir Orfeo: 
Sche crid, & lopli bere gan make: 
Sche froted hir honden & hir fet, 
& crached hir visage -- it bled wete; 
Hir riche robe hye al to-rett, 
& was reueyd out of hir witt. 
31 
Such self-destructive forms of maniacal behaviour are associated chiefly with 
women. Ladies in medieval romances, of course, are idealized in terms of their 
physical appearances; in the patriarchal society of medieval England, female 
beauty is perhaps a woman's only widely acknowledged asset of value. By 
disfiguring themselves, therefore, women implicitly reject the value-system that 
reduces them to the condition of passive objects of admiration. 
With the exception of its demonic elements, Kempe's behaviour also 
resembles that of Clerimond in the romance Valentine and Orson, who pretends to 
be 'mad and out of her wytte' in order to escape a forced marriage to an Indian 
king: 
In thys wyse dyd the lady abyde longe tyme, and she made it so 
well that wythin fyftene dayes she semed more lykely a [bleest than 
a resonable woman. She was of so cruell and folysshe maners that 
all the seruauntes lytle and greate, ladyes and damoyselles 
habandoned her, and abode wythout companye. Wyth her teth and 
nayles she bote and scratched all them that wolde approche nere 
her. And by her greate crudelyte she was locked all alone in her 
chambre, and by a wyndowe they gaue her meat and drynke as to a 
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beest. On the daye she made the semblaunt that her maladye 
encreased, and al to rente her clothes. 32 
Clerimond's madness, albeit feigned, resembles Kempe's in its causes as well as 
its symptoms: in both cases madness is a desperate response to unwelcome male 
demands. On a sociological level, Kempe's madness constitutes an individual's 
struggle for autonomy and her rejection of her social role. But insanity is never 
simply a matter of the individual casting off the burdens of social expectation; 
rather, it involves the internalisation of social pressures. Thus Kempe's torments 
are presented not simply as external impositions on an integrated, 
homogenous self but the guilty product of her own struggles for an 
identity which would enable a relative autonomy in relation to 
priest, husband, and others. The cost of this individual struggle is a 
terrifying isolation combined with immense aggression against her 
husband, her community, and the self formed by conflicting 
tendencies within it. 33 
The anti-social aggression which Kempe shows during her madness is typical of 
medieval madpeople in very different social circumstances. Nevertheless, Kempe's 
psychosis may reasonably be seen as a rejection of her role. Her anxiety about her 
unspoken sin and her resentment of her confessor's hastiness is compounded by 
her confusion about her new obligations as a new wife and mother. 34 
Kempe, unlike Clerimond, is not empowered by her experience. Indeed, 
real madness may be more a 'manifestation of cultural impotence and of political 
castration' than an effective strategy of opposition to authority. 35 Nor is Kempe 
'liberated' by her insanity. As Julia Long says, 'if her madness is a sign of her 
rebellion against her role (as indicated by its nature -- revealing violent feelings 
towards herself, her beliefs, her family), it leads her to being even more 
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constrained -- forcefully and literally'. 
36 Kempe's experience of mania is clearly 
very different from Thomas Hoccleve's, taking the form of aggressive 
confrontation with those around her and being dealt with by the sternest measures. 
This is unsurprising given the sensational nature of postpartum psychosis 
which, more than any other form of insanity, constitutes a total rejection of all 
socially acceptable ways of behaving. The condition has always been treated by 
physicians with barely concealed astonishment and deep suspicion. Writing three 
centuries after Kempe, the physician John Woodward describes a puerperal maniac 
in the following terms: 
Amongst others, she had Thoughts of the Devil, as tempting and 
vehemently urging her to ill; particularly to fling her Child into the 
fire, beat its Brains out, and the like; to which she had the utmost 
Horror and Aversion; being naturally mild, good natured, and very 
virtuous. But she found herself so much out of her own Power and 
Guidance [... ] that she was in perpetual fear of doing something 
very ill. [... ] She had frequently Temptations to lay violent Hands 
on herself. 37 
This language, minus its demonic components, is echoed by later physicians. For 
the Victorian alienists Bucknill and Tuke, the puerpally insane woman evinces 
a total negligence of, and often very strong aversion to, her child 
and husband [... ] explosions of anger occur, with vociferations and 
violent gesticulations; and, although the patient may have been 
remarkable previously for her correct, modest demeanor, and 
attention to her religious duties, most awful oaths and imprecations 
are uttered, and language used which astonishes her friends. 38 
248 
There are obvious similarities between Kempe's description of her insanity and 
these much later descriptions of postpartum psychoses in terms of both style and 
content. 39 In each case the madwoman is exempted from blame for her behaviour; 
but there is also a common sense of the madwoman's profound degeneration from 
a virtuous life to one of complete degradation. 
Given the stigma of postpartum psychosis, we may wonder why Kempe 
confesses to her insanity, especially since it apparently involves possession by 
demons -- the most wretched and morally degraded form of madness. And once 
Kempe had decided to include the account of her psychosis in her Book, why did 
she choose to characterize it so bleakly? If she had wished to elicit sympathy she 
might have described her suffering as a pitiable affliction, as Hoccleve does in his 
roughly contemporary Complaint. Alternatively, she might have presented her 
madness as a superior sort of wisdom, like the insanity of a woman cured by 
Kempe's visits and conversation later in the Book. Instead, her madness is a moral 
and social catastrophe. Part of Kempe's purpose in describing her madness is in 
shaming her confessor, as has already been suggested. Kempe also, however, 
presents her insanity negatively, as a temporary aberration from the way of Christ. 
This impulse is elucidated by an observation of Jean Starobinski -- a 
fomidable commentator on both the history of psychiatry and the history of 
consciousness -- on the enabling conditions of autobiography: 
one would hardly have sufficient motive to write an autobiography 
had not some radical change occurred in his life -- conversion, entry 
into a new life, the operation of Grace. If such a change had not 
affected the life of the narrator, he could merely depict himself once 
and for all, and new developments would be treated as external 
(historical) events: we would then be in the presence of the 
conditions of what Benveniste has named history, and a narrator in 
the first person would hardly continue to be necessary. It is the 
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internal transformation of the individual -- and the exemplary 
character of this transformation -- which furnishes a subject for a 
narrative discourse in which "I" is both subject and object. 
Thus we discover an important fact: it is because the past "I" 
is different from the present "I" that the latter may really be 
confirmed in all his prerogatives. The narrator describes not only 
what happened to him at a different time in his life, but above all 
how he became -- out of what he was -- what he presently is. 
40 
According to Starobinski, then, the search for identity through autobiography is 
only necessary after some radical crisis of identity. Kempe -- like her 
contemporary Thomas Hoccleve -- experiences just such a crisis in the form of a 
spectacular mania. Her frankly admitted psychosis, coming at the beginning of her 
Book, marks both her greatest alienation from friends and family and her deepest 
moral abjection, since her madness is clearly bound up with the sins of her early 
life -- in particular the 'fleshly lusts' with which she continually battles. 
In the latter regard Kempe resembles other medieval autobiographers from 
the French abbot Guibert de Nogent to Francois Villon and Thomas Hoccleve, all 
of whom describe the lechery and unruliness of their younger years. Kempe's 
subsequent behaviour, however, is carefully distinguished from the youthful follies 
that preceded and contributed to her madness. Like the period of insanity 
described by Augustine in Book VII of the Confessions, Kempe's diabolical mania 
is the cardinal point in both her life and her work; it functions as a moral 
touchstone against which the divinely-inspired cryings and roarings of the rest of 
the Book may be tested and vindicated and by which the author, in Starobinski's 
words, may be 'confirmed in all [her] prerogatives'. 
41 
Kempe regains her reason following her first vision of Christ: 
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whan sche had long ben labowred in pes & many oper temptacyons 
at men wend sche schuld neuyr a skapyd ne levyd, an on a tym, 
as sche lay a-loon and hir kepars wer fro hir, owyr mercyful Lord 
Crist Ihesu, euyr to be trostyd, worshypd be hys name, neuyr 
forsakyng hys seruawnt in tyme of nede, aperyd to hys creatur 
whych had forsakyn hym in lyknesse of a man, most semly, most 
bewtyuows, & most amyable pat euyr mygth be seen wyth mannys 
eye, clad in a mantyl of purpyl sylke, syttyng up-on hir beddys 
syde, lokyng vp-on hir wyth so blyssyd a chere at sche was 
strengthyd in alle hir spyritys, seyd to hir pes wordys: 'Dowtyr, 
why hast pow forsakyn me, and I forsoke neuyr peT [... ] And 
a-noon be creature was stabelyd in hir wyttys & in hir reson as wel 
as euyr sche was be-forn. (8) 
Kempe is now restored to her previous domestic role, a rehabilitation marked with 
mundane ceremony when the keys to the buttery are returned to her. But Kempe's 
madness is now recognized as a moral, as well as a social aberration. Christ's 
gently admonishing words in the passage above confirm that her madness is a 
punishment for sin, presumably the unspoken sin which she felt unable to reveal to 
her insensitive confessor. 
In the following chapter, Kempe presents herself in a social setting. 
Despite her husband's reproofs and the obloquies of other townsfolk, she is unable 
to leave her sinful pride in her 'pompows aray', insisting on wearing extravagant 
clothing on the pretext that she is born of 'worthy kenred' (9). This concern with 
clothes is, of course, extremely conventional. 
42 Kempe also succumbs to avarice, 
trying her hand first at brewing and then at milling 'for pure coveytyse & for to 
maynten hir pride' (9). Both of these improvident business enterprises end in 
humiliating failure. It is at this point that she finally recognizes her worldly losses 
as 
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be skowrges of owyr Lord pat wold chastyse hir for hir synne. Iran 
sche askyd God mercy & forsoke hir pride, hir coueytyse, & desyr 
pat sche had of be worshepys of be world, & dede grett bodyly 
penawnce, & gan to entyr be wey of euyr-lestyng lyfe, as schal be 
seyd aftyr. (11) 
The vision of Christ is the first of Kempe's many spiritual revelations. After the 
year 1413 these revelations are usually accompanied by the crying, shouting and 
wild gestures which modern readers have variously interpreted as signs of 
psychosis, epilepsy or hysteria. The reactions of Kempe's contemporaries to this 
disruptive behaviour indicate that many of them also believe her to be mad. 
While on a visit to Calvary in 1413 Kempe has a vision of Christ's 
Passion. Her epileptiform behaviour during this vision sets the pattern for future 
ecstasies. Writhing on the ground with outstretched arms, Kempe 
cryed wyth a lowde voys as bow hir herte xulde a brostyn a-sundyr, 
for in be cite of hir sowie sche saw veryly & freschly how owyr 
Lord was crucifyed. Beforn hir face sche herd and saw in hir gostly 
sygth be mornyng of owyr Lady, of Ser lohn & Mary Mawdelyn, 
and of many oiler bat louyd owyr Lord. & sche had so gret 
compassyon and so gret peyn to se owyr Lordys peyn at sche myt 
not kepe hir-self fro krying & roryng bow sche xuld a be ded 
therfor. (68) 
Kempe adopts the conventional behaviour of the sorrowing mother or mater 
dolorosa, typified by Our Lady's display of sorrow in the increasingly emotional 
crucifixion scenes of the late Middle Ages. 43 Thus Kempe identifies throughout 
her life with an exclusively female behavioural pattern. 
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This behaviour, if not properly controlled, could come dangerously close to 
madness. Highly-charged emotional scenes, of course, were common at 
pilgrimage sites in the late Middle Ages; but they were nevertheless regarded with 
grave suspicion by some contemporaries. Fabri, a fifteenth-century German 
pilgrim, disparagingly describes the behaviour of some of his companions at the 
church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem: 
I saw there some pilgrims lying powerless on the ground, forsaken 
by their strength, and as it were forgetful of their own being by 
reason of their excessive feeling of devotion. Others I saw who 
wandered hither and thither, from one corner to another, beating 
their breasts, as though they were driven by an evil spirit. Some 
knelt on the earth with their bare knees, and prayed with tears, 
holding their arms out in the form of a cross. Others were shaken 
with such violent sobs that they could not hold themselves up, and 
were forced to sit down and hold their heads with their hands, that 
they might endure their thick-coming sobs. Some lay prostrate so 
long without motion, that they seemed as though they were dead. 
Above all our companions and sisters the women pilgrims shrieked 
as though in labour, cried aloud and wept. Some pilgrims, out of 
excess of devotion, lost all command of themselves, forgot how 
they should behave, and out of excessive zeal to please God, made 
strange and childish gestures. 
44 
This description recalls the clerical condemnations of dancing frenzies mentioned 
in Chapter 3. But this passage is concerned in particular with the unacceptability of 
certain forms of female behaviour. Fabri's observation that women are particularly 
susceptible to 'excessive feeling of devotion' is consistent with the widespread 
medieval idea that women are governed by their emotions rather than reason. 45 It 
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is hardly surprising that women were held to be more liable than men to diabolical 
seduction or that, as we shall see later, holy laywomen who became too 
enthusiastic were often chastised in the same terms as madwomen. 46 
The variability of the public perception of religious ecstasy is a major 
concern of the Book. Those who witness Kempe's cryings at Calvary and many 
other less sanctified places are astonished, and each advances his own explanation 
of her conduct: 
For summe seyd it was a wikkyd spiryt vexid hir; sum seyd it was a 
sekenes; sum seyd sche had dronkyn to mech wyn; sum bannyd hir; 
sum wisshed sche had ben in pe hauyn; sum wolde sche had ben in 
Pe se in a bottumles boyt; and so ich man as hym thowte. (69) 
This ragbag of explanations for Kempe's behaviour illustrates the diversity of 
interpretations of irrational behaviour in the late Middle Ages. Like Hoccleve, 
however, Kempe gives short shrift to public opinion, firmly rejecting the welter of 
speculation about her behaviour and asserting her identity in personal and spiritual 
terms. 
Kempe finds supporters among all sorts of people, especially the 'gostly 
men' who realize that Kempe is not mad, but blessed. The opinions of these 
churchmen are frequently registered by Kempe, who is, as Sarah Beckwith says, 
constantly 'incorporating the voice of others' into her texts. 47 A particularly 
striking example of this occurs in Chapter 28. Here the passage describing the 
public reaction to Kempe's behaviour at Calvary is followed by a defence of her 
conduct. Kempe makes explicit the negative significance of madness, comparing 
her ecstatic behaviour favourably with the sinful excesses of madmen and -women: 
It is nowt to be merueyled 3yf pis creatur cryed and made wondirful 
cher & cuntenawns, whan we may se eche day at eye boge men and 
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women, summe for los of werdly good, sum for affecyon of her 
kynred er for werdly frenshypys thorw ouyr fele stody & erdly 
affecyon, & most of alle for inordinat lofe & fleschly affecyon 3yf 
her frendys er partyn fro hem, bei wyl cryen & roryn and wryngyn 
her handys as 3yf bei had no wytte ne non mende, & yet wetyn bei 
wel j-now bat bei displesyn God. &, 3yf a man cownsel hem to 
leevyn er seesyn of her wepyng er crying, bei wyl seyn that bei may 
not; bei louyd her frend so meche & he was so gentyl & so kende to 
hem bat Pei may be no wey for3etyn hym. How meche mor myth 
bei wepyn, cryen, & roryn 3yf her most belouyd frendys wer wyth 
vyolens takyn in her sygth & wyth at maner of reprefe browt be-for 
be juge, wrongfully condemnyd to be deth, & namely so spyteful a 
deth as owr mercyful Lord suffyrd for owyr sake. How schuld bei 
suf[fyr y]t? No dowt but bei xulde boge cry & rore & wrekyn hem 
3yf bei myth, & ellys men wold sey bei wer no frendys. Alas, alas, 
for sorwe, bat be deth of a creatur whech hat oftyn synned & 
trespasyd a-geyn her Maker xal be so vnmesurabely mornyd & 
sorwyd. & it is offen to God & hyndryng to be sowlys on eche 
syde. (70-71) 
We have already seen that grief-madness was held in moral suspicion by the 
churchmen. John Hirsch's observation that this passage 'reads like' the 
priest-scribe's interpolation rather than Kempe's own explanation is therefore 
plausible. 48 There are also stylistic reasons for thinking that this passage was not 
written by Kempe. First, the orderly catalogue of causes and the questioning style 
are quite untypical of the Book. More significantly, the passage is unique in the 
Book in that it does not refer explicitly to Kempe or her actions; as the large 
number of conditional subordinating conjunctions indicates, it is a lengthy and 
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theoretical narrative digression. We may tentatively conclude that this justificatory 
passage was either written or significantly reinterpreted by the priest-scribe. 
This was not done, of course, without Kempe's knowledge. Indeed, it is 
possible that Kempe invented the priest-scribe and that in this passage she is 
merely ventriloquising a clerical voice. Whatever the case, Kempe had complete 
control over the contents of her Book. We must therefore see her as prudently 
defending her suspiciously female form of devotion by invoking an ecclesiastical 
condemnation of madness. Kempe's allegiances have temporarily shifted: if her 
madness was precipitated by a Church representative, it is precisely by means of 
such authority that she now establishes her sanity. 
Kempe's remark that those who suffer from grief- or study-induced 
madness 'displesyn God' recalls Fabri's condemnation of the behaviour of 
Jerusalem pilgrims, as does her reference to the madmen's 'inordinat lofe & 
fleschly affeccyon'. The latter phrase also echoes the expression Kempe uses to 
describe the sinful pleasures of her early married life, the guilty memory of which 
may have contributed to her madness. We are therefore encouraged to make a 
qualitative distinction between Kempe's divinely-inspired cryings -- and by 
extension her other religious gifts such as the power of prophecy -- and the sort of 
sinful madness from which she suffers at the beginning of the Book. 
Kempe's need to emphasize the separateness of her devotional tears and her 
earlier psychosis is best understood in the context of the medieval Church's ideas' 
about religious ecstasy. The difficulty of distinguishing between experiences of 
madness and true religious ecstasy has bedevilled the Christian tradition. Both 
conditions involve a loss of identity: the madman loses his memory; the ecstatic, 
etymologically, is 'displaced' or 'beside himself'. Furthermore, both madness and 
mystical experience are more or less inaccessible to rational investigation: students 
of mysticism frequently comment on what William James called the 'ineffability' 
or incommunicability of the experience of religious ecstasy, just as philosophers 
point to the paradox involved in reasoning about madness. Such considerations did 
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not, however, deter medieval writers from discussing madness or divine ecstasy, 
or from distinguishing carefully between them. 
Despite their occasional toleration of ecstatic behaviour, the Church 
Fathers agreed that divine inspiration and insanity were incompatible. The 
psychiatric historian Gregory Zilboorg recounts the famous story of Tertullian's 
association with two female ecstatics. Although the episode predates the Book by 
some twelve centuries, the conduct of these women resembles not only Kempe's, 
but also that of the 'holy madwoman' who appears later in the Book: 
He [Tertullian] wrote of a certain Montanus, who, although a 
heretic, claimed to bring a new light to the Christian world. 
Montanus knew two women, Prisca and Maximilla, and all three 
were apparently somnambulistic and suffered from attacks of grande 
hysterie. Two bishops in succession, St. Zephyrinus and St. Victor, 
were convinced of the prophetic powers of these three sick people, 
and they were accorded 'letters of peace. Tertullian at first thought 
that Montanus and his two friends were 'in error, ' but he soon felt 
convinced that when in ecstasy they really possessed prophetic 
powers. 'There is now among us, ' he relates, 'a sister who is 
favored with the gift of revelations. These come to her in church in 
the midst of the consecration of sacraments, when she enters the 
state of ecstasy. While in this state, she converses with angels and at 
times even with our Lord Jesus Christ. In her rapture she sees and 
hears the celestial secrets, she knows what is concealed in the hearts 
of some people and she gives information about salutary remedies'. 
Zilboorg concludes from this passage that Tertullian considered 'mental diseases 
with religious ecstatic trends as coming from the Lord and his angels'. 49 Of 
course, the claim that these three supposed mystics were in any sense sick or 
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hysterical is Zilboorg's, not Tertullian's. For the Church Fathers, true insanity 
could not be divine in origin. In fact, as David Knowles says, the reduction of all 
mystical phenomena to the category of hysteria is 'against all the traditional 
teaching of the Church on the development of the spiritual life'. 50 A man or 
woman claiming to be a mystic might therefore be either insane or touched by 
God, but surely not both. 'The patristic tradition', says William Ober, 'held that a 
prophet must be conscious and in full command of his faculties'. 
51 This point is 
made clear in Ronald Knox's study Enthusiasm. 'The spokesmen of orthodoxy', 
writes Knox, 'were inclined to view with suspicion any kind of enthusiasm which 
was accompanied by alienation of the senses'. 
52 
The same view is ubiquitous in the writings of late-medieval mystics. 
Walter Hilton emphasizes that true mystical experiences cannot occur without the 
exercise of the faculty of reason: 
For wyte you wele Pat a nakyd mynde or a nakyd ymaginacion of 
Ihesu or of any gastly thynge, with-outyn swetenes of We in 
affeccyon, or with-outyn ly3te of knowynge in resone, it is bot a 
blyndenes, &a way to disceyte, if a man halde it in hys awen sy3te 
mare Pan it is. Perfor I halde it sekyr pat he be meke in his awen 
felynge, and hald pis mynde in regarde nou3t til he may by custome 
& vsynge of pis mynde fele be fyre of We in hys affeccion, & be 
li3t of knawynge in hys resone. 53 
The abandonment of reason leaves the aspiring mystic open to satanic suggestion 
or madness. 'No writers', says Ronald Knox, 'have insisted more strongly than the 
mystics themselves on the fact that ecstasy can be counterfeited by diabolic 
influence, or even by hysteria. One of the privileges of sanctity, it is not 
necessarily a mark of sanctity'. 54 Thus the English mystic Richard Rolle, with 
whose Incendium Amoris Kempe elsewhere claims familiarity, describes how the 
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over-eager mystic can fall into error through physical infirmity or the workings of 
the devil: 
are he be callede of Godd, he gedyrs his wittys by violence to seke 
and to be-halde heuenly thynges, are his eghe be made gastely by 
grace, and ouertrauells by ymaginaciouns his wittes, and by 
undiscrete trauellynge turnes be braynes in his heuede, and 
for-brekes be myghtes and Pe wittes of be soule and of be body; and 
ban, for febilnes of be brayne, hym thynkes pat he heres 
woundirfull sownes and sanges, and pat is no thynge ells bot a 
fantasie caused of trubblyng of be brayne, as a man pat es in a 
fransye, hym thynkes Pat he herys or sese bat na notier man duse, 
and all es bot vanyte and fantasie of be heued; or elles by wyrkyng 
of be enemy bat fenys swylke sowune in his herynge. 55 
Rolle's terms constitute a familiar rhetoric of moral censure: 'fantasie', 'vanyte' 
and 'fransye' are precisely those words used to ridicule the 'madmen' in Chaucer's 
Miller's and Summoner's tales. 
In the light of such disapproving invectives, Kempe's fear of being 
regarded as insane is understandable. When she meets Julian of Norwich in 
Chapter 18, she is advised to obey the will of God in whatever way she pleases, so 
long as 'it wer not a-geyn be worshep of God & profyte of hir euyn-cristen, for, 
yf it wer, pan it wer nowt be mevyng of a good spyryte but rapar of an euyl 
spyrit' (42). Julian does not doubt the pedigree of Kempe's ecstasies; she simply 
recognizes that madness and the devil lie always in wait for the unwary mystic. 
There are indeed many who believe Kempe to be possessed. As a young 
monk of Lincoln says to her, 'Eypyr pow hast be Holy Gost or ellys pow hast a 
devyl wyth-in be, for pat pu spekyst her to vs it is Holy Wrytte, and bat hast bu 
not of piself' (28). Similarly, a steward of Leicester who sexually molests her 
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demands to know, on pain of imprisonment, whether her 'speche' comes 'of God 
er of De Devyl' (113). Kempe is sensitive to these doubts and frequently expresses 
her 'drede for illusyons & deceytys of hyr gostly enmys' (3). That the first book 
should end with a warning about the proper interpretation of divine revelations 
also shows that authenticity is a major concern. 
The real issue here, of course, is not whether Kempe's religious 
experiences were real, but to what extent others believed their veracity. In the late 
Middle Ages prophecy was always a dangerous business associated with deception: 
that other fifteenth-century resident of Lynn, John Capgrave, records the 
attempted assasination of Henry III at Woodstock by 'a clerk, whech feyned him a 
prophete, and sumtyme feyned him frentik'. 56 Kempe was not exempt from 
suspicion. In fact, 'concerning Margery Kempe's status as saintly or mad, 
authentic or hypocritical, public opinion, as reported in her Book, is more divided 
and fragile than it is of any other English or continental mystic'. 57 
Unfortunately, many critics have tended to blur Kempe's careful 
distinctions between insanity and religious ecstasy by seeing her as both saintly 
and mad. This view, we have already suggested, is based on twentieth-century 
scientific assumptions which had little currency in the Middle Ages. As Carolly 
Erikson remarks, 'our lexicon associates visions with mysticism, irrationality, 
occultism, impracticality, and madness. From our point of view the visionary is a 
person who sees what isn't there'. 
58 In our culture, then, mystical experience is 
continuous with delusion and insanity. This may explain the tendency of literary 
critics and psychiatric historians to regard madness and religious ecstasy as 
compatible in the medieval mind. Donald R. Howard avers that Kempe is 'quite 
mad, an incurable hysteric with a large paranoid trend'; but, he continues, 'to the 
medieval way of thinking this was not incompatible with real visions'. This leads 
Howard to speculate that Kempe 'may after all have been the real thing, a holy 
madwoman'. 
59 Derek Pearsall even regards the idea that '"real" fools and 
madmen have a special access to God and God's truth' as 'a common belief in the 
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Middle Ages'. 60 The psychiatric historian Roy Porter also asserts that madness 
was often divine. Basing his argument on Michael Screech's provocative 
contention that 'madness and Christianity go hand in hand', Porter states that 
madness, as well as being seen as a sign of moral turpitude, 'can also be holy, 
either as the innocent otherwordliness of the Pauline fool or as the ecstasy of the 
Old Testament prophet'. 61 But these assertions of what constituted madness in the 
Middle Ages are oversimplified, if not entirely misleading. 
The theme of Pauline folly or the 'Folly of the Cross' is important in the 
Book. Roland Maisonneuve has convincingly demonstrated that Kempe presents 
herself as a 'Fool for Christ'. 62 Throughout her life she suffers with humility the 
scorn of her friends and companions. Indeed, she was 'mery whan sche was 
repreuyd, skornyd, or japyd for ower Lordys lofe, & mych mor mery kan sche 
was be-for-tyme in ke worshepys of Pe world' (13). Moreover, Christ tells her 
that by enduring worldly humiliation she is assured of his grace: ' "Dowtyr, is 
plesith me rith wel, for je mor schame & mor despite pat Pu hast for my lofe, be 
mor joy schalt you haue wyth me in Heuyn, and it is rithful pat it be so"' (185). 
On one occasion during Kempe's visit to the Holy Land, the theme of holy 
folly becomes explicit. Kempe's fellow pilgrims become so exasperated by her 
weeping that they humiliate her by forcing her to wear the white gown of a fool, a 
form of clothing that Kempe elsewhere adopts by choice despite its associations 
with the suspect Flagellant sect: 
They cuttyd hir gown so schort pat it come but lytil be-nethyn hir 
kne & dedyn hir don on a whyte canwas in maner of a sekkyn gelle, 
for sche xuld ben holdyn a fool & be pepyl xuld noy makyn of hiy 
ne han hir in reputacyon. Pei madyn hir to syttyn at be tabelys ende 
be-nethyn alle obey pat sche durst ful euyl spekyn a word. (62) 
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It has been suggested that 'gelle' is 'an extension of gill or jill, a familiar or 
contemptuous term applied to a woman'. 63 At all events, this episode fulfills 
Christ's graphic warning to Kempe that she would be 'etyn & knawyn of the pepul 
of the world as any raton knawyth the stokfysch' (17). 'Holy folly', as Karma 
Lochrie observes, 'clearly carries none of the protection or allowances made for 
the court fool' . 
64 
Kempe's humiliation here recalls her earlier encounter with the 'hastye' 
confessor: in both instances she is forced into the role of madwoman and is 
reduced to silence -- a conventional token of insanity -- by unsympathetic members 
of her community. Clearly, however, the imputations of madness here are 
spurious. Michael Screech argues that, for Erasmus, St Paul himself was seen -- 
and even regarded himself -- as truly insane. But Screech's retention of inverted 
commas when referring to St Paul, Christ and other men and women as 'mad' 
suggests a degree of circumspection. 65 In fact, as Screech's quotations from the 
Praise of Folly make clear, Erasmus noted only the similarity, not the identity, of 
madness and religious rapture. Christian ecstasy, he writes in the Praise of Folly, 
is 'a kind of madness' (insaniam quandam) 'very like dementedness' (dementiae 
simillimum). 66 Kempe's white gown resembles that of Christ as he is 
representated in late-medieval portrayals of the Mocking of Christ, an 
identification which implies both her sanctity and her sanity. 67 The Fool for 
Christ is not truly insane; he is merely held mad by others. 
Nor were the Old Testament prophets considered mad according to 
conventional theology. On the contrary, the Bible 'made it virtually impossible for 
a theologian to admit of any connection between true prophecy and insanity. 68 As 
Ronald Knox concludes in his discussion of Tertullian's involvement in the 
so-called Montanist heresy, 'it seems quite clear that the orthodox of the second 
century [... ] distinguished sharply between prophecy and alienation of the senses'. 
Later, St Jerome expends much energy 'assuring us that the Old Testament 
prophets had all their wits about them' and Albert the Great insists that true 
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prophets, unlike the insane, have control over the onsets of their trances. 69 It is 
therefore all the more significant that it is Jerome who endorses Kempe's tears 
when he appears to her at his tomb in the church of St Maria Maggiore in Rome 
(99). 70 For the Church Fathers, neither the Pauline fool nor the Old Testament 
prophet could be described, from a Christian perspective, as truly mad. 
Medieval medical authorities bolstered the Church's views by stressing that 
madness could produce only the delusion of true prophecy. The seventh-century 
Byzantine author Paul of Aegina, for example, notes that some melancholics 
appear to 'fortell what is to come, as if under divine influence; and these are, 
therefore, properly called demoniacs, or possessed persons'. Paul's 'demoniacs' 
probably refers to the Greek tradition of divine inspiration; nevertheless, Paul 
clearly disbelieves that prophecies in such circumstances are true. In this he 
follows his sixth-century predecessor Alexander of Tralles. 71 
Roy Porter stresses the very different origins of madness and mystical 
ecstasy in Christian theology. 'Satan's voice', he writes, 'mimicked God's, and 
when such diabolical ventriloquism happened, "divine ecstasy" imploded into 
raving madness'. 72 Hence the Church's requirement that visionaries, for example, 
undergo rigorous testing (probatio) to determine the truth of their experiences and 
to rule out the possibility of delusion through mental infirmity. 73 However 
difficult they may have been to disentangle in practice, 'raving madness' and 
'divine ecstasy' were carefully distinguished in medieval theology and medicine; 
orthodoxy permitted no overlap between them. It is true that 'at no time since the 
first century has it been possible to draw a sharp line between several kinds of 
Christian other-worldliness and diabolical or organic madness'. 74 The 
fifteenth-century Alphabet of Tales, for example, relates Jacques de Vitry's 
description of 'devote wommen, pat was so hugelie ravissid with thoght of holy 
liffyng, pat of all Pe day per was no Witt in paim vnto none oute-ward thyng'. 75 
Nevertheless, Christian writers attempted to draw a line between madness and 
religious ecstasy and were extremely anxious that it should not be crossed. 
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The point is neatly illustrated in the autobiography of the thirteenth-century 
Flemish mystic Beatrice of Nazareth, who, like Kempe, longed so ardently for 
Christ that 'very often, destitute of the obedience of her corporeal senses, she was 
not able to discern by their services what was outside her'. 76 Despite this 
apparently insane behaviour, Beatrice was regarded by her biographer as saintly; 
but when she consulted her confessor about the possibility of 'molding herself to 
the way of [... ] madness or foolishness' she was advised against it. 77 The 
confessor's reluctance to endorse her project implies that Beatrice had not yet, in 
his estimation, become insane, and that such a development would be undesirable. 
Clearly, then, madness did not intersect with mystical rapture. 'In Christian 
theology, as in Christian medicine', says Judith Neaman simply, 'true madness 
was never divine' "78 Nevertheless, to 
be mistakenly held mad by others is the lot 
of the mystic. In the thirteenth-century prose legend of St Christina, for example, 
the saint's family and friends suppose her to be possessed on account of her 
bizarre behaviour: 
Therfore after bis whan Cristyn fledde be presens of folke wib a 
wonder loping into wildernesse and in to trees, into be coppys of 
tourys or chirches or of obere hye thinges: hir frendys, supposynge 
hir wode and ful of fendes, atte laste with grete laboure toke hir and 
bonde hir with chaynes of yren. And whan sche so bounden hadde 
soffred many pennuryes and peynes, but moost in sauour of men: 
vpon a nighte sche was holpen of oure lorde, and hir bondys and 
fettirs vndone she skaped aweye and fledde ferre into deserte to 
wodes, and Pere she Iyued as bryddes don, in trees. [... ] be 
mene-tyme she was soghte, founden and taken of hir freendys, and 
tyed with yren chaynes, as she was byfore. 79 
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Christina's friends and family are ashamed of the saint's behaviour. They bind her 
and feed her like a dog with bread and water, a detail which recalls the treatment 
of those heroes and heroines of romance who either become or pretend to be mad. 
Both Robert of Sicily and Clerimond in Valentine and Orson, for example, are 
forced to live as hounds. Most significantly, Christina's treatment allies her with 
Christ, whose family try to restrain him as a madman. 80 
Other female ascetics exhibit mad behaviour. The self-mutilation of St 
Elizabeth of Spalbeck, so reminiscent of Kempe's behaviour during her psychosis, 
appears maniacal to others: 'sche takip her owne cheekys, be whiche byfore sche 
hadde smyten wip many strokes, now with be platte hande now wip be fiste, and 
obere-while wit, her fingers, drawen to-gedir, as sche wolde pulle oute her 
chaules'. 81 The Alphabet of Tales relates the story of a holy nun whose asceticism 
causes her to be considered mad by the other sisters of her order. Only the visiting 
St Patrick, himself a wilderness-dwelling ascetic, recognizes her sanctity: 'sho is 
wise, & ye er bod fules; ffor sho is bettyr pan owder ye or I' . 
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Like these holy women, Kempe is held mad by many in her society. 
Moreover, she appears to encourage allegations of insanity by likening her cryings 
to the ravings of madmen and drunkards. Alcoholic intoxication, we have seen, 
was inextricably linked with madness in the Middle Ages; but it was also widely 
used as a metaphor for mystical experience. 'The drunken consciousness', as 
William James recognized, 'is one part of the mystic consciousness'. 83 In Chapter 
41 Kempe becomes 
so delectabely fed wyth be swet dalyawns of owr Lorde & so 
fulfilled of hys lofe bat as a drunkyn man sche turnyd hir fyrst on 
be o syde & sithyn on be oiler wyth gret wepyng & gret sobbyng, 
vn-mythy to kepyn hir-seife in stabilnes for be vnqwenchabyl fyer 
of lofe whech brent ful sor in hir sowie. Pan meche pepyl wonderyd 
up-on hir, askyng hir what sche eyled, to whom sche as a creatur at 
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wowndyd wyth lofe & as reson had fayled, cryed wyth lowde voys, 
'ke Passyon of Crist sleth me'. (98) 
Similarly, when her mind is 'raueschyd' in church at Candlemas, Kempe is unable 
to bear her candle to the priest with the rest of the congregation and instead 'went 
waueryng on eche syde as it had ben a dronkyn woman' (198). Unlike Hoccleve in 
his Complaint, then, Kempe uses drunkenness as an analogy not for madness, but 
for religious ecstasy. This is risky, for Kempe must beware undermining her status 
as a holy woman by allowing her metaphors to be taken literally. As the ever-wary 
marginal annotator of the Butler-Bowden manuscript insists, Kempe's 
'drunkenness' should be interpreted as a case of ebrietas sancta (98). 
Kempe is well aware of the dangerous potential of her metaphors. A 
passage she quotes from the fourteenth-century compilation Stimulus Amoris 
recognizes the similarity between mystical devotion and insanity or drunkenness at 
the same time as it distinguishes between them: 
'A, Lord, what xal I mor noysen er cryen? Pu lettyst & Pu comyst 
not, & I, wery & ouyrcome thorw desyr, begynne for to maddyn, 
for lofe gouernyth me & not reson. I renne wyth hasty cowrs 
wher-pat-euyr thu wylte. I bowe, Lord, Pei pat se me irkyn and 
rewyn, not knowyng me drunkyn wyth pi lofe. Lord, Pei seyn "Lo, 
Sen wood man cryeth in be stretys, " but how meche is be desyr of 
myn hert Pei parceyue not. ' (154) 
As in the passage justifying Kempe's tears at Calvary, Kempe stresses that the 
difference between drunkenness or madness and divine ecstasy is not simply one of 
degree. Madness here is spectacular and public; mystical rapture, although 
apparently similar, is in truth the 'desire' of the 'heart', inherently private, 
incommunicable and invisible. In Sarah Beckwith's phrase, mysticism involves a 
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'drive towards interiority'. 84 As in Hoccleve's Complaint, Kempe's unease about 
the public perception of her unusual behaviour entails a deep sense of division 
between inner and outer. 
So far we have seen that Kempe, after her initial psychosis, takes pains to 
emphasize her sanity and to show madness as a token of sinfulness. Towards the 
end of the Book, however, Kempe presents madness in a very different light; 
moreover, she herself shows symptoms of a variety of mental and physical 
illnesses. As has already been suggested, retrospective clinical diagnoses are of 
limited value and are in any case often bedevilled by a lack of reliable data; what 
is important here is Kempe's description of her behaviour and the contemporary 
response to it. 
Kempe's freakish behaviour is often attributed to organic diseases other 
than madness. It certainly occurs to both lay and clerical observers that she is 
suffering from a 'sekenes'. One suggested cause is epilepsy, a condition often 
identified with insanity in the Middle Ages. Many people think that Kempe has the 
'fallyng euyl' and spit at her in abhorrence of the disease (105). That Kempe's 
face turns blue during her ecstasies certainly suggests epilepsy, although Trudi 
Drucker prefers a diagnosis of 'convulsive hysteria'. 85 And although it is 
dangerous to apply clinical descriptions to historical cases, Kempe also arguably 
demonstates the chief personality changes associated with epilepsy. 86 The hostile 
reactions of others towards Kempe's 'sekenes' may therefore be attributable to the 
fact that of all illnesses in the Middle Ages, epilepsy was the 'slowest to find a 
plausible pathology of a rational kind'. 
87 
Not all diseases, however, were treated with such revulsion. A friar who 
disbelieves that Kempe's crying is a gift from God courteously asks her to 
acknowledge that her behaviour is caused by a physical illness, a 'cardiakyl er sum 
oiler sekenesse' (151). In return he promises to tolerate her cryings and to 
encourage the people to pray for her. Kempe, of course, refuses the bargain. Thus 
she rejects not only the morally stigmatising allegations of possession and 
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drunkenness, but also any suggestion that her behaviour is attributable to organic 
causes. Eluned Bremner speculates that Kempe's acceptance of a natural cause of 
her tears would have aroused suspicions of demonic possession. 88 This is 
possible, since Kempe's contemporaries tend to see her either as a holy woman or 
as possessed by the devil. But as we have seen, illness could be regarded as 
entirely organic in origin. More plausible, therefore, is Drucker's suggestion that 
if Kempe had attributed her cryings to a 'kendly seknes', 'she would have had to 
forfeit the unique attention she attracted and become only another uninteresting 
sick woman'. 
89 
Nevertheless, Kempe does present herself as sick and even insane. She is 
frequently afraid that mental illness will follow from her many physical 
infirmities. 90 Moreover, she displays the symptoms of mania and melancholia 
long after her psychosis of 1394. Indeed, in assessing Kempe's mental condition, 
we must be careful to distinguish her early postpartum psychosis -- usually a 
self-limiting condition -- from her behaviour in the rest of the Book. As Freeman 
et al. rightly complain, too many critics have 'extended their pronouncements' on 
the initial psychotic episode 'to the whole of The Book'. 91 
Despite the fact that Kempe suffers a 'puerperal breakdown following her 
first child, which seems to have been psychotic in nature', Dr Anthony Ryle finds 
in the rest of the Book no evidence of a 'continuing psychotic process'. 92 Most 
commentators, however, have regarded Kempe's behaviour after her first bout of 
madness as hysterical. Freeman, Bogorad and Sholomskas summarize some of 
their opinions: 
Howard calls Margery Kempe 'an incurable hysteric with a large 
paranoid trend. ' McCann labels her as manifesting 'violent 
hysteria. ' Ryle writes of 'hysterical personality organisation. ' Tuma 
calls her 'hysterical and undoubtedly mentally unbalanced, ' and 
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Ober applies Carter's 1853 classification to Kempe of 'tertiary 
93 hysteria'. 
Despite the popularity of such speculation, there are good reasons for eschewing it 
here. First, the term hysteria has accumulated such a stigma that the responsible 
critic must seriously consider the wisdom of using it as a diagnostic category. 94 
More importantly, the diagnosis of hysteria, however interesting to modern 
physicians, is ultimately anachronistic; it does nothing to further our understanding 
of the Book, Kempe's condition, or medieval reactions to it. Indeed, it seems most 
unlikely that either psychiatry or modern medicine, as Marion Glasscoe claims, 
provides the 'most helpful perspective' in understanding Kempe's symptoms. 95 
A far more promising and relevant approach is taken in Freeman, Bogorad 
and Sholomskas's recent attempt to diagnose Kempe's pathology in terms of 
medieval medical nosology. Freeman et al. argue that Kempe, after her initial 
postpartum psychosis, suffered 'cyclical episodes of mania and melancholia'. 96 
With the exception of her initial psychosis, it is open to question whether a 
medieval physician would have found much in Kempe's behaviour that accorded 
with the traditional definition of mania. As we have seen, the maniac -- according 
to the textbooks -- made insulting or nonsensical remarks and attempted to harm 
himself and others so that he had to be restrained. These are the core behavioural 
symptoms of mania, and they apply only imperfectly to Kempe. 
Nevertheless, Kempe does display some distinctly manic-depressive traits. 
Freeman, Bogorad and Sholomskas point to the pride that she takes in her 'showy 
manner of dressing' as evidence of her mania, quoting Aretaeus of Cappadocias, a 
second-century physician who believed the classic form of mania to be the bipolar 
form. 'The patient who previously was gay, euphoric, inspired and hyperactive', 
says Aretaeus, 'suddenly has a tendency to melancholy; he becomes at the end of 
the attack languid, sad, taciturn, he complains that he is worried about his future, 
he feels ashamed'. After the depressive phase is over, the madmen 'show off in 
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public with crowned heads as if they were returning victorious from the games'. 97 
Freeman compares this latter observation with Kempe's behaviour shortly after her 
postpartum psychosis: 
sche wold not leeuyn hir pride ne hir pompows aray Oat sche had 
vsyd be-for-tym, neipyr for hyr husbond ne for noon ober mannys 
cownsel. And 3et sche wyst ful wel pat men seyden hir ful mech 
velany, for sche weryd gold pypys on hir hevyd & hir hodys wyth 
be typettys were daggyd. Hir clokys also wer daggyd & leyd wyth 
dyuers colowrs be-twen be daggys pat it schuld be pe mor staryng 
to mennys sygth and hir-self be mor ben worshepyd. (9) 
This detail may be interpreted in at least two, not necessarily incompatible ways. 
On the one hand, Kempe's 'pompows aray' can be seen, like the Wife of Bath's 
similar gaudy apparel, as a near-statutory assertion of wealth and status in an 
aggressively competitive capitalist society. 98 But the suggestion that Kempe's 
display is a symptom of mania remains a possibility; sartorial ostentation was 
interpreted as a symptom of mania in women until at least the early twentieth 
century. 99 
Freeman also points out that Kempe suffers from regular bouts of 
melancholia. Kempe never exhibits the morbid desire for death, the intense 
fearfulness, the sense of bodily fragility or the delusions of catastrophe which 
attend melancholics in medical works like Bartholomeus Anglicus's De 
Proprietatibus Rerum. Nevertheless, she does return compulsively to her feelings 
of depression and despair throughout the Book, rather as Hoccleve does in his 
Complaint. 
Perhaps her profoundest and most prolonged melancholic episode occurs 
near the beginning of the Book, in Chapter 4. Here she describes her guilt for 
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consenting to sexual intercourse with a man who, it transpires, is merely toying 
with her: 
Pan fel sche half in dyspeyr. Sche thowt sche wold a ben in Helle 
for be sorw that sche had. Sche thowt sche was worthy no mercy 
for hir consentyng was so wylfully do ne neuyr worthy to don hym 
seruyse for sche was so fals vn-to hym. [... ] but he wythdrowe not 
hir temptacyon but rapar incresyd it as hir thowt. And perfore wend 
sche bat he had forsakyn hir & durst not trostyn to hys mercy, but 
was labowrd wyth horrybyl temptacyons of lettherye & of dyspeyr 
ny al be next 3er folwyng, saue owyr Lord of hys mercy, as sche 
seyd hir-self, 3af hir ech day for the most party too owerys of 
compunccyon for hir synnys wyth many byttyr terrys. & sythen 
sche was labowryd wyth temptacyons of dyspeyr as sche was befor 
and was as for fro felyng of grace as bei that neuyr felt noon. & 
that mygth sche not beryn, & kerfor al-wey sche dyspeyred. Safe 
for be tyme bat sche felt grace, hir labowrs wer so wondyrful bat 
sche cowd euel far wyth hem but euyr mornyn & sorwyn as bow 
God had forsakyn hir. (16) 
We may compare Kempe's melancholia here with Hoccleve's. Whatever religious 
significance Hoccleve's madness may have, its immediate cause is to be found in 
the poet's dire financial situation and his stressful working conditions in the 
understaffed Privy Seal Office. Kempe's melancholia is related to her guilty sexual 
feelings and is much more closely bound up with her religiosity; it springs from 
her theological concern that she is beyond redemption. 
Despite her careful differentiations between insanity and mystical union at 
certain points of the Book, then, Kempe shows symptoms of madness. This is 
initially perplexing. If madness and holiness were regarded as incompatible in 
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orthodox thought, it may seem strange that a medieval woman with aspirations to 
sainthood would risk appearing to be insane. By presenting herself as insane in the 
eyes of others, of course, she places herself in the hallowed company of the 
misunderstood female ecstatics whom she admires so much. But Kempe goes 
further than this, by admitting to symptoms of genuine madness. She must 
therefore find some way of vindicating, or at least softening the stigma of 
madness. 
Towards the end of the first book, Kempe is increasingly accused of being 
mad or possessed by demons. It is therefore fitting that in Chapter 74 she visits 
and helps a number of sick people, including a woman assailed by demons. Like 
Kempe during her psychosis and her depressive bouts later in the Book, this 
woman is tormented by the devil with threats of damnation and lecherous 
thoughts. Kempe, understandably, feels sympathy for the woman and is able to 
comfort her with kind words and prayers. 
Chapter 75 describes Kempe's cure of a woman suffering from postpartum 
psychosis. This is a thematically and structurally important event whose similarity 
to the description of Kempe's postpartum psychosis has not escaped critical 
notice. 100 Its inclusion suggests that Kempe is a cannier artist that is often 
allowed. Nevertheless, Kempe, with typically ironic ingenuousness, does not 
acknowledge the similarity between what are arguably the two most memorable 
events in the Book. Despite Lynn Staley's observation that there is no comfortable 
closure or circularity in the Book, this episode, like the preceding one, seems 
intended to mark the end of Kempe's spiritual journey from madness to 
saintliness-101 The circumstances of this episode indicate that the onetime 
madwoman has become a locally revered holywoman with both the power and the 
authority to restore the deranged to their senses. 
As Kempe is praying in the Church of St Margaret -- the site of earlier 
miracles -- a distracted man approaches her and implores her to visit his wife who, 
like Kempe at the beginning of the Book, has gone insane shortly after childbirth. 
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The madwoman's symptoms, as described by her husband, are similar to those 
suffered by Kempe: 
As Pe sayd creatur was in a chirch of Seynt Margaret to sey hir 
deuocyons, Per cam a man knelyng at hir bak, wryngyng hys 
handys & schewyng tokenys of gret heuynes. Sche, parceyuyng hys 
heuynes, askyd what hym eylyd. He seyd it stod ryth hard wyth 
hym, for hys wyfe was newly delyueryd of a childe & sche was owt 
of hir tuende. '&, dame, ' he seyth, 'sche knowyth not me ne non of 
hir neyborwys. Sche roryth & cryith so pat sche makith folk euyl 
a-feerd. Sche wyl boge smytyn & bityn, & perfor is sche manykyld 
on hir wristys. (177-178) 
The passage suggests that the medieval insane led a far from carefree life and that 
madness, far from being a liberating experience, involved extreme suffering. In 
David Aers's provocative words, 'perhaps there is an anxiety in this isolating 
confinement of the female victim which Foucault's "history" of madness might not 
lead one to expect in this period'. 102 
Eventually the woman's incessant crying so exasperates her neighbours that 
she is confined in a room at the outskirts of the town. Kempe, who converses with 
her easily and pleasantly, helps restore her to her right mind; the madwoman 
regards everyone else as possessed by demons and tries to attack them: 
So sche went forth wyth hym to se Pe woman. &, whan sche cam 
in-to Pe hows, as sone as Pe seke woman at was alienyd of hir 
witte saw hir, sehe spak to hir sadly & goodly & seyd sehe was ryth 
wolcome to hir. & sehe was ryth glad of hir comyng and gretly 
comfortyd be hir presens, 'For 3e arn, ' sehe seyd, 'a ryth good 
woman, &I behelde many fayr awngelys a-bowte 3ow, & kerfor, I 
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pray 3ow, goth not fro me, for I am gretly comfortyd be 3ow. ' 
And, whan oiler folke cam to hir, sche cryid & gapyd as sche wolde 
an etyn hem & seyd bat sche saw many deuelys a-bowtyn hem. 
Sche wolde not suffyrn hem to towchyn hir be hyr good wyl. Sche 
roryd and cryid so boge nyth & day for be most part bat men wolde 
not suffyr hir to dwellyn a-mongys hem, sche was so tediows to 
hem. Pan was sche had to be forthest ende of be town in-to a 
chambyr bat be pepil xulde not heryn hir cryin. & per was sche 
bowndyn handys and feet wyth chenys of yron bat sche xulde 
smytyn no-body. (178) 
The madwoman's aversion to being touched obviously indicates a deep fear of 
defilement by human contact. Indeed, Kempe asks us to respect this madwoman as 
an irrational sage who perceives in her delirium the sinfulness of normal 
humanity. Thus the madwoman is clearly identified as Kempe's spiritual ally. 
Indeed, the language in which she is described recalls the terms applied to Kempe 
elsewhere in the Book: Kempe's behaviour in the churches of London, for 
example, is described as 'tediows' to the 'curatys & preistys' (245). Moreover, 
unlike the possessed woman in Chapter 74, the madwoman is not a virgin, 
corroborating Christ's early message to Kempe that he loves 'wyfes also' (49). In 
other ways, the episode is problematic: the sympathetic attitude towards this 
woman's mania is inconsistent with Kempe's previous insistence on the 
separateness of madness and blessedness. In fact, Kempe now eschews her earlier 
moral distinction between madness and divine inspiration, emphasising the 
holiness, rather than the sinfulness and abjection of madness. 
Despite its rationale in terms of social harmony, the madwoman's removal 
to the fringes of the town has a positive spiritual significance. Michel Foucault 
stresses the symbolic significance of the madman's liminal position in 
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late-medieval society. If he was not cast adrift on one of Foucault's imaginary 
ships of fools, the madman was assigned a 
liminal position on the horizon of medieval concern -- a position 
symbolised and made real at the same time by the madman's 
privilege of being confined within the city gates: his exclusion must 
enclose him; if he cannot and must not have another prison than the 
threshold itself, he is kept at the point of passage. He is put in the 
interior of the exterior, and inversely. 103 
The madman's simultaneous inclusion within and exclusion from society suggests 
that he was regarded as only partly belonging to the world. 
The insane were not the only elements of medieval society to occupy such a 
position. One is struck particularly by the similarity between the medieval 
madman's marginal location and that of the medieval anchorite, who was typically 
walled up in a tiny cell adjacent to a church, with only a small window to the 
outside world, or a narrow squint into the church itself. The anchorite's cell was 
fashioned like a tomb, so that her confinement signified death to the world. 104 
Thus the anchorite, like the madwoman in the Book, occupies what the sociologist 
Victor Turner calls a 'betwixt and between' position in society, on the threshold 
(Latin limen) between this world and the next. 105 
Whatever the associations between the mad and religious recluses, the 
madwoman visited by Kempe is certainly close to the spiritual world. The attitude 
towards her madness is therefore quite different to that in Kempe's description of 
her postpartum psychosis, which was seen as a token of sinfulness. Like 
Langland's 'lunatyk lollares' or Geoffrey of Monmouth's Merlin, this madwoman 
combines elements of raving madness and holiness or moral insight. The 
madwoman's sanctity is further suggested by the fact that, like the female saints of 
the prose legends, she is roughly treated by her family and neighbours. When she 
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sees angels surrounding her visitor, then, she vicariously endorses Kempe as a 
'ryth good woman' (178). 
The main purpose of this vignette, of course, is to establish Kempe as a 
healer of the sick and insane, like other holy men and women referred to in the 
Book. Kempe is therefore obliged to stress the woman's genuine madness. The 
unexpected and unorthodox implication of the anecdote is that such madness is not 
incompatible with divine inspiration. As we have seen, this contradicts both 
patristic authority and the warnings of contemporary mystics. It also contrasts 
radically with the passage describing Kempe's cryings and roarings at Calvary. In 
the earlier passage, Kempe, in the voice of the priest-scribe, invokes an 
authoritative moral distinction between sinful madness and divine inspiration, and 
makes it clear that Kempe's behaviour is of the latter sort. This, as we have seen, 
is a distinction Kempe insists on elsewhere in the Book. Here, however, the 
distinction is abandoned: far from separating man from God, madness has become 
a token of saintliness. Thus Chapter 75 shows Kempe's readiness to employ very 
different conceptions of madness to achieve different effects. Clearly, Kempe is 
more interested in validating her own behaviour than in maintaining a consistent 
position, orthodox or otherwise, on the relationship between insanity and 
inspiration. This in itself is a significant conclusion, in view of the desire of many 
medieval critics to regard medieval texts as coherent expositions of a single 
theological perspective. 
The comparison between the anchorite and the madwoman at 'be forthest 
ende of Pe town' implies not only her sanctity, but her social alienation. Like an 
anchorite, and like Kempe at the beginning of the Book, this woman is unable to 
communicate, deprived of subjectivity and social interaction. In this connection, 
we may recall a monk's gruff aside to Kempe in Chapter 13: '1 wold pow wer 
closyd' in an hows of ston pat per schuld no man speke wyth Pe' (27). There is no 
critical consensus about the precise meaning of these words. Possibly he wishes 
that Kempe were an anchorite; or perhaps he wants to have her confined as a 
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madwoman. In either case, Kempe's incarceration would neutralize the threat to 
public order posed by her unusual behaviour. As we shall see shortly, male 
authorities regarded madwomen and secular holy women as threats to social 
stability and upbraided them all in similar language. 
Despite her abjection, the madwoman is calm in Kempe's presence and is 
eventually returned to her senses thanks, we are told, to her visitor's frequent 
visits and prayers. Kempe herself does not claim to be able to perform miracles -- 
a precondition for sainthood. Nevertheless, the woman's cure is generally 
considered 
a ryth gret myrakyl, for he pat wrot Pis boke had neuyr be-for pat 
tyme sey a man ne woman, as hym thowt, so fer owt of hir-self as 
pis woman was ne so euyl to rewlyn ne to gouernyn, & sithyn he 
sey hir sad & sober a-now, worschip & preysyng be to owr Lord 
wythowtyn ende for hys by mercy & hys goodnes bat euyr helpith 
at nede. (178-179) 
The invocation of the original scribe at this point is striking. This interjection, 
unlike the preceding passage, recalls the priest-scribe's justification of Kempe's 
outrageous behaviour at Calvary. Once again madness is condemned by a 
representative of orthodoxy; and again, Kempe's actions -- this time in the 
interests of public order -- are comfortably endorsed by a male authority. 
Moreover, Kempe's comment on the previously 'ungovernable' condition 
of the madwoman briefly but effectively reinvokes a rhetoric of male censure. In 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance, the terms 'rule' and 'governance' had 
widespread application. Very frequently, however, they were used in antifeminist 
contexts: male governance was considered necessary to suppress female autonomy. 
The author of the fifteenth-century Dives and Pauper gives the following warning: 
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And therfor seith the lawe that the offys of teching & chastysyng 
longyth pout only to the buschop but to euery gouernour aftir his 
name & his degre, to the pore man gouernynge his pore houshold, 
to the riche man gouernynge his mene, to the housebond gouernyng 
his wif. 106 
That the author feels such instruction necessary implies his concern that powerful 
women might reject male rule: for every Constance there is a Wife of Bath. Such 
anxiety is evident in even the least historically-specific genres of medieval 
literature: thus, in the popular lyric La Belle Dame Sans Merci, an implacable 
mistress tells her enthralled suitor that she will not 'be Rulyd by mannys 
gouernance'. 107 
Since such a degree of autonomy was generally abhorred as unnatural and 
even mad, the causal connection between madness and indiscipline was reversed, 
so that insane women were described as 'ungovernable' or 'unrulable'. These 
terms often referred to the relationship between the madwoman and her relatives, 
especially with the rise of the bourgeois nuclear family. In his examination of the 
case notes of the seventeenth-century physician Richard Napier, Michael 
MacDonald has shown the close connection between female insanity and domestic 
disobedience. The 'frantic and raging' Rose Bateman, for example, would 'not be 
ruled by her parents and friends'. 
108 Indeed, madwomen were often described as 
'unrulable' or 'ungovernable' until at least the nineteenth century. 109 
Lay religious women were frequently condemned for similar reasons and in 
identical language. A sixteenth-century Spanish writer, for example, complains 
that some of these women 
no longer want to take advice, they do not want to submit 
themselves to anyone. [... ] Such women are obedient only in little 
ways, [... ] but in all the rest, in important matters, they question 
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everything, and argue, and want to govern, and even rule their 
masters. 110 
Kempe, of course, is constantly made aware of such attitudes. In Chapter 43, for 
example, an anchorite demands that Kempe be 'gouernyd' by him (103). Kempe 
refuses, saying that God does not wish this, indicating that divine will overrides 
male governance. Kempe's unruliness is widely recognized. Everywhere she goes 
she is accused of being a heretic and of abandoning her proper role; thus the 
inhabitants of the countryside around Beverley advise her to go home and spin like 
other women (129). 111 Moreover, her autonomy is considered to have a 
corrupting effect on others. In Beverley, for example, she is accused of advising 
Lady Greystoke, the daughter of Lady Westmoreland, to leave her husband -- an 
allegation she vehemently denies (133). Kempe's cure of the madwoman is 
therefore important in vindicating her reputation as a woman of probity. By 
bringing an unruly madwoman to order, she acquits herself of the charge of being 
a disruptive influence. 
Chapter 75, then, contains a characteristically stealthy, double-edged 
attempt by Kempe to vindicate her behaviour. On the one hand it suggests that 'the 
holy might be located in areas where we are not usually prepared to find it': since 
the madwoman is a seer, she is able to endorse Kempe's sanctity. 112 
Nevertheless, the potentially heretical implications of such subjective validation 
are shrewdly offset by other, more orthodox, strategies. First, Kempe's cure of the 
madwoman places her comfortably in the eminent company of those like Sir 
Gowther who abandon the madness of sin to become saints with the power to cure 
madness. Furthermore, by couching the madwoman's previously 'ungovernable' 
condition in the well-established rhetoric of male censure, Kempe emphasizes her 
religious and political orthodoxy and negotiates the dualistic 'either/or' thinking 
that is applied to her throughout the Book. 113 Describing her privileged 
relationship with God in language well-pleasing to His representatives on earth, 
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she ensures that her vicarious authority is endorsed, as it were, from both above 
and below. Recent research suggests that this careful balancing of orthodox and 
potentially dangerous ideas is a feature of other late-medieval visionary 
autobiographies. 
114 
Regarded as an historical document, the Book provides some simple 
conclusions about the history of madness. For example, both Kempe's experience 
of insanity and that of the madwoman in Chapter 75 indicate that madness 
involved suffering and anxiety rather than a life of ease. In this regard, the 
treatment of madness in the Book corresponds with that in Hoccleve's Series. 
Although Hoccleve and Kempe would have felt little kinship, there are other, 
more fundamental similarities between the Series and the Book. Stephen Medcalf 
notes that Hoccleve and Kempe, both apparently autobiographers, were also 
mentally disturbed. 
115 Indeed, in both the Series and the Book insanity has an 
important structural function: as a radical crisis of identity, madness constitutes the 
inner transformation necessary for the writing of autobiography. 
Kempe's bouts of melancholia are isolating and private experiences; her 
apparent mania, on the other hand, renders her a public spectacle. Her experiences 
of madness are therefore a source of alienation and self-consciousness. Sarah 
Beckwith fairly refers to Kempe's 'acute sense of audience', concluding that 'in 
place of the "harmony of her inner and outer life" which Denise Despres has 
found in the book, I find rather a disjunction of inner and outer'. 116 Like 
Hoccleve, Kempe seeks to refute public allegations of madness by relating her 
subjective experiences; as she herself puts it, 'kei knewyn ful lytyl what sche felt' 
(69). Thus her account of madness, like Hoccleve's, challenges the widespread 
assumption that medieval authors spoke only with a public voice. 
In other ways Kempe's and Hoccleve's experiences diverge significantly. 
The Book illustrates differences between the female and male experiences of 
madness. Hoccleve's madness is precipitated by a combination of professional and 
financial anxieties. Kempe's madness, on the other hand, is the product of her 
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confusion and guilt about her relation to her husband, her uncontrollable sexual 
urges and the oppressions of various civic and ecclesiatical figures. 
Kempe's social rehabilitation, too, is in a sense more ambiguous and 
difficult than Hoccleve's. Hoccleve's bid for respectability depends upon his 
eschewing the stigma of insanity and unruliness. Kempe, on the other hand, not 
only behaves in such as way as to court allegations of insanity, but also presents 
symptoms of genuine madness. The public reactions to Hoccleve and Kempe after 
their recoveries also differ markedly. Although Hoccleve's friends think him still 
mad after his recovery and shun his company, their attitude towards him is 
essentially sympathetic; Kempe, like many female ecstatics, is widely regarded as 
possessed by demons. This attitude stems from the widespread clerical view of 
women's religious activities as interchangeably appealing and dangerous; 117 and it 
explains why Kempe paradoxically complements her insistence on the separateness 
of madness and divine ecstasy with the much riskier view that madness can be a 
blessed condition. The very inclusion of such an unorthodox viewpoint attests to 
the radicalism of the Book. But in an age in which religious heterodoxy carried 
with it the danger of burning at the stake, Kempe treads carefully. Like the 
Hoccleve of Jonathas and Fellicula, she ends her book by invoking the traditional 
male rhetoric on female unruliness in order to establish herself as a woman of 
probity. 
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Conclusions 
Despite the dangers of generalizing about madness, we can draw a number of 
broad conclusions about the significance of madness in the Middle Ages and the 
function of insanity in the medieval texts discussed here. Some of these 
conclusions belong to the domains of psychiatric or cultural history, others to 
literary criticism. Since we have so far not endeavoured to separate purely literary 
considerations (whatever that phrase might mean) from other concerns, there is no 
need to do so now. In any case, it is seldom either possible or necessary to decide 
when a theory is illuminating a text or vice versa. 
In the Introduction it was suggested that rather than interpret texts in the 
light of a pre-established theory, we must be critically flexible, taking account of 
the different ways in which medieval writers adapted the available concepts of 
madness to their artistic design and vision. It was also suggested that the lack of 
critical consensus about the definition of madness has been a considerable, but 
hitherto unacknowledged obstacle to discovering its significance. In particular, the 
tendency of critics to conflate the concepts of madness and folly has led to 
alarmingly widespread disagreement about the meaning of madness. In the Middle 
Ages, it was suggested, madness was not synonymous with folly; on the contrary, 
legal, theological, and literary works distinguished madness from folly in all of its 
forms. Although frequently associated with folly of various kinds, 'madness' or 
'woodness' usually referred to mania or melancholia. Finally, madness, contrary 
to a vast body of literary critical opinion, was not generally considered a blessed 
condition. 
Even working with a relatively clear definition of madness, the significance 
of madness in medieval literature and society is less one-sided than certain 
psychiatric historians and literary critics have implied. Perceptions of madness and 
madmen depended on a writer's social position. Theologians stressed the causal 
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connection between insanity and spiritual turpitude. Medical writers, however, 
generally regarded madness as an organic affliction to be treated by rational 
methods. Moreover, as Hoccleve's Complaint suggests, the theory of demonic 
possession was not credited by all elements of medieval society. 
The few texts examined here exhibit a striking diversity of attitudes 
towards madness. Sometimes madness is used as a metaphor for sinfulness or 
social disintegration; at other times it is interpreted as an occasion for sympathy, 
or even, in exceptional circumstances, as a sign of sanctity. Many literary texts 
contain a number of conflicting views of madness. Medieval authors clearly saw 
madness as a relatively fluid concept which could be used to achieve various, often 
contradictory effects. The language of madness can be used either to articulate 
condemnation of the politically or socially unorthodox or to register dissent from 
social or political norms. Indeed, the subversive potential of madness lies in its 
protean nature, its capability of bearing different meanings in different 
circumstances. 
The powerful association of madness and sin ensured that insanity 
functioned, in didactic contexts at least, as a metaphor for sin and its punishment. 
Madness has this significance in all of the works examined here. As the medieval 
chivalric romances demonstrate, however, madness and allegations of madness can 
have secular, as well as Christian meanings. As well as evoking a Golden Age of 
chivalry, Malory's works present madness as the outcome of a struggle for a 
degree of autonomy within a competitive and repressive society. At this level, 
Malory, quite as much as Margery Kempe, presents madness in a recognisably 
fifteenth-century social context. In fact, many of the texts we have examined 
undermine the view that madness had no social or political significance until after 
the Middle Ages. 
Some romances, especially clerical adaptations like Sir Gontiher or the Tale 
of Beryn, emphasize the sinfulness of madness. Gowther, Robert of Sicily and 
Beryn -- like Margery Kempe -- all progress from unholy to holy folly via a period 
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of penitential madness. In these romances madness is clearly viewed as an 
undesirable and often sinful state. Other romances draw on the increasingly 
positive view of the Wild Man and therefore reflect a more tolerant, even 
reverential attitude towards the mad hero. Malory's works, for example, view the 
mad knights as bestial but well-natured and present madness as an extreme 
symptom of social alienation from a culture which leaves little room for 
autonomous self-expression. 
The latter point is vividly contextualized in the works of Chaucer and 
Gower. Both writers reflect, in their different ways, the language of madness in 
which the representatives of official culture stigmatized the peasantry at the time 
of the Peasants' Revolt. In the dream in Book I of the Vox, madness is imputed 
collectively to the unrulable peasantry and is seen as the consequence of their 
violation of the divinely-ordained social order. In this way, opposition to authority 
is rescripted as insanity. The peasant disorder necessitates the dreamer's pathetic 
life of exile and madness. Thus Book I describes both the contemptible frenzy that 
leads to the breaking of social bonds and the pitiable mental distraction of others 
that follows. In this sense, the Vox affirms Malory's view of madness as an 
implicit rejection of civilized values. Gower's view of human nature, however, is 
more pessimistic and more typically medieval than Malory's. For Gower insanity 
is linked to the dominant concerns of the late Middle Ages, Original Sin and the 
Last Judgement. The Vox is a lament for mankind as it degenerates to the level of 
beasts through the sinful madness of the peasantry. 
In the Miller's and Summoner's tales Chaucer is also concerned with the 
relation between madness and social class. Whereas the Vox is characterized by a 
terrible sincerity, however, these tales are essentially parodic or satirical. Peasant 
madness is again described and defined by the distinctly clerical discourse of 
reason. Chaucer, however, deconstructs Gower's ideological opposition of 
madness and reason. In the Miller's Tale the allegations of madness against the 
carpenter, however deserved, are undermined by a variety of formal techniques 
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which cast doubt upon traditional clerical interpretations of madness and reveal the 
constructedness of insanity. By inviting us to compare one dubious allegation of 
madness with another, the text solicits suspicion about the language of madness 
and the social groups that make use of it. Similar 'undercutting' techniques are at 
work in the Summoner's Tale, in which the imputations of peasant madness are 
deflected by Jankyn's foolish, satirical but essentially conservative scientific 
demonstration. The tale nevertheless has radical implications. Jankyn's solution to 
the problem of the fart is couched in scholarly terminology which recalls the 
unpleasant class antagonism of the Miller's Tale. 
Predictably, Chaucer's fabliaux present their mad protagonists as objects or 
comic spectacles. Other works of literature, however, emphasize a different side 
of insanity. In the major works of Hoccleve, madness does not function simply, or 
even mainly, as a spectacular moral emblem. Indeed, if discovering the 
significance of madness in the romances involves looking beyond the moral 
surface of the texts, the case of Hoccleve suggests the dangers of privileging 
`deep' Christian interpretations of texts at the expense of `surface' meanings. The 
Series, it has been seen, concerns the social as well as the moral meaning of 
madness. Hoccleve rejects common wisdom about madness, suggesting that 
insanity is subjective, secret and hidden. This contradicts a basic assumption of 
psychiatric history which would never have attained such currency if translations 
of Hoccleve's works, like Margery Kempe's, were more easily available to 
historians of psychiatry. 
Hoccleve's writings about madness, like the medieval romances, attest to a 
growing interest in expressions of individual experience. For I! occlevc, as for the 
knights of the romances, recovery from madness involves feelings of deep shame 
and self-consciousness. Furthermore, five centuries before Freud, madness is 
perceived by a medieval author as the 'enemy within'. Indeed, Iloccleve's Series, 
Kempe's Book and the medieval romances all point to the close association of 
madness and subjectivity or self-consciousness. In the works of iloccleve and 
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Kempe, madness constitutes, among other things, the radical crisis of identity 
which is the prerequisite of autobiographical writing. 
Like the Series, The Book of Margery Kempe suggests the one-sidedness of 
many modern assumptions about madness. One of the most widespread of these is 
that madness and religious devotion went hand in hand. Kempe generally upholds 
the orthodox opinion that insanity and divine ecstasy are essentially incompatible; 
like the moralizing Hoccleve of the end of the Series, she frequently distances 
herself from the mad or riotous behaviour of others in order to validate her own 
unusual conduct. 
Nevertheless, the Book, rather like Hoccleve's Series, presents another, 
more positive attitude towards madness. It is perhaps because Kempe herself 
exhibits symptoms of what many of her contemporaries regard as madness that the 
madwoman whom she brings to health in Chapter 75 displays the signs of divine 
inspiration. Even the insane, Kempe implies, can be blessed. Thus, while 
describing the madwoman's cure as a triumph of male 'governance' over female 
'unruliness', Kempe implies that a woman, in all her madness, may perceive and 
interact with an order higher than that supervised by men. Like Iloccleve, Kempe 
overturns orthodox ideas about madness to gain credibility in her own right. Both 
authors write about madness not simply because it is a convenient metaphor for 
sinfulness, but because by doing so they are able to express and eventually 
overcome their sense of social alienation. In this sense, Kempe's Book, of all the 
texts considered here, constitutes the most detailed illustration of madness as an 
individual response to the often oppressive ideologies of late medieval society. 
Whatever conclusions about madness we have arrived at, and however 
much a full understanding of madness in literature depends an appreciation of 
historical context, it is hoped that this discussion has contributed to the 
appreciation of the aesthetic qualities of some of the works discussed. The 
discussion of madness in Chaucer's tales, for example, increases critical 
understanding of their well-known formal complexity. Similarly, the analysis of 
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representations of madness in The Book of Margery Kempe reveals Kempe's too 
rarely acknowledged literary virtuosity. 
This dissertation also raises a more general point about late-medieval 
literary aesthetics. All of the works discussed here manipulate a variety of often 
incompatible attitudes towards madness. The consideration of such textual 
contradictions is no doubt encouraged by recent trends in critical theory; but it is 
also sanctioned by the inherently inclusive nature of many late-medieval texts, by 
what might be called a Gothic tendency to juxtapose apparently incongruent ideas. 
The critic's task is not necessarily to discern the aesthetic consistency of medieval 
texts, but to draw out and account for the multiple perspectives they contain. 
Perhaps the chief theoretical conclusion of this dissertation, however, is 
that the common deterministic approach to the history of madness, tacitly endorsed 
by scholars as diverse as Michel Foucault and Penelope Doob, is less valuable than 
one which takes account of the interactions between subjects and history. On the 
one hand, the language of madness is used to articulate and consolidate political 
and moral authority; but representations of madness may also be used by 
individuals to question or subvert orthodox values. After so long a period of 
resistance, it is necessary for historians and literary critics to take account of the 
individual voices, as well as the official pronouncements, of the Middle Ages. 
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